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OVERRIDING MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT REFUSALS: HOW 
MUCH PROCESS IS “DUE”? 
SAMUEL JAN BRAKEL* and JOHN M. DAVIS, M.D.** 
ABSTRACT 
Getting mental health treatment to patients who need it is today a much 
belegaled enterprise.  This is in part because lawmakers have a skewed view of 
the enterprise, in particular regarding the treatment of patients with 
antipsychotic medications.  The properties and uses of these medications are 
misunderstood by many in the legal community, with the drugs’ undesirable 
side effects typically overstated and the remedial effects undersold when not 
outright ignored.  One specific legal effect has been to accord to mental 
patients a substantively outsized right to refuse treatment that comes with a 
correspondingly action-stifling dose of procedural safeguards, this despite the 
patients’ frequent lack of capacity to exercise the right wisely and the bad 
personal and systemic consequences that flow from that.  The purpose of this 
Article is to provide better balanced and accurate evidence of the properties of 
antipsychotic drugs so as to convince lawmakers and advocates for the 
mentally disabled that it is safe to roll back some of the more 
counterproductive legal strictures on the effort to provide mental health 
treatment.  An analysis of selected cases and statutes is intended to illustrate 
that such a roll back can and should be applied to a variety of legal and 
institutional contexts. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1991 we published an article in the Indiana Law Review entitled Taking 
Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental Patients and the Right to Refuse 
Treatment.1  In it we argued that extending a legal right to refuse mental health 
treatment, at least in the sense of its being protected by potentially multiple 
judicial hearings, to involuntarily committed mental health patients was a legal 
and logical anomaly—one that had bad consequences for those patients who 
exercised the right, not to mention their fellow patients, the hospital doctors, 
and the institutions in which the patients were (ware)housed.2  We felt, 
somewhat naively perhaps, that the reason the law was askew stemmed from 
the lack of good medical information on the part of lawyers, judges, and 
legislators and that rectifying the situation required the presentation in an 
appropriate legal forum of such information.3  Everyone’s eyes would be 
opened and the law would change in the direction warranted by our confidence 
 
 1. Samuel Jan Brakel & John M. Davis, Taking Harms Seriously: Involuntary Mental 
Patients and the Right to Refuse Treatment, 25 IND. L. REV. 429 (1991). 
 2. Id. at 430 & n.6. 
 3. Id. at 437–41. 
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in the medical facts—that the antipsychotic drugs predominantly used in 
treatment were highly efficacious and with nowhere near the negative side 
effect profiles portrayed by anti-psychiatric alarmists.4 
There has been some success in the realization of this hope, though pinning 
much or any of it on the publication and dissemination of a legal academic 
article would be presumptuous.5  There has been progress in the law in the 
sense that the cases and statutes today are somewhat more likely than a decade 
or so ago to reflect an appropriate appreciation of what the medications can do, 
and what they will not do, in multiple contexts.6  Whether the issue is civil 
commitment and treatment (inpatient or outpatient), treatment in the criminal 
justice-mandated context of competency commitments (whether pretrial or pre-
sentence), or post-conviction treatment in the prison setting, medical authority 
to medicate unwilling patients has expanded overall while judicial review has 
been relegated to a lesser and later “post-deprivation” role—a realignment of 
power that one would surmise has much to do with better knowledge of the 
large benefits versus relatively small costs in potential negative consequences 
of the medications.7 
At the same time, however, there has been some jurisprudential 
backsliding as well, including at the U.S. Supreme Court, where a small 
number of decisions have been handed down and some language articulated 
that seems to give new life to what one had hoped was the moribund view of 
psychotropic drugs as predominantly harmful and the accompanying disbelief 
in the competence and integrity of doctors to appropriately prescribe them.8 
Given the thus still uneven, not to say precarious, lay of the legal landscape 
on treatment refusals, we feel it is timely to do a reprise of sorts of our 1991 
article and to present once again what we believe is a true picture of the risks 
and benefits of antipsychotic medications.  It is a picture that in many respects 
is and can be more optimistic than before, consistent with another set of major 
advances over the last ten to fifteen years in psychiatric medicine, in particular, 
the development of the so-called atypicals, a new line of antipsychotic drugs 
with higher benefit potential and fewer risks than the “old” medications, and 
continuing improvement in their usage.9 
 
 4. Id. at 440–41. 
 5. Indeed, it would be demonstrably wrong: (1) what success there is has been slow in 
coming and uneven; (2) the article has not been cited with great frequency, its appeal apparently 
being limited mostly to the already converted; and (3) the achievement of significant legal change 
tends to require a combination of many factors and forces, among which academic writings may 
play a role but not usually a prominent one. 
 6. See infra Parts IV & V. 
 7. See infra Part III.C. 
 8. See infra Part IV. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
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Unlike last time when we avoided engaging the medication skeptics on 
their terms, this time around we will get into the legal arguments these skeptics 
are prone to advance.  After all, most of the skeptics are lawyers and this is 
their game.  Further, it is the law that rules what doctors can do, not their 
medical axioms, ethics, or habits.  Also, whether an optimist by inclination or 
more of a realist, one can hardly hope to persuade the unpersuaded with 
“inconvenient” facts alone.  The facts do matter, both qualitative and 
quantitative, but only in conjunction with a challenge to theoretical positions 
staked out and with an overt, that is, compensated for, appreciation of how 
readily the facts can be disregarded or manipulated by the theoretically pre-
positioned and pre-disposed.10 
Also unlike last time, when we limited our observations and conclusions to 
the civil commitment context leaving to implication the wider message that we 
knew was there, this time we are more willing to spell out the implications for 
other legal contexts.  It comes with the territory of engaging the skeptics on 
their wider legal terms.  The legal context may vary from institution to 
institution as may the patients’ legal status whether in or outside an institution.  
Legitimately, if one will permit some small word play, the legal and 
institutional context will have much bearing on what is “right,” proper, and 
practicable when it comes to the matter of who makes and reviews treatment 
decisions and who has the first and final decision-making authority. 
We will proceed as follows: we will begin by presenting the new medical 
data because (1) it is the most significant new element in the debate on the 
matter of treatment rights, including the right to refuse it, and (2) it 
immediately makes more intelligible what that debate is about, what our 
preferences as authors are, and from where these derive.  We will present the 
research and anecdotal results documenting the heightened efficacy and the 
reduced possibility of untoward effects of the new antipsychotic drugs.  This 
section of the Article will include information on the harms, both personal and 
institutional, that result from withholding for legal reasons treatment that is 
medically indicated.  In short, we will at least present some indication of the 
costs of an inefficient legal treatment refusal regime; one that makes any 
conscientious and medically justified attempt to override the patient’s 
 
 10. For example, on a different issue—the need for tort reform—lawyers who oppose such 
reform have demonstrated substantial agility when it comes to dealing with unpleasant facts.  See 
Samuel Jan Brakel, Using What We Know About Our Civil Litigation System: A Critique of 
“Base-Rate” Analysis and Other Apologist Diversions, 31 GA. L. REV. 77, 78, 200 n.374 (1996).  
The large number of reported instances of the abuse of law they dismiss as mere “anecdotes,” 
despite the fact that the common law is quintessentially and fundamentally anecdotal (as per the 
quip “one grievance is an anecdote; two are a class action”).  Id. at 79–80.  But when anecdotes 
make a point they want or like, the anti-anecdotalists are as ready to invoke them as anyone.  Id. 
at 93.  Further, when the ostensibly “hard” quantitative facts suggest an unwanted message, the 
tactic is to contextualize, distort, or simply ignore them.  See, e.g., id. at 95. 
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resistance to treatment cumbersome to the point of impractical, if not 
impossible. 
After the medical discussion we will, as before, try to pinpoint what we 
believe is the real issue in the debate over mental patients’ rights to refuse 
treatment from both a legal and pragmatic standpoint.  Without such a focal 
delineation, the whole debate is or soon becomes unrewarding, if not 
incomprehensible. 
This is followed by a recapitulation of where things stood legally in 1991, 
at the time we wrote the first article—not only the promise we saw in some 
contemporary judicial decisions and pronouncements, but also the persisting 
levels of entrenchment of anti-psychiatric bias that we felt could easily dash 
hopes for further progress. 
After that, we will list and analyze the more significant new cases and 
statutes, both those that appear to endorse the legal implications of the new 
medical advances and those that seem to go counter and continue to trade on 
the medical misinformation and myths that used to dominate the right-to-refuse 
jurisprudence. 
In the course of the above, we will try to touch once again on what we 
believe is the contextual reality in which treatment refusals and the decisions to 
override them are made, this time a wider reality in that we characterize not 
only patients and institutions subject to the dictates of civil commitment, but 
also civil outpatients and individuals on the criminal side of the ledger.  
Though dealt with to an extent in the medical data section, this discussion will 
make reference to new data on the prevalence of anosognosia (the inability to 
recognize one’s illness) among the severely mentally ill and the implications of 
the data on the law’s approach to treatment refusals.11 
Finally, we conclude with a section on such legal reforms as we feel are 
needed.  This will be brief in that we will suggest principles rather than call for 
the emulation or adoption of specific salutary (in our view) case decisions, 
statutory provisions, or agency regulations.  Much less will we engage in the 
drafting of model laws on involuntary (or “assisted”)12 mental health treatment 
 
 11. Martin Davies et al., Anosognosia and the Two-Factor Theory of Delusions, 20 MIND & 
LANGUAGE 209, 209 (2005). 
 12. The word “assisted,” introduced by pro-treatment activists with the Treatment Advocacy 
Center (TAC), a group with roots in the National Alliance for the Mentally Ill (NAMI) but 
corporately separate today, is more than a euphemism as it is meant to reflect the fact that many 
of the mentally ill who resist hospitalization do so only half-heartedly, inconsistently, or 
temporarily while many others do so for delusional reasons including paranoia about the motives 
of relatives who want to get them the help they need or a false belief that they are not ill and do 
not need help.  See Samuel Jan Brakel, Searching for the Therapy in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
33 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. AND CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 462 n.22, 494–95 (2007).  In that article, 
the lawyer-author of this Article offered a somewhat more detailed set of proposed reforms than 
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or urge the adoption of such existing models as are out there.  Of course, any 
attempts to put on the books or into practice such “principled” reform as we 
advocate will of necessity involve detailed analysis of the precedents (non-
legal meaning) and ultimately much borrowing from them.  However, we feel 
that job is best left to the reformers. 
I.  OF TYPICALS AND ATYPICALS: THE OLD AND NEW MEDICAL DATA 
We begin this section on the new medical data by summarizing what we 
said in the old article.  Under the heading “Separating Myth from Reality,” we 
first reported on a review we conducted of the legal literature on the use of 
psychotropic drugs—law journals as well as judicial opinions—concluding 
that the vast bulk of it was woefully, even willfully, misinformed about both 
the drugs’ risks and benefits.13  The prevalence and severity of negative side 
effects were almost uniformly overstated, the alleged misuse of “drugging” by 
state physicians was played up as rampant if not the norm (embellishments and 
inventions ranging from the charge that drugs were administered mostly for 
administrative convenience or punishment to the suggestion by analogy that it 
 
appear here, but even these were on the order of broad principles rather than specific legal 
prescriptions.  See id. at 493–99. 
 13. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 437–38.  Among the very few articles not deserving of 
this criticism (and not noted in the 1991 piece) is one written by two well-known psychiatrists 
with considerable forensic experience to match their clinical expertise.  Thomas G. Gutheil & 
Paul S. Appelbaum, “Mind Control,” “Synthetic Sanity,” “Artificial Competence,” and Genuine 
Confusion: Legally Relevant Effects of Antipsychotic Medication, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (1983).  
The authors focused in some detail on the effects of the antipsychotic medications of the time 
with regards to various aspects of perception and functioning.  Id. at 99–117.  They also looked at 
contemporary legal cases dealing with the right to refuse treatment, finding a difference between 
how the criminal courts tended to perceive the effects of the drugs as well as how they ruled on 
the issue of their refusal compared to civil courts, the latter being found more negative on the 
drugs and, not illogically, more supportive of the patient’s right to refuse their administration 
(though the civil courts’ logic may in fact be the inverse, with an a priori antipathy to forced 
administration driving the jaundiced view of the medications).  Id. at 79–98.  The article received 
a fair amount of attention especially in the initial years after publication, but it has had very little 
impact on legal thinking.  A post-1991 piece also departing strikingly from the anti-psychiatry, 
anti-medication norm was published in a 2002 issue of the SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW.  Douglas 
Mossman, Unbuckling the “Chemical Straightjacket”: The Legal Significance of Recent 
Advances in the Pharmacological Treatment of Psychosis, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1033 (2002).   
Written by the respected and prolific forensic psychiatrist Douglas Mossman, it has been all but 
ignored in the subsequent law journal literature.  A Lexis search finds the article cited between 
one and two dozen times since 2002, conspicuously less often than Mossman’s writings on the 
death penalty and violence prediction, considered more serviceable to the “legal” point of view.  
Even the articles that do cite Mossman’s pharmacological piece tend to ignore its message, 
sometimes flagrantly.  See, e.g., Elizabeth G. Schultz, Sell-ing Your Soul to the Courts: Forced 
Medication to Achieve Trial Competency in the Wake of Sell v. United States, 38 AKRON L. REV. 
503, 547–48 (2005). 
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might be or at least risked being done to suppress political dissent), while the 
huge health benefits of proper drug usage for people with serious mental 
illness got no play at all (the whole helping rationale behind psychiatric 
treatment being simply ignored).14  We wrote of the characteristic internal 
referencing aspect of this legal literature where reliance for authority was not 
on original medical publications but almost exclusively on a few biased 
analyses written by non-physicians or one or two radical anti-psychiatry 
doctors, leading to an inevitable repetition of false information and myth or 
even, as in the legal cases ruled by common law precedent, the outright 
transformation of medical myth into legal fact.15 
Not much has changed in the law journal commentary of the decade and a 
half since.  As for judicial pronouncements they have shown sporadic, 
marginal improvement albiet with some backsliding, as we will sketch out in 
text sections to come.16  The reasons for this lack of progress may be more 
profound than we initially thought.  It is more than a difference in priorities 
between the two professions, medicine and law, and the presumed pursuit of a 
patient’s medical best interests by the one side versus the preservation of his or 
her legal rights by the other.  Nor is it a matter of mere information lag as 
sometimes occurs when law has difficulty, or deliberate reasons for not, 
keeping up with science.  It is not even a matter of different worldviews.  
Rather, it is that the worldview which has animated law and continues to hold 
sway over the profession is just plain wrong, a fact for which psychiatry bears 
some responsibility. 
An analogy might help clarify our point.  Had there been a well-developed 
legal system at the time everyone believed the world was flat, one could 
imagine the existence of an intricate body of maritime and trade law reflecting 
that assumption.  The individual parts or provisions of that body of law would, 
ideally, partake of an inherent logic and consistency that would regulate the 
domains at issue with maximum efficiency.  The system might have worked, 
or seemed to work, but only up to a point, because the whole legal edifice was 
built on a flawed premise whose fault lines would eventually be exposed and 
bring it crashing down.  Such is the case with the law of psychiatry.  While in 
some respects appealing in its patient-protective logic and workable for 
achieving these limited ends, it, too, is built on a false premise and is crashing 
 
 14. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 438–40. 
 15. Id. at 438–40 (citing In re the Mental Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d 645 (Ind. 1987) 
and In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d 64 (Ill. 1988) as textbook examples).  The earlier Indiana case had 
made reference to a “virtually undisputed allegation that a person medicated with antipsychotic 
drugs has a 50% risk of contracting tardive dyskinesia.”  Id. at 440 (quoting In re the Mental 
Commitment of M.P., 510 N.E.2d at 646).  This in fact highly disputable, if not plainly erroneous, 
allegation was then cited by the Illinois court in a subsequent decision as a “fact” “found” by the 
Indiana Supreme Court.  Id. (quoting In re Orr, 531 N.E.2d at 74). 
 16. See infra Part IV. 
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all around us in a cascade of ruined lives that are the product of treatment 
needs frustrated through misdirected law and treatment opportunities forgone. 
In the last forty to fifty years there has been an almost revolutionary shift 
in theories about schizophrenia, the classic form of mental illness.  Absent a 
Maggelan of psychiatric medicine, it has taken time for that revolution to fully 
spread its tenets and inferences even within the psychiatric profession.  In law, 
however, it appears that even rumors of this revolution have yet to penetrate as 
the advocacy bar persists in making sure patients do not fall off the precipice 
of law-protected self-determination into a psychiatric netherworld of custodial 
neglect and punishment, even as safe and effective treatments are becoming 
increasingly, if not globally, available.  The premise underlying the 
revolutionary transformation of psychiatry is this: schizophrenia and other 
major mental disorders17 are biologically based and so, therefore, are the 
treatments of them.  The implications of this reality once recognized are 
enormous. 
Half a century ago, it could be, and was, argued that schizophrenia did not 
exist and that mental illness was a myth propagated to permit the incarceration 
of dissidents and misfits or others with “problems in living.”18  This was not 
the dominant view and counterarguments were certainly made, but the theories 
on which they were based proved difficult to substantiate.19  Results of early 
investigations of biological or genetic factors were inconclusive or subject to 
criticisms that were fatal to credibility.20  Unlike physical disease where 
pathology could be demonstrated on post-mortem examination, no similar 
proof of abnormalities was available for schizophrenia and it could be 
 
 17. We will use schizophrenia as our prototypical severe mental illness.  Most patients in 
mental facilities, where the issue of assent to or refusal of treatment comes primarily into play, 
have been diagnosed with schizophrenia.  Other psychotic diseases such as manic manifestations 
of bipolar disorder and psychotic depression and occasionally severe suicidal non-psychotic 
depression may also lead to institutionalization.  Mostly, we will describe the major advances in 
our understanding and treatment of schizophrenia over the last fifteen to twenty years, but the 
implications, if not always the facts, apply as well to these other illnesses.  Occasional comments 
about factual differences will be made. 
 18. Thomas Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness, 15 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 113, 114 (1960); see 
also THOMAS J. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY ILL: A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 154, 168 (1966) 
(stating that it is not the behavior of mentally ill persons which determines whether or not they 
are retained or released in a hospital and that their status is usually ascribed rather than achieved). 
 19. See Walter R. Gove, The Labelling Perspective: An Overview, in THE LABELLING OF 
DEVIANCE: EVALUATING A PERSPECTIVE 16 (Walter R. Gove ed., 2d ed., 1980) (“[F]or some 
forms of deviant behavior it has not been established that persons who are labelled as deviant 
differ from those who are not labelled on relevant behavioral, personality, and physical 
characteristics.”). 
 20. See, e.g., Seymour S. Kety, From Rationalization to Reason, 131 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
957, 961–62 (1974). 
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maintained that none existed.21  The very “reality” of the illness could thus be 
drawn into question. 
Today, by contrast, there is an overwhelming body of data showing that 
schizophrenic patients have physical abnormalities.22  Post-mortem 
examination of the brains from schizophrenic patients show these 
abnormalities, some of which are at the cellular level, others subcellular.23  The 
pathology can be seen in living patients as well as via imaging technology.24  
There is today no doubt that schizophrenic patients have less grey matter than 
normals as well as enlarged ventricles, fluid-filled spaces in the brain.25  These 
findings have been replicated in hundreds of studies and can be considered 
established.26  There are also encephalographic (EEG) changes which can be 
detected when patients have electrodes placed on their heads and electrical 
events are recorded and analyzed.27  The studies finding such abnormalities 
have also been replicated many times and validated using multiple indicators 
of EEG function.28  In addition, schizophrenic patients have an eye movement 
 
 21. Id. at 958 (citing R.D. Laing, Phenomenological Approach to Schizoprhenia, in 
PSYCHOPATHOLOGY TODAY 351–58 (W.S. Sahakian ed., 1970)). 
 22. Even a partial perusal of the psychiatric literature would yield many thousands of 
writings documenting this fundamental fact, from materials in textbooks such as the American 
Psychiatric Association’s COMPREHENSIVE TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, to individually 
published research monographs, to articles in sub-specialty journals such as MOLECULAR 
PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHIATRIC GENETICS, JOURNAL OF PSYCHIATRIC RESEARCH, SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULLETIN, SCHIZOPHRENIA RESEARCH, and BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY to pieces in general 
psychiatric journals such as JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION or the 
ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY published by the American Medical Association, not to 
mention research meetings such as the International Congress on Schizophrenia where numerous 
papers are presented on any number of subjects, but all equally supportive of the biological basis 
of schizophrenia.  For the sake of space and sanity, we only present a few of the more significant 
writings supporting different aspects of the basic point, as reflected in the titles.  Sharon L. 
Eastwood & Paul J. Harrison, Cellular Basis of Reduced Cortical Reelin Expression in 
Schizophrenia, 163 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 540 (2006); Leisa A. Glantz & David A. Lewis, 
Dendritic Spine Density in Schizophrenia and Depression, 58 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 199 
(2001); Alesandro Guidotti et al., GABAergic Dysfunction in Schizophrenia: New Treatment 
Strategies on the Horizon, 180 PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 191 (2005); David A. Lewis & Jeffrey 
A. Lieberman, Catching Up on Schizophrenia: Natural History and Neurobiology, 28 NEURON 
325 (2000); Lynn D. Selemon, Grazyna Rajkowska & Patricia S. Goldman-Rakic, Abnormally 
High Neuronal Density in the Schizophrenic Cortex: A Morphometric Analysis of Prefrontal Area 
9 and Occipital Area 17, 52 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 805 (1995). 
 23. Martha E. Shenton et al., A Review of MRI Findings in Schizophrenia, 49 
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 1, 2, 5–6 (2001). 
 24. Id. at 1. 
 25. Id. at 23, 34–35. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Jyrki Ahveninen et al., Inherited Auditory-Cortical Dysfunction in Twin Pairs 
Discordant for Schizophrenia, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 612, 613–14 (2006). 
 28. Id. at 612–13. 
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disorder, detectable electrophysiologically (EES) or neuropshychologically 
(with psychological tests), which is characterized by difficulty in trying to 
follow a target.29  The common denominator in these physical changes or 
abnormalities is the presence of cognitive and information processing deficits 
in patients with schizophrenia resulting in impaired thinking and deficiencies 
in other higher mental processes.30 
There are also multiple studies, conducted in various countries, showing a 
well-replicated genetic association of schizophrenia.31  There are a number of 
leads pointing to abnormalities in certain genes or regions of the genome at a 
given location on a given chromosome.32  Furthermore, there is an active 
exploration in schizophrenia research of epigenetic events, changes in DNA 
after conception.33  During life many genes can be silenced and remain 
dormant, whereas others can be activated at certain times in embryonic or adult 
life.34  Post-mortem examination of brains from schizophrenic patients, for 
example, shows major protein decreases of the “reelin” gene,35 suggesting 
potentially major negative effects for brain development or the formation of 
normal synaptic connections between neurons that occur throughout adult life 
and the negative cognitive and information processing consequences that in 
turn flow from that. 
Not all of these pathologies and pathophysiological events are, as yet, well 
understood.  There remains much we do not know as research on schizophrenia 
continues with increased intensity and sophistication.  But the notion that the 
disease of schizophrenia does not exist and that it is caused simply by 
psychodynamic events (bad mothering) or sociologically (by a sick society and 
therefore is not a disease) has been abandoned by serious medical investigators 
 
 29. Phillip S. Holzman, Behavioral Markers of Schizophrenia Useful for Genetic Studies, 26 
J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 427, 429, 431 (1992). 
 30. See Phillip D. Harvey et al., Changes in Cognitive Functioning With Risperidone and 
Olanzapine Treatment: A Large-Scale, Double-Blind, Randomized Study, 169 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 404, 404–05 (2003); Laura F. Martin et al., Alpha-7 Nicotinic Receptor 
Agonists: Potential New Candidates for the Treatment of Schizophrenia, 174 
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 54, 54 (2004). 
 31. See, e.g., IRVING I. GOTTESMAN, SCHIZOPHRENIA GENESIS: THE ORIGINS OF MADNESS 
93–127 (1991); Patrick F. Sullivan, The Genetics of Schizophrenia, 7 PLOS MEDICINE 614 
(2005). 
 32. Richard E. Straub & Daniel R. Weinberger, Editorial, Schizophrenia Genes—Famine to 
Feast, 60 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 81, 81 (2006). 
 33. E. Costa et al., Reelin and Schizophrenia: A Disease at the Interface of the Genome and 
the Epigenome, 2 MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 47, 53 (2002). 
 34. Id. at 51, 53. 
 35. Id. at 48; S.H. Fatemi, J.A. Earle & T. McMenomy, Reduction in Reelin 
Immunoreactivety in Hippocampus of Subjects with Schizophrenia, Bipolar Disorder and Major 
Depression, 5 MOLECULAR PSYCHIATRY 654, 660 (2000). 
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and practitioners.  It is time the law acknowledged the consequences of our 
new understanding as well. 
One area where the law needs to adjust is the treatment of patients with 
antipsychotic drugs.  When these drugs were first discovered in the early 
1950s, they were referred to as tranquilizers.36  The first antipsychotic drug, 
chlorpromazine, did have considerable sedative properties.37  Thence came the 
charge that the drugs “dulled the senses” or that they were a convenient 
chemical straightjacket.38  But even the early drugs did not act by sedation.39  
Like the newer drugs, their action is to counteract psychosis by blocking 
excessive dopamine, a hormone-like substance whose release in abnormal 
quantities is associated with “positive” psychiatric symptoms such as 
hallucinations and delusions.40  While the drugs may quiet a highly agitated 
and excited patient, they also help restore apathetic, affectless patients.41  The 
restoration is in the nature of a regaining of cognitive skills, ideally as close as 
possible to normal pre-morbid thinking and functioning. 
The old drugs risked producing parkinsonism in an area of the brain 
concerned with modulating movements and could cause stiffness, involuntary 
jerking and other parkinsonian-like symptoms.42  The newer drugs have only 
 
 36. Sheldon Gelman, Looking Backward: The Twentieth Century Revolutions in Psychiatry, 
Law, and Public Mental Health, 29 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 531, 562 (2003). 
 37. Id. at 533, 578. 
 38. Mossman, supra note 13, at 1153. 
 39. Gelman, supra note 36, at 578. 
 40. Mossman, supra note 13, at 1066.  There are imaging data today from living 
schizophrenic patients that show excessive dopamine release in the brain when the patient is 
having hallucinations and delusions, as well as of the blocking effect on dopamine receptors 
when antipsychotics are administered.  See Anissa A. Abi-Dargham et al., Increased Striatal 
Dopamine Transmission In Schizophrenia: Confirmation in a Second Cohort, 155 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 761, 767 (1998); A. Breir et al., Schizophrenia is Associated With Elevated 
Amphetamine-Induced Synaptic Dopamine Concentrations: Evidence from a Novel Positron 
Emission Tomography Method, 94 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 2569, 2569 (1997). 
 41. Robert N. Swidler, Medical Innovations and Ethics: A State Government Perspective, 57 
ALB. L. REV. 655, 667 (1994).  The amotivational, apathetic, poor social skills aspects of 
schizophrenia are its so-called negative symptoms.  Id.  Combined with cognitive and executive 
defects, these deficits contribute greatly to poor social and vocational functioning among people 
with the illness.  Mossman, supra note 13, at 1056–57.  But today’s drugs can go a long way 
toward remedying these deficits and we have an understanding, albeit imperfect, of how they 
work.  See John M. Davis & Nancy Chen, Clinical Profile of an Atypical Antipsychotic: 
Risperidone, 28 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 43, 58 (2002); Stephen R. Marder, John M. Davis & Guy 
Chouinard, The Effects of Risperidone on the Five Dimensions of Schizophrenia Derived by 
Factor Analysis: Combined Results of the North American Trials, 58 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 538, 
541 (1997). 
 42. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON TARDIVE DYSKINESIA, TARDIVE 
DYSKINESIA: A TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, 13–14 
(1992). 
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weak activity in this area of the brain and as a result a much-reduced profile for 
this type of extrapyramidal side effect.43  Normal treatment practice would be 
for the doctor to choose a drug for the patient that he or she thinks does not 
have, or has the least chance of producing the side effects the patient is 
concerned about.  If side effects do develop, the option almost always exists 
today to switch the patient to a drug that does not cause these effects.44  
Particularly in cases that engender dispute or litigation today where the issue is 
short-term hospitalization or otherwise mandated treatment, the potential for 
extrapyramidal symptom development would rarely be of concern, if ever. 
There is no correlation between sedative properties of the antipsychotic 
drugs and their benefit to psychotic patients.45  There are the so-called minor 
tranquilizers (benzodiazepines, Librium, Valium, and so forth) which do 
produce sedation at higher doses, but they operate by an altogether different 
process and are used for conditions that are unrelated to schizophrenia and 
other psychotic manifestations.46 
Treatment with antipsychotic drugs is the hallmark of psychiatric treatment 
of patients suffering from schizophrenia and other major mental disorders.47  In 
no institution today, whether in the remaining state facilities, private general 
hospitals or specialized facilities, the medical schools, or for that matter in the 
doctor’s office, is psychological or psychosocial treatment alone provided.48  
 
 43. Howard C. Margolese et al., Tardive Dyskinesia in the Era of the Typical and Atypical 
Antipsychotics. Part 2: Incidence and Management Strategies in Patients with Schizophrenia, 50 
CAN. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 703, 704 (2005). 
 44. E.g., id. at 708. 
 45. There are many drugs given to patients by psychiatrists and neurologists which have 
considerable sedative properties: barbiturates, non-barbiturate sedatives and hypnotics, anti-
anxiety agents in the benzodiazepine class of drugs such as Librium and Valium, and drugs like 
Ambien.  Some anticonvulsants have substantial sedative aspects.  Certain antidepressants such as 
amitriptyline (Elavil), mirtazapine (Remeron), and trazodone do as well, as do certain 
antihistamines that pass the blood brain barrier and can produce considerable sedation.  None of 
these drugs help schizophrenia.  While some antipsychotics, particularly chlorpromazine and 
clozapine, have sedative properties, most of the newer antipsychotics either have no sedative 
effects above placebo or only a very low incidence of such effects.  Stimulants do not help 
schizophrenia, either.  The amount of sedation produced by an antipsychotic is irrelevant to its 
antipsychotic action.  It should be noted that sometimes a sedative agent might be useful in the 
first few hours of treatment of a highly agitated patient.  However, beyond this transitory effect 
sedatives have no antipsychotic utility.  See GOODMAN & GILMAN’S THE PHARMACOLOGICAL 
BASIS OF THERAPEUTICS 317–41, 401–526 (Laurence L. Brunton et al. eds., 11th ed. 2006). 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Tyrone D. Cannon et al., Antipsychotic Drug Treatment in the Prodromal Phase of 
Schizophrenia, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1230, 1230 (2002) (“Initiation of drug therapy after the 
onset of psychotic symptoms is associated with better medication response, less likelihood of 
relapse, and more favorable long term outcome among patients with schizophrenia.”). 
 48. See Roshel Lenroot et al., Integrated Treatment of Schizophrenia, 54 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVS. 1499, 1499 (2003) (“It is no longer questioned whether medication is a necessary part of 
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Treatment is always given with drugs.49  It is not true that wealthy patients get 
verbal psychotherapy while poor patients are drugged.  The wealthy get drugs 
plus psychotherapy.50  Medication dispensation and management have become 
primary aspects of psychiatric treatment for mentally ill patients of all classes 
and cultures.51  What is seen by unknowing critics as an orgy of pill pushing is 
no more than a reflection of the reality that without drugs as the base treatment 
for schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders there is no hope for 
improvement.  Talk and behavior therapy are still provided, but such therapy 
builds on the substantial degree of cognitive and emotional restoration that can 
be achieved with medication.52  Often its focus is on developing the patient’s 
and even the family’s coping skills, to sharpen recognition of the onset of an 
episode, of the conditions and stresses that signal vulnerability, and what to do 
in the face of them.53  The family has become an ally in this, whereas before it 
was often the scapegoat.54  Psychotherapy in the form of assertive case 
management can also be quite useful in helping the patient with the residual 
“negative symptoms” of apathy and poor motivation.55  By themselves 
however, these treatment methods are useless for schizophrenia and potentially 
harmful even, particularly if used to the exclusion of needed pharmacology.56 
 
management of schizophrenia” but “medications alone [are] not sufficient for the treatment of 
most people with schizophrenia.”). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 451. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Treatment of Mentally Disordered Offenders, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 126, 137 (1997). 
 53. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 449. 
 54. Id. at 442. 
 55. See Susan M. Essock & Nina Kontos, Implementing Assertive Community Treatment 
Teams, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 679, 679 (1995); Kim T. Mueser et al., Models of Community 
Care for Severe Mental Illness: A Review of Research on Case Management, 24 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULL. 37, 37 (1998). 
 56. It is less a matter of psycho-social treatments having no place or a lesser place in the 
treatment of severe mental illness today than that the treatments are entirely different.  They 
capitalize today on the gains in thinking and functioning that can be achieved by the medications, 
as distinct from trying the impossible, which is to achieve these gains directly through verbal or 
behavioral therapy.  See Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, Inc., 490 A.2d 720 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
1985), for an early case.  The reported court case merely affirms an arbitration award for 
allegedly negligent treatment that took place in 1979.  Id. at 724.  However, the case involved the 
recognition that verbal therapy as such is ineffective in treating mental illness with substantial 
biological components, in this instance a psychotic depressive reaction, and that the failure on the 
part of the defendant to initiate psychopharmacologic treatments may constitute negligence.  The 
defendant institution, Chestnut Lodge, was a facility famous for furthering psychoanalytic theory 
and practice, having trained a number of prominent American psychiatrists of this school, a fact 
which seems to have influenced the diagnosis its staff made of the plaintiff’s mental health 
problems as much as the treatment course that was pursued in the face of unmistakable evidence 
that the patient was getting worse rather than better. 
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Prior to the early 1950s, most schizophrenic patients spent much of their 
life in state insane asylums.57  Since schizophrenia’s onset is typically in 
adolescence, the illness took away most of the patients’ normal lives.  In the 
early 1950s, fifty percent of the hospital beds in the country were in massive 
state mental facilities located in rural areas.58  Up to a half million mental 
patients filled these beds.59  When chlorpromazine was discovered in 1953 its 
use spread quickly throughout the world in two or three years.  Violence in 
state hospitals in the United States dropped by ninety percent almost 
overnight.60  The number of patients in hospitals began to drop year by year 
with comparable alacrity.  Today the total number of patients in state mental 
hospitals throughout the United States is less than ten percent of what it was in 
the mid-1950s and the facilities themselves have almost completely 
disappeared, been restructured for new use, or torn down.61 
When good care is available and patients take their medication, the 
majority of them can return to work or school and be productive members of 
society.  Unfortunately, many schizophrenic patients do not have access to 
high quality care.62  The emptying of the state hospitals was accompanied by 
the realization that much of the treatment burden would now fall on 
community, mostly outpatient, programs.63  But the will or wherewithal to 
create a community treatment system equal to the task never materialized.  The 
result is that the hope of full social rehabilitation, a theoretical possibility for 
many schizophrenic patients, is realized in all too few cases.64  For other 
patients it is worse than that.  They may get brief treatment in a hospital or, 
more likely today, in a jail but they will stop taking their medication once 
 
 57. E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S MENTAL 
ILLNESS CRISIS 8–9, 85 (1997). 
 58. See id. 
 59. Id. H. Brill & R.E. Patton, Population Fall in New York State Mental Hospitals in First 
Year of a Large-Scale Use of Tranquilizing Drugs, 114 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 509 (1957). 
 60. See Brill & Patton, supra note 59, at 510. 
 61. See TORREY, supra note 57, at 8–14.  The lawyer-author of this Article conducted social 
and legal research in the early 1970s at Kankakee State Hospital, thirty miles south of Chicago, at 
a time when it housed some 4,000 patients.  Within a few years the hospital was a relic, empty of 
mentally ill patients and in the process of being converted, to the extent possible, to other uses. 
 62. See Steven S. Sharfstein et al., Managed Care and Clinical Reality in Schizophrenia 
Treatment, 18 HEALTH AFFAIRS 66, 66 (1999) (“Improved access to effective schizophrenia care 
is the promise, not the reality, of today’s managed care marketplace.”). 
 63. See Mary R. Merwin & Frank M. Ochberg, The Long Voyage: Policies for Progress in 
Mental Health, 15 HEALTH AFFAIRS 96, 97 (1996). 
 64. See Sharfstein et al., supra note 62; see also Merwin & Ochberg, supra note 63, at 105 
(“the needs of most deinstitutionalized and uninstitutionalized people are not being met in the 
communities”). 
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released.65  Their lives will spiral downward to where episodes of active 
schizophrenia grow more frequent and worse and recovery is less complete 
with each episode.66  Eventually the disease process may flatten out, but by 
then too often alcoholism, drug abuse, and homelessness will have become 
dominant if not permanent features of the patient’s existence.67  What used to 
be the back wards of hospitals for these patients have today become the back 
streets and jails.  As presently structured, the law and the courts provide little 
in the way of relief from this pattern. Schizophrenia is not normally thought of 
as a fatal illness.  The average life expectancy of schizophrenic patients is 
lower than that of the normal population, but many live into old age.  Much of 
the shorter life span is attributable to a high suicide rate among people 
suffering from schizophrenia, as well as accidental death and the negative 
lifestyle effects of those who are not well cared for.  In that respect, it is 
relevant to note that schizophrenic patients not receiving drugs die at a rate ten 
times higher than patients on medication.68 
We also wrote about what we called the “reality of the patient’s setting.”69  
By this we meant to convey the fact that when dealing with the issue of the 
right to refuse treatment—that is, of asserted and contested refusals—one 
would be dealing typically with involuntarily hospitalized patients, the sickest 
of patients, as distinct from voluntary admittees or community facility 
residents or outpatients who tended to be less ill and for whom refusing was 
not an issue because they could.70  In other words, the matter of how the law 
 
 65. Kathleen Winchell, The Need to Close Kentucky’s Revolving Door: Proposal for a 
Movement Towards a Socially Responsible Approach to Treatment and Commitment of the 
Mentally Ill, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 213 (2002). 
 66. Veronica J. Manahan, When Our System of Involuntary Civil Committment Fails 
Individuals With Mental Illness: Russell Weston and the Case for Effective Monitoring and 
Medication Delivery Mechanisms, 28 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 20 (2004). 
 67. The neuropsychological deficits and the loss of gray matter seem to get worse after the 
patient’s first psychotic episode and there is strong evidence that failure to treat the first episode 
with antipsychotic drugs leads to substantially worse outcomes, in terms of repeat episodes and 
recovery therefrom, in the following five years.  There is beginning evidence that at least some of 
the second generation drugs in particular are effective in blocking the progression of these deficits 
and losses.  Wiepke Cahn et al., Brain Volume Changes in First-Episode Schizophrenia: A 1-Year 
Follow-Up Study, 59 ARCH. OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1002, 1002 (2002); Kiyoto Kasai et al., 
Progressive Decrease of Left Superior Temporal Gyrus Gray Matter Volume in Patients with 
First-Episode Schizophrenia, 160 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 156, 163 (2003).  Moreover, a large 
study carried out in Finland, based on that country’s central register, found that the risk of 
untreated schizophrenic patients dying was ten times higher than that of patients on medication.  
Jari Tiihonen et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Treatments in a Nationwide Cohort of Patients 
in Community Care After First Hospitalization Due to Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective 
Disorder: Observational Follow-Up Study, 333 BRIT. MED. J. 224, 227 (2006). 
 68. Tiihonen, supra note 67, at 227. 
 69. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 441. 
 70. Id. at 441–43. 
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should deal with refusals had to be approached in the context not of people 
with mild, first-time episodes or marginal conditions but of patients with major 
mental illnesses such as schizophrenia, mania, or psychotic depression, often 
with suicidal tendencies not to mention a history of revolving-door psychiatric 
admissions and scrapes with the law due to violent or threatening behavior.71  
Today with mandated outpatient treatment on the rise, as will be discussed, the 
landscape of psychiatric treatment refusers and refusals has changed somewhat 
though the laws as written still intend that nonconsensual treatment be reserved 
for the most ill.  As for patients in correctional facilities or forensic units 
within the mental health system, this Article will address the right-to-refuse 
implications of their particular legal status, while recognizing that they, like the 
civilly committed, tend equally to come from the ranks of the seriously ill.72  
Finally, it bears emphasizing that though not unknown at the time we wrote the 
first paper, there is today a great deal more documented evidence of the 
concept of anosognosia.73  More than just an assertion that mentally ill people 
sometimes lack full awareness of or adequate insight into their illness and 
distinct from denial as a psychologically based defense tactic, the term is 
meant to describe a “biologically based” or even “neurological” inability on 
the part of the sick person to appreciate that he or she is sick and needs 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. The emptying of the large state mental hospitals in the 1970s was part of a conscious 
deinstitutionalization movement whose promise was that most of the mentally ill would and could 
henceforth be treated “in the community.”  Implicit if not inherent in this promise was a 
secondary promise that enough quality community mental health treatment facilities would be 
built and staffed to accommodate the numbers coming out of the hospitals.  For any number of 
reasons that second promise was not fulfilled with the result that the post-institutionalization age 
came to be marked by abundant homelessness and the phenomenon of transintitutionalization, the 
latter meaning to convey the large numbers and percentages of mentally ill people coming to the 
attention of criminal justice officials and winding up in correctional rather than mental health 
facilities.  For a provocative account of the whole deinstitutionalization movement; its promises; 
failures; and the various motivations of the variously connected actors, commentators, and 
spectators, see generally RAEL JEAN ISAAC & VIRGINIA C. ARMAT, MADNESS IN THE STREETS: 
HOW PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW ABANDONED THE MENTALLY ILL (Free Press 1990).  To the 
extent this “hydraulic” or systemic “balloon” phenomenon reflects an irreducible constant of 
psychiatrically and socially impaired people, it stands to reason that their treatment needs are 
equally constant, irrespective of where they happen to be housed or not housed. 
 73. Researchers most prominently identified with the concept of anosognosia, through 
studies conducted in the early 1990s, are psychologist Xavier Amador at Columbia University in 
New York and psychiatrist Anthony David at the Institute of Psychiatry in London (UK).  
Psychiatrist Joseph McEvoy of the University of Pittsburgh, however, first explicitly linked the 
characteristic to the illness in the 1980s.  Joseph P. McEvoy et al., Why Must Some Schizophrenic 
Patients Be Involuntarily Committed? The Role of Insight, 30 COMPR. PSYCHIATRY 13, 13 
(1989); Joseph P. McEvoy et al., Measuring Chronic Schizophrenic Patients’ Attitudes Toward 
Their Illness and Treatment, 32 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 856, 856 (1981). 
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treatment, which is a characteristic of the illness itself.74  It is said to afflict 
some forty-seven to fifty percent of schizophrenic patients,75 with implications 
not just for health and behavior (as mentioned, untreated mental illness is 
strongly related to psychiatric deterioration and violence) but of course also the 
law’s assessment of a treatment refuser’s “competence” and the desirability of 
honoring his or her wishes.76 
A general description of the “State of Medical Art and Research” followed, 
the state of the art at that time.77  In it we wrote, as above, of the history of 
mental health treatment and the relatively recent (1950s) discovery of 
antipsychotic drugs, including the resultant, gradual transformation of mental 
hospitals from places where basic physical care and custody was about all that 
could be delivered, to institutions where effective treatment of the patient 
population was a distinct possibility if not always the immediate reality.78  We 
explained the role of the Federal Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the 
evaluation and approval of drugs, the insistence on blind trials and other study 
controls, and how antipsychotic drugs had become the treatment of choice 
worldwide for the major mental illnesses, relegating psychoanalytic and other 
talk therapies that used to be the hallmarks of psychiatry to at best 
complementary roles in treating the seriously mentally ill.79  We presented 
some “hard” results from an early (1966) National Institute of Mental Health 
(NIMH) study on the clinical benefits of drug treatment not only to document 
these benefits but to give a flavor of the research methods and the drug 
approval process.80  We also wrote of the costs of treatment delayed or denied 
because of the law’s overprotections: individual clinical costs such as mental 
deterioration and the inability to recapture such psychiatric loss, institutional 
costs and harms on the order of increased violence in hospitals on the part of 
untreated patients and its effect on compliant patients and caregivers, and the 
direct financial costs of warehousing patients before they can be treated, as 
well as legal process expenditures in judicially or administratively resolving 
treatment refusal disputes.81  Finally, we wrote of the “true risks of side 
effects” of the antipsychotic drugs (the first generation drugs of that time), 
noting that on the one hand all drugs have side effects, and on the other, that as 
 
 74. Xavier F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia, 51 ARCH. GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 826, 829 (1994). 
 75. Id.; see also Xavier F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia and 
Schizoaffective and Mood Disorders, Awareness Deficits in Neurological Disorders and 
Schizophrenia, 24 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 96 (1997). 
 76. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 433. 
 77. Id. at 444–51. 
 78. Id. at 444, 446. 
 79. Id. at 444–51. 
 80. Id. at 451–53. 
 81. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 453–61. 
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measured by both their high but underappreciated efficacy and their asserted 
bad effects (grossly overstated as to seriousness, general prevalence, and 
particular risk to the patient or patient class) the antipsychotics predominantly 
used were relatively benign.82  We pointed out that muscle reactions such as 
dystonia and akastesia, while alarming and painful, were rarely dangerous and 
could be readily and effectively treated with antiparkinsonian medication 
(dystonia in particular), while simply going away when the antipsychotic dose 
was reduced or the medication changed.83  With respect to neuroleptic 
malignant syndrome, a potentially fatal reaction, we wrote that while its 
seriousness could obviously not be gainsaid, it bore noting that its occurrence 
was very rare and its causal attribution to the taking of antipsychotics had not 
been conclusively established.84  Besides, the risk of death from untreated 
psychosis, drawn from hospital studies documenting large numbers of deaths 
from lethal catatonia, suicide, accidents, infection, and other harms that used to 
befall chronically psychotic patients in pre-drug days, was infinitely larger than 
from the antipsychotic drugs, a situation we analogized to the benefits of 
penicillin which exponentially increased medical survival rates in homes, 
hospitals, and on the battle fields despite the fact that an allergic reaction to the 
drug can on occasion be fatal.85  As for tardive dyskinesia (TD), the most 
notable of the adverse reactions to medication with antipsychotics, we pointed 
out in the face of outsized claims that half of all hospitalized mental patients 
suffered from the condition that the true figure was more on the order of 
twenty percent and that only after prolonged, continued treatment with the 
drugs in excess of six to seven years.86  Even then, many of the cases would be 
mild to moderate in severity and typically reversible.87  It would be 
exceedingly rare for TD to develop in the first six months of treatment; 
thereafter the risk of contracting the disorder rises about three percent per year 
assuming continued administration of the drug at high dosage.88  Most mental 
patients even then spent only a few weeks in the hospital, in which case the 
risk of developing TD was essentially nil if they have not had antipsychotics 
before and would have been increased by only a small fraction of a percent if 
they had.89  To anticipate arguments about autonomy or even free speech, we 
emphasized then, as we do today, the restorative properties of the drugs, that 
the evidence of cognitive or perceptual restoration to pre-morbid “normal” 
 
 82. Id. at 461–67. 
 83. Id. at 462. 
 84. Id. at 462–63. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 463. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 463–64. 
 89. Id. at 463. 
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mental processing was substantial for many patients treated with the drugs, and 
the bearing this in turn should have on which of the patient’s choices in what 
mental state to honor.90 
This was the state of the medication treatment art in regard to what have 
since been called the “typicals” (i.a., haloperidol, chlorpromazine, thioridazine, 
fluphenazine, and perphenazine), the “old,” “conventional” antipsychotic drugs 
that in the early 1990s began to be replaced by a newer line of pharmaceuticals 
called, of course, the “atypicals” (the forerunner clozapine and later 
olanzapine, quetiapine, risperidone, ziprasidone, and aripiprazole).91  Trials 
and other research on the atypicals tended to show substantial efficacy gains as 
well as a marked reduction in the prevalence and seriousness of undesirable 
side effects.92  Moreover, the higher costs of the new drugs, clozapine in 
particular, were shown or projected to be easily offset by reduced relapse and 
rehospitalization rates and all other associated alleviations of personal and 
social misery presumably brought about by improved treatment.93  It would 
have been simple for us to summarize and cite this literature and be done with 
the medical data section, moving on to the legal policy analysis from the firm 
base of major medical advances that would allow us to reinforce the argument 
for abandoning the stricter, medically counterproductive legal process controls 
and advocate for a return to a treatment decision-making model that pays 
greater heed and deference to the medical perspective and to physician 
authority. 
However, the burden of persuasion has been somewhat altered by the 
appearance of a recent study funded by the NIMH suggesting, or at least so 
reported in the popular press, that the medical advances are a mirage and that 
the new generation of psychiatric drugs is no better or not appreciably better 
than the old drugs.94  We do not want to overstate the medical significance of 
 
 90. Id. at 465. 
 91. Jeffrey A. Lieberman et al., Effectiveness of Antipsychotic Drugs in Patients with 
Chronic Schizophrenia, 353 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1209, 1210 (2005). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Richard Jed Wyatt & Ioline de Saint Ghislain, Letter to the Editor, Economic Savings 
and Clozapine, 152 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 650, 650 (1995).  The first large, pivotal trial was 
conducted as early as 1988 and involved the drug clozapine, the first atypical, as measured 
against a dominantly used typical, chlorpromazine.  John Cane et al., Clozapine for the 
Treatment-Resistant Schizophrenic: A Double-Blind Comparison with Chlorpromazine, 45 
ARCH. OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 789, 789 (1988); see also Kristian Wahlbeck et al., Evidence of 
Clozapine’s Effectiveness in Schizophrenia: A Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis of 
Randomized Trials, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 990, 991 (1999). 
 94. See Lieberman et al., supra note 91.  The study was reported in the CHICAGO TRIBUNE 
under the headline New Schizophrenia Drugs Test No Better Than the Old.  Ronald Kotulak, New 
Schizophrenia Drugs Test No Better Than the Old, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 20, 2005, at 12.  Among the 
initiated, the study is known (affectionately?) as “CATIE” after the study’s Clinical 
Antipsychotic Trials of Intervention Effectiveness subtitle.  Prior to the CATIE study there had 
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the so-called “CATIE” study, but we do need to acknowledge its potential 
political impact.  The study results have been seized upon by some to suggest, 
as one commentator within the profession put it, that a drug market equivalent 
of the “irrational exuberance” that infected the financial markets in the 1990s 
may have blinded researchers, doctors, manufacturers, and investors alike to a 
more sobering reality that could and should have been perceived.95  If this is 
the view of a medical insider, albeit an iconoclastic one, it requires no great 
imagination to speculate how legal outsiders unsympathetic to the “drugging” 
of patients, if not to the whole psychiatric enterprise, might want to interpret 
the information. 
We can begin by agreeing to the proposition that a Greenspanian word of 
caution is indeed in order as a hedge against overenthusiasm in this context, as 
in any context.  That does not mean, however, and we think it is important to 
stress, that we must now reject all good news and submit to an equally 
irrational backlash of pessimism.  Some substantial exuberance remains 
justified, as we shall see. 
First, consider the CATIE study itself.  What can be made of the results?  
Not a great deal we feel, at least not such as has legal policy implications.  The 
study has too many built-in limitations for that.  We will describe some of 
these in the extended footnote below and include two charts in an appendix to 
 
been other studies whose results questioned the larger claims of the new drugs’ superiority, but 
these studies did not have much traction.  Some of this research was done abroad.  John Geddes et 
al., Atypical Antipsychotics in the Treatment of Schizophrenia: Systematic Overview and Meta-
Regression Analysis, 321 BRIT. MED. J. 1371, 1371 (2000) (finding that “atypical antipsychotics 
had no benefits in terms of efficacy or overall tolerability, [though] they still caused fewer 
extrapyramidal side effects” and concluding that the cheaper conventional drugs should be used 
“unless the patient has previously not responded to these drugs or has unacceptable 
extrapyramidal side effects”).  E.g., S. Leucht et al., Efficacy and Extrapyramidal Side Effects of 
the New Antipsychotics Olanzapine, Quetiapine, Risperidone, and Sertindole Compared to 
Conventional Antipsychotics and Placebo: A Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 35 
SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 51, 51 (1999) (concluding that all the new anti-psychotics were more 
effective than placebo, but that “contrary to wide-spread opinion,” the conventional drugs and 
new drugs were on many measures only “slightly superior” to the old drugs). 
 95. Robert Rosenheck, The Growth of Psychopharmacology in the 1990s: Evidence-Based 
Practice or Irrational Exuberance, 28 INT’L. J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 467 (2005).  Rosenheck is well 
known as a ferocious critic of the drug industry, and his article should be read with that in mind.  
One reason for the scarcity of data comparing the first generation drugs with the later drugs is that 
much of the research has been on the order of comparing new drugs against placebo, or 
comparisons between and among new drugs.  The latter, aided and abetted by the fact that the 
drug companies sponsor much of the research and control the published results, does not always 
produce the most usable or for that matter credible information.  For an analysis of atypical drug 
trials that is more scientifically oriented than the Rosenheck piece, see generally Stephan Heres et 
al., Why Olanzapine Beats Risperidone, Risperidone Beats Quetiapine, and Quetiapine Beats 
Olanzapine: An Exploratory Analysis of Head-to-Head Comparison Studies of Second-
Generation Antipsychotics, 163 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 185 (2006). 
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give an overview of the finer medical details.96  We use a footnote for this 
purpose not only because we are hesitant to interrupt the narrative too much, 
but also because we feel the study does not deserve more play in this narrative.  
 
 96. The CATIE study’s method was to randomly assign a total of 1,493 schizophrenic 
patients recruited for this purpose from sites throughout the U.S. to receive a flexible (determined 
by the treating doctor) but conservative dosage of one of the four new generation drugs or of one 
“midpotency” first generation antipsychotic for up to eighteen months.  Lieberman, supra note 
91, at 1209, 1211.  The primary measure of relative efficacy was “time to the discontinuation of 
treatment for any cause,” with the cause, inefficacy, intolerable side effects, or any other reasons, 
recorded as a matter of high secondary, explanatory interest.  Id. at 1212.  While imminently 
defensible to the extent that, as the researchers put it, time to discontinuation is a discrete 
outcome selected because discontinuation or changing of medication is a frequent occurrence in 
the treatment of schizophrenia and because it “integrates patients’ and clinicians’ judgments of 
efficacy, safety and tolerability into a global measure of effectiveness that reflects their evaluation 
of therapeutic benefits in relation to undesirable side effects,” it by definition emphasizes the 
negative at the expense of a more textured look at what is gained.  Id. at 1211.  In addition, the 
study’s method in effect encouraged discontinuation from treatment with the assigned drug.  
Given randomization, it is inevitable that a large number of patients were “randomized” to a to-
them less effective drug than the one they were on before the study started.  Many would 
recognize this sooner rather than later and discontinue or switch their medication in short order.  
For other patients and their doctors mere curiosity would be enough of a motivator to switch 
medications in a study of this type, given the ever-present hope to do better and to do better with 
fewer untoward effects.  By measuring discontinuation from the first-assigned drug the research 
thus creates a perversely negative image of the sort of trial-and-error treatment that is in fact the 
hallmark of effective psychopharmacology in the real world, where the ultimate goal is to 
continue treatment and to promote adherence via selection of a drug for which the patient’s 
tolerance is optimum.  Finally, the administration in the study of low, possibly sub-therapeutic, 
dosages of medication may have depressed efficacy results just as they reduced, per the study’s 
intent, the risk of bad side effects.  Even at that, the results preserve significant advantages for 
selected atypicals, though this is all but hidden by the report’s preoccupation with the global cost-
benefit equation.  One of the second generation drugs in particular, olanzapine, seems to have 
come out as appreciably more effective on critical measures than the first generation drug used as 
well as compared to the other atypicals.  It had the lowest rate of discontinuations (though the rate 
was high for all, for reasons speculated about above and not disconfirmed by the finding that by 
far the most prevalent reason for stopping was an undifferentiated, unexplained “patient’s 
decision”) as well as superior efficacy as measured by reduction in psychopathology, duration of 
successful treatment, and rate of hospitalization or rehospitalization for exacerbation of 
symptoms.  This was purchased at the cost of greater weight gain among patients taking 
olanzapine and related undesirable metabolic effects.  Against this one disadvantage, however, 
stands the substantial evidence developed in earlier studies and acknowledged by the CATIE 
researchers in their report, id. at 1210, that olanzapine as well as the other atypicals produce far 
fewer neurological or extrapyramidal effects than the old typicals and are appreciably more 
efficacious than the old drugs in reducing the negative symptoms of schizophrenia such as lack of 
emotion, interest, and expression.  See John M. Davis et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Efficacy of 
Second-Generation Antipsychotics, 60 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 553, 553, 560 (2003).  In the 
service of full disclosure and out of concern that the actual results might get lost in the advocacy, 
we summarize this research in Tables 1 & 2, see infra Appendix, one comparing side effects 
among and between typical and atypical drugs, the other comparing efficacy. 
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In some ways, as the medical author of this Article put it when first weighing 
what sort of response would be appropriate, the less said about CATIE the 
better.  And this is not because we want to hide the “bad news” but rather 
because it is too much “no news.”  The limitations of the CATIE study 
severely restrict its capacity to verify or negate the claimed advantages of the 
new, second generation atypicals; much less do its results speak to the drug 
“debate” as it is waged in the legal cases and commentaries of today or 
yesterday.97 
The lack of a clearer picture emerging from the CATIE study on 
neurological side effects such as tardive dyskinesia (TD) is especially 
unfortunate given the condition’s prominence in the legal mythology on 
treatment refusals.98  As a result, FDA labeling that no antipsychotic has been 
shown to have a lower risk for TD than any other will probably remain in 
effect for the time being.99  The evidence continues to accumulate, however, 
that the risk of TD is very low with the new drugs, in effect nonexistent for 
some.  New evidence also affirms that it was overstated for the older drugs and 
even that some symptoms which were thought to be TD are spontaneously 
occurring dyskinesia that is part of the symptomatology of schizophrenia.100  
As one of the leading researchers on schizophrenia puts it, “A wide variety of 
neurological abnormalities have been reported in individuals with 
schizophrenia who have never been treated with antipsychotic 
medications”101—have long been reported, for two centuries in fact, long 
before there were antipsychotics. 
The evidence also continues to accumulate and solidify that all drugs, old 
or new, produce major gains and help safeguard against psychiatric loss that 
 
 97. As the foregoing material in both the text and footnotes indicates, there is genuine 
controversy in psychiatry about the efficacy gains of the new drugs over the old ones, especially 
in light of the formers’ higher costs.  But this is largely irrelevant to the central aspect of the legal 
debate which is whether or not to administer drugs.  The fact of the matter is there is no 
alternative, less restrictive or otherwise, to drug treatment for patients with major mental 
disorders be it with typicals or atypicals.  As to the side effects, the other half of the legal 
controversy, it is today pretty much a non-issue given contemporary treatment realities.  This 
includes the relatively short periods of mandated treatment to which patients might be exposed, 
the options to choose from among various drugs with varying side effects, the availability of 
medications that counteract undesirable effects, and last, when it comes to the side effects of 
greatest concern, the so-called extrapyramidal effects, it can be concluded that, some hesitancies 
stemming from the CATIE study notwithstanding, the profile of the new generation of drugs is 
that they are largely risk-free in this regard. 
 98. Paul R. Benson, Factors Associated with Antipsychotic Drug Prescribing by Southern 
Psychiatrists, 21 MED. CARE 639–40 (1983). 
 99. See Rosenheck, supra note 95, at 475. 
 100. Id. 
 101. E. Fuller Torrey, Studies of Individuals with Schizophrenia Never Treated with 
Antipsychotic Medications: A Review, 58 SCHIZOPHRENIA RES. 101 (2002). 
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occurs in the absence of treatment and cannot be recouped even after treatment 
is initiated.  Recent studies document disturbingly high percentages of 
untreated mental illness or treatment that is interrupted against medical advice, 
this, in a context where the law’s preoccupation continues, anachronistically, to 
be with alleged unneeded and unwanted treatment.  A 2001 report of a 
National Comorbidity Survey conducted between 1990 and 1992 found that 
less than forty percent of a cohort of seriously mentally ill patients received 
stable treatment, with the primary reason for failure to seek treatment or failing 
to continue being the subjects’ unwillingness or inability to see the need.102  
The prognosis for these patients is a diminishing chance of amelioration or 
recovery as relapses mount and symptoms increase in acuity, severity (negative 
symptoms in particular), and resistance to remediation.103  At the same time, 
studies on adherence to drug treatment, many conducted in the context of 
attempts to evaluate the merits of  so-called outpatient commitment (OPC),104 
show the benefits of treatment and especially continued treatment, even for the 
minimally symptomatic, on virtually all important personal and social 
measures: i.a., reduced hospital recidivism, reduced criminal recidivism, 
reduced violent behavior,105 as well as reduced victimization;106 quality of life 
improvements such as measured by reduced psychiatric symptomatology and 
better functioning;107 and systemic gains in terms of less discordant and more 
appropriate use of the mental health and correctional systems, respectively, for 
 
 102. Ronald C. Kessler et al., The Prevalence and Correlates of Untreated Serious Mental 
Illness, 36 HEALTH SERV. RES. 987, 987 (2001). 
 103. E.g., Charles M. Beasley Jr. et al., Is Quality of Life Among Minimally Symptomatic 
Patients with Schizophrenia Better Following Withdrawal or Continuation of Antipsychotic 
Treatment?, 26 J. OF CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 40, 40, 43 (2006); D.A.W. Johnson et 
al., The Discontinuance of Maintenance Neuroleptic Therapy in Chronic Schizophrenic Patients: 
Drug and Social Consequences, 67 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVICA 339, 339 (1983); Diana 
O. Perkins et al., Relationships Between Duration of Untreated Psychosis and Outcome in First-
Episode Schizophrenia: A Critical Review and Meta Analysis, 162 AM J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1785, 
1785 (2005). 
 104. See infra Part V.B. 
 105. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Arrests 
Among Persons with Severe Mental Illness?, 28 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 156, 158–59 (2001); 
Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Involuntary Out-Patient Commitment and Reduction of Violent 
Behaviour in Persons With Severe Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 324, 324 (2000); 
Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism?: 
Findings from a Randomized Trial with Severely Mentally Ill Individuals, 156 AM. J. OF 
PSYCHIATRY 1968, 1968, 1974 (1999). 
 106. Virginia Aldigé Hiday et al., Impact of Outpatient Commitment on Victimization of 
People With Severe Mental Illness, 159 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 1403, 1403 (2002). 
 107. Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Effects of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on Subjective 
Quality of Life in Persons With Severe Mental Illness, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 473 (2003). 
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mentally ill people who come into contact with the law as well as appreciable 
gains in housing situations, i.e., reductions in homelessness.108 
Finally, as mentioned, new findings and confirmation of older study 
results, which document the relationship between schizophrenia and lack of 
insight as one of the latter being a neurological function or symptom of the 
former (anognosia), provide strengthening support for a best-medical-interests 
decision-making model in mental health matters.109  The implications of the 
concept of anognosia for treatment compliance are self-evident.  A person who 
believes he is not sick will resist treatment at all stages and levels.  To the 
extent the implications for the person’s mental health (negative, as they would 
be for most any untreated somatic illness) are not equally self-evident, they 
have been described and documented in studies such as those cited in the 
preceding paragraph.  Lastly, while the details may ultimately bedevil some or 
many, we believe no spelling out is required of anognosia’s implication in 
principle regarding the need for and propriety of the option of legal coercion in 
mental health treatment.  Much as we might want and desirable as it may seem, 
we cannot afford to limit mental health treatment to its entirely voluntary 
provision and acceptance. 
These then are the contemporary medical facts against whose backdrop we 
proceed with the analysis in the remainder of this Article. 
II.  ONCE AGAIN: WHAT IS THE LEGAL DEBATE ABOUT? 
The overwhelming jurisprudential consensus today is that mental patients 
have, like all other citizens, a right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, or at 
least a right and an opportunity to articulate their objections.110  Virtually every 
 
 108. Haya Ascher-Svanum et al., Medication Adherence and Long-Term Functional 
Outcomes in the Treatment of Schizophrenia in Usual Care, 67 J. OF CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 453, 453 
(2006). 
 109. See McEvoy et al., Measuring Chronic Schizophrenia Patients’ Attitudes, supra note 73; 
see also Xavier F. Amador et al., Awareness of Illness in Schizophrenia, 17 SCHIZOPHRENIA 
BULLETIN 113, 113 (1991); Xavier F. Amador & Regina A. Seckinger, The Assessment of 
Insight: A Methodological Review, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 798, 798 (1997); Anthony S. David, 
Insight and Psychosis, 156 BRIT. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 798, 798 (1990); Faith B. Dickerson et al., 
Lack of Insight Among Outpatients with Schizophrenia, 48 PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 195, 195 (1997); 
Craig Goodman et al., Insight into Illness in Schizophrenia, 46 COMPR. PSYCHIATRY 284, 284 
(2005); McEvoy et al., Why Must Some Schizophrenic Patients Be Involuntarily Committed?, 
supra note 73. 
 110. A classic supporting citation here is to Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosps., 105 
N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).  In this venerable case, Justice (then-Judge) Cardozo wrote: “Every human 
being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own 
body.”  Id. at 93.  Of course the qualification “sound mind” draws into question the rights of 
mentally ill individuals, just as “adult years” renders equivocal the right of minors to make their 
own health decisions.  Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 604 (1979), shows the extent to which 
the rights of minors may be qualified when it comes to making mental health decisions.  The 
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court that has ruled on the matter—irrespective of whether the patients were 
civil or “criminal,” voluntary or involuntary—has recognized that the patients 
have what is called a due process-protected liberty interest in not being 
medicated against their will.111  There are also state tort laws against 
unauthorized touching (battery), natural law concepts averring to the rights and 
entitlements of personhood, Bill of Rights claims stemming from the First 
Amendment’s protection of free speech, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
against cruel and unusual punishment, “penumbral” privacy rights that 
emanate from the overall constitutional firmament, and any number of other 
legal theories that can and have been invoked to protect patients from 
unwanted treatment.112  But when it comes to establishing a generally 
recognized and enforceable protective shield for patients, most lawyer 
advocates and the judges who hear them prefer to construct it on the due 
 
Parham case is ultimately about procedure, which we will show to be the crux of the matter for 
the adult mentally ill as well. 
 111. Classic cites here are to Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1147–48 (D.N.J. 1978), 
modified, 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), vacated, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 
judgment vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), remanded to, 720 F.2d 266 (1983), and Rogers v. Okin, 
478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).  
Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), and Rogers v. Commissioner, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 
1983), are seen to have “established” this proposition in the civil commitment context.  But there 
are dozens of other cases, in a variety of legal contexts (a number of which will be explicitly 
reviewed later in this Article), that make the same point in the same terminology.  This includes 
several cases that provide only scant procedural protection to patients who seek to exercise the 
right.  See, e.g., Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221–22 (1990); United States v. Charters 
(Charters II), 863 F.2d 302, 305–07 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).  In Mills, the Supreme Court 
assumed without deciding the existence of a right to refuse treatment for mentally ill persons.  
Mills, 457 U.S. at 304.  By the time it decided Harper ten years later, the Court “had no doubt” 
about it.  494 U.S. at 221–22. 
 112. For example, the court in Davis v. Hubbard, after listing most of the competing theories 
for finding a right to refuse, said its source “can best be understood as substantive due process, or 
. . . as an aspect of ‘liberty’ guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”  506 F. Supp. 915, 929 (N.D. Ohio 1980).  Judge Coffin, in Rogers v. Okin, equally 
thought this to be the source for the right, “most likely as part of the penumbral right to privacy, 
bodily integrity, or personal security.”  634 F.2d at 653 (emphasis added).  Yet another way to 
conceptualize it is to see the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating and applying to the states, 
who may not by the Amendment’s mandate deprive its citizens of liberty without due process, the 
four or five federal Bill of Rights Amendments thought to be the source of the patient’s right to 
refuse.  Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360.  Whether the conceptualizations of the right or interest as 
an aspect of the thing itself or a part of something else or an incorporation via something else are 
reconcilable or, for that matter, intelligible, is the sort of issue few lawyers, let alone lay folks, 
worry much about.  In any event, following the federal constitutional “genesis” of the right to 
refuse treatment, state law or interpretations thereof—both statutory and constitutional—has 
become available as a complementary source for the right, indeed, a source even of an expanded, 
procedurally better protected, version of the right.  See, e.g., Rogers, 458 N.E. 2d at 314–15, for 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court’s articulation of the right based, ostensibly, on state law. 
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process concept (when they do not just fold these other theories into the 
concept).113 
To doctors, this language of due process-protectable liberty interests will 
be unfamiliar and the reasoning behind what is embedded in, implied by, or 
derived from it perhaps arcane.  It certainly won’t resonate with them as it does 
with the legally initiated.  Even so, there is every reason for doctors to support 
this particular application of the theory and the language that seeks to advance 
it.  For one, to agree to the accordance via the due process theory or otherwise 
of a general human right to a specific population disadvantaged by past 
withholding of the right or vulnerable to continued disempowerment if not 
discrimination is a humane position to take—liberal in the classic sense of the 
term.  Second, and more directly pertinent to our discussion, it is a position 
every doctor can live with, so to speak, because the extension as per the Due 
Process Clause of a right to refuse treatment to mental patients need not and 
does not, in and of itself, interfere with the doctor’s ability to treat the patients 
when and as well as necessary.  The reason is that the obstructions erected by 
the patient’s opposing will and wishes can be overcome when and where 
medically needed by virtue of the fact that, as the courts never tire of saying, 
due process rights are not absolute substantively and are wholly flexible 
procedurally.114 
 
 113. See supra note 112. 
 114. One could cite in support of this proposition the major mental health law cases that are 
the subject of this Article.  However, prison law cases provide the more dramatic example.  As 
recently as a century and a quarter ago, prisoners were considered slaves of the state, dead men, 
for legal purposes, having no rights or claims of right whatsoever.  Ruffin v. The Commonwealth, 
62 Va. 790, 796 (Ct. of App. Va. 1871).  But gradually during the twentieth century, and not so 
gradually during its latter part and the civil rights revolution of the 1960s and ’70s, this position 
gave way to a consensus that prisoners retained many of their legal and constitutional rights 
subject to curtailment by the state, primarily if not only in the face of legitimate penological 
counter-interests.  These penological counter-interests defined the substantive due process limits 
for prisoners.  As for procedure, prisoners’ rights came to be protected by a due process mandate 
that varied from a “modicum” of formality in contexts such as disciplinary cases, including major 
infractions where loss of good-behavior time was a potential outcome (in effect lengthening 
confinement),  Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1985), and Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 
539, 556–57 (1974), to hearings with substantial trial-like trappings, required for example when 
the state contemplated the transfer of a prisoner to a mental hospital (with associated 
stigmatization and potentially invasive treatment), Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980).  
Among the mystifications of constitutional analysis to lay readers, the distinction between 
substantive due process and procedural due process, or even the very identification of these 
concepts, probably ranks well up there.  Process to the ordinary mind is just that: process, 
procedure.  Even some judges, especially those of conservative bent, have expressed bafflement.  
Judge Posner of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for example has labeled substantive 
due process an “oxymoron,” in the same sense that its procedural counterpart would be a 
redundancy.  Illinois Psychological Ass’n v. Falk, 818 F.2d 1337, 1342 (7th Cir. 1987).  A more 
politically charged assessment, one made by jurists who subscribe to a philosophy of “judicial 
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That the patient’s right to refuse treatment is not absolute substantively 
means it may at some point have to give way to other important interests, 
classically to more “compelling” state interests when these are weighed, as by 
constitutional precedent they must be, against the individual’s interests.115  In 
most instances that concern us, it is the doctor who stands in the state’s 
authoritative “shoes.”  So it is the interests of the doctor or the medical or 
correctional institution where he or she works, if not the state itself (the first 
two are typically listed as respondents in right-to-refuse litigation) which are 
pitted against the patient’s interests and which in the proper circumstances may 
trump the patient’s right to refuse.  The only question is what circumstances 
are proper under what legal criteria and provable by what proof? 
More important yet than its substantive relativity is the procedural 
flexibility of due process.  This is because the theoretical possibility of the 
state’s right trumping the patient’s right in some situations can be vitiated for 
all practical purposes by the requirement of costly, cumbersome, and time-
consuming procedures that must be followed in the decision-making process.  
The legal precedents on what constitutes procedural due process show a wide 
range, from very quick and informal “proceedings” (the word suggests too 
 
restraint” against their more activist brethren, is that substantive due process is a convenient myth 
that empowers judges to do as they please on the bench—to strike down as unconstitutional 
whatever displeases them.  Having raised these questions about the nature and meaning of due 
process, we will in this Article, for pragmatic reasons, proceed as if they had not been broached 
and as if they have no bearing on the analysis. 
 115. The point is made explicitly in almost all of the right to refuse decisions, no matter what 
their outcome.  Even the least compromising advocates for patient-plaintiffs will concede that the 
state can override the patient’s right in some situations.  See, e.g., Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1352, 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 F.2d at 654.  Emergencies are pretty much universally conceded 
to be a circumstance, for plaintiffs often the only one, under which the patient’s right must give 
way to the interventions of those appointed to deal with the alleged dangers of the moment, 
whose true scope and reality there is no time to assess.  Of course there can be disagreements over 
what constitutes an emergency, as there were in Rogers where the defendants gave a psychiatric 
definition that to the plaintiff’s side seemed like any psychiatric reason.  478 F. Supp. at 1364.  
But all the real battles, legal and otherwise, are over medical authority in non-emergency 
situations.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), is the leading precedent for the 
procedural aspects of this non-absolutist proposition.  The case requires courts to weigh or 
balance the private (individual’s) interests against the public (state’s) interests in determining 
whether a given procedure that regulates a particular practice is constitutional.  It goes so far as to 
not only require inquiry into the effect of existing procedures on these respective interests, but 
also an assessment of the costs and benefits of additional or substitute procedures proposed by 
one party or the other.  That this can get pretty intricate goes without saying.  For one of the 
earliest, oft-cited expressions of the general proposition that fundamental rights are not absolute, 
but subject to regulation by the state for reasons of health and safety, see Jacobson v. 
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905). 
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much already) to full-fledged, even multiple, court adjudications.116  Any and 
all of it may satisfy due process.  How much process is due in any given 
situation depends precisely on that situation, on the interests involved, the 
stakes, the costs, the benefits, the feasibility of more or the economy of less of 
it, and so forth. 
Properly understood thus, due process suggests an ordering of the 
substantive interests to reflect their relative weight or importance and a 
tailoring of procedure to whatever the situation mandates or tolerates. 
This then is what it comes down to, what our Article on the right to refuse, 
any article on the subject, must begin with acknowledging: all patients have a 
legally, even constitutionally, protected right to refuse treatment.  There is no 
disagreement on this and need not be.  Nor, despite its constitutionally 
protected status, is there any doubt that this right of a patient, who in most 
cases will have been formally declared incompetent but even when not,117 in 
 
 116. To preview a bit, the maximum dose of due process prescribed is in cases such as 
Rogers, 458 N.E.2d 308, while the minimum is exemplified by the Charters II decision.  863 F.2d 
302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc).  In recognition of the reality that the procedural protections for 
refusers may be minimal indeed, we phrased the right to refuse three paragraphs earlier in the text 
as a right to articulate objections.  In some situations it is no more than that.  Perhaps this is really 
all human decency—or to be more academic, the respect-for-persons principle—requires.  The 
Charters II minimalism came in the context of and was influenced by the patient’s incompetence 
to stand trial.  But we feel, against the state of the prevailing law, that patients who are 
involuntarily committed to civil hospitals should have no more elaborate a right to refuse 
treatment in terms of ascertainable time to be “bought” or protective procedure to be invoked to 
sustain their refusal once they have made their objection known.  We do not mean to suggest 
involuntarily committed patients have no right to refuse at all, as some thought our earlier article 
intimated.  Our point then was, and remains now, only that the issue of the patient’s decision-
making capacity, and thus his or her very competence to refuse, should be disposed of either as 
part of, or as nearly as is feasible, simultaneously to, the decision to commit.  As we said then and 
repeat now, there is no point in or logic to committing patients for treatment (thus taking away 
their liberty in the largest, most conspicuous sense) only to allow them to litigate at length in 
another court whether or not once they walk through the hospital door they will in fact be treated.  
Or, take even the right to refuse of the involuntary patient’s legal opposite, the voluntary patient.  
Though it is labeled absolute, as opposed to the involuntary patient’s qualified right, it is hardly 
more substantial.  An exercise of the right to refuse on the voluntary patient’s part beyond mere 
articulation will typically result in a discharge against medical advice.  But in being discharged 
the voluntary patient pays a distinctly untherapeutic price for the assertion of this unqualified 
right.  The alternate, “therapeutic,” possibility is that the doctor will initiate civil commitment 
proceedings against the patient, which involves a loss of rights and liberty greater than being 
coerced to take an antipsychotic drug. 
 117. The incompetency may relate to the patient’s capacity to decide to be hospitalized, or 
treated as an outpatient, or even his or her capacity to stand trial or be sentenced, competencies 
that can and have been distinguished from the competency to make “actual” treatment decisions, 
but that is not material.  The state in pursuit of its wide-ranging parens patriae and police powers 
may override the will of even a competent person given sufficiently compelling reasons, such as 
the patient’s dangerousness (within or without the institution) or even contagiousness (a form of  
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some situations must yield to superior interests, in particular the interests of 
treating doctors, those they represent, or both.  The “issue” is how much and 
what kind of process must be observed to override the patient’s refusal, should 
that be considered medically necessary.  This is where opinions, both legal and 
lay, diverge.  And the legal and medical contexts in which the refusal is 
asserted will have everything to do with what the answer is or, better as there is 
no consensus here, what we think the answer ought to be.  This is the crux of 
the matter.  From this vantage point we will proceed to examine the pertinent 
cases, statutes, and how we will come to our own conclusions about what sort 
of legal right-to-refuse regimen makes most sense. 
III.  WHERE WERE WE IN 1991? 
There is no one agreed upon “short list” of cases that dominated the right-
to-refuse jurisprudence of the 1980s when the concept first gained full 
recognition, but any such list likely would include the following: Rennie v. 
Klein,118 Rogers v. Okin,119 Davis v. Hubbard,120 and Bee v. Greaves.121  We 
would add to this list United States v. Charters,122 for reasons we will spell out 
later.  The first three of these cases, Rennie, Rogers, and Davis, each took 
many years to complete,123 winding their way from first initiation of the action 
 
dangerousness) or simply because the integrity of the legal process mandates it.  Again, 
previewing some of the involuntary treatment cases, see Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 
(2003) (forcible treatment of criminally accused to restore for trial); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346 (1997) (civil commitment of recidivism-prone compulsive sex offender); Washington v. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (forcible treatment of “dangerous” convict); Jones v. United States, 
463 U.S. 354 (1983) (treatment or restoration of “morally innocent” criminal offender); Jacobson, 
197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination and quarantine for contagious medical disease); United States v. 
Charters, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988); and Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 
1972) (civil mental health commitment).  It is also worth noting that the best or better medical 
interests of the patient, whether competent or not, may conflict with his or her legal interests or 
assertions not to be treated.  It is not always the state that stands in opposition to the individual, 
who in a sense may be at war with him or herself. 
 118. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978). 
 119. 478 F. Supp. 1342, 1361–62, 1364–65 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), Rogers v. 
Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). 
 120. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
 121. 744 F.2d 1387, 1391 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 122. United States v. Charters (Charters II), 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); United 
States v. Charters (Charters I), 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 123. The several years that it took to litigate these cases in various fora, Rennie v. Klein, 476 
F. Supp. 1294, 1297 (D.N.J. 1979) (initial complaint filed in 1977); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 
at 1353 (patient-plaintiff class first certified in 1975); and Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 916 n.1 (first 
single-judge U.S. district court order issued in 1974), is nowhere near long in the context of 
institutional litigation.  A major prison case, Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), 
for example, was actively open for twenty-plus years, and only then did it wind down to less than 
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to final decision via a route that took them not only through one or several 
appeals (some interim or interlocutory, as opposed to from a final order), 
including side trips to the United States Supreme Court in the cases of Rennie 
and Rogers, but also, as in the latter, a switch for its final denouement from the 
federal forum to the State’s and a change in the name of the defendant party—
not once, but twice.124  The other two had a shorter, somewhat less tortuous, 
legal lifespan.  Merely to order these cases chronologically presents hazards, as 
it is difficult to find agreement on precisely when each of these cases began or 
ended.125  Much depends on the bendable fact of what one considers the first 
 
active status with most of the major issues resolved and the court having formally relinquished 
jurisdiction over them.  Ruiz v. Estelle, 161 F.3d 814, 816 (5th Cir. 1998).  The 1980 date cited 
for the Ruiz case is the date when the district court entered its decision on the merits and issued its 
first decree in the case, which had been originally filed in 1972.  Id.  Some matters were still 
under the court’s jurisdiction in the early 1990s.  Id. at 814; see also Clarence J. Sundram, Wyatt 
v. Stickway, A Long Odyssey Reaches an End, AAMR Reading Room, Apr. 6, 2007, 
http://www.aamr.org/Reading-Room/pdf/wyatt.shtml (reporting on the termination after thirty-
three years of this major right-to-treatment case from Alabama, a period during which, as the 
author notes, there had been seven U.S. presidents, nine Alabama governors, and fourteen state 
mental health commissioners). 
 124. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 
1979), modified, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), 720 F.2d 266 (3d 
Cir. 1983); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 
F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), Rogers v. 
Comm’r, 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983).  Again, for a case of even moderate length, the feature of 
a change in the named defendant is routine (directors of major, frequently sued bureaucracies or 
institutions tend not to last that long).  The Ruiz case cited above became Ruiz v. McKaskle, 724 
F.2d 1149 (5th 1984), in 1984 when Texas Department of Corrections (TDC) Director W.J. 
Estelle, Jr., had had enough and resigned.  After that it was Ruiz v. McCotter, 661 F. Supp. 112 
(S.D. Tex. 1986), and perhaps other, later designations (one loses track once personal 
involvement in the case ceases).  There are a half dozen or so landmark cases in which the named 
defendant is Estelle owing to the fact that “Jim” Estelle directed TDC during many of its legally 
more contentious years, the lesson being that if one wants to achieve a measure of legal fame or 
infamy one should become head of Corrections in a large, preferably southern, state.  See, e.g., 
Williams v. Estelle, 566 F. Supp. 1376 (S.D. Tex. 1983); Rummel v. Estelle, 498 F. Supp. 793 
(W.D. Tex. 1980).  TDC Director Procunier had a number of major California cases to his name 
as a result of directing that state’s correctional department before he came to run the Texas 
prisons and garnered a few more.  See, e.g., Gordon v. Procunier, 629 F. Supp. 192 (S.D. Tex. 
1985); Clark v. Procunier, 617 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Tex. 1985).  Florida’s DOC director has given 
us several major Wainwright decisions spanning a period from the late 1960s to the mid 1980s.  
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Zamora v. Wainwright, 610 F. Supp. 159 
(S.D. Fla. 1985); Brown v. Wainwright, 459 F. Supp. 244 (M.D. Fla. 1978); Adderly v. 
Wainwright, 272 F. Supp. 530 (M.D. Fla. 1967). 
 125. See supra note 123, in regard to the matter of selecting the starting date of a case or any 
series of cases.  The date of a case’s completion tends to be no easier to determine consistently.  
See, e.g., Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980), whose formal citation suggests 
a final decision at the end of the decade of the 1970s when in fact several issues were still open at 
the time.  This, too, is characteristic of big institutional litigation.  See supra note 124. 
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and last significant action in each case.126  The lack of a clear, straight-line 
chronology ensures that there is no straight-line doctrinal development that can 
be discerned from the cases either.  Instead, one finds a multi-directional 
reliance by any one of the courts on early and interim decisions of the others, 
as well as the later results, in what is perhaps best, or at least most 
sympathetically, characterized as a process of abundant legal cross-
fertilization. 
The cases also come from different legal contexts and their outcomes are, 
for that reason as well as others to be explained, hardly identical.  What they 
all have in common though, except for Charters,127 is that they are cited again 
and again not only during their progress to finality but in the years after the 
final outcomes were handed down.  And, they are cited as much for the 
verbiage and the rhetoric they employ as for their outcomes, if not more so.  In 
fact, the way the cases are used by advocates and academic commentators alike 
suggests a heavy-on-the-process, need-to-police-the-psychiatrists solidarity 
that fails to reflect the substantial differences in the diagnoses of the issue and 
the consequent remedies proposed or imposed by the various courts. 
A. The Bad News in the Civil Commitment Context 
Take for example Rennie v. Klein.128  To the extent it is cited in the Rogers 
case (which itself is generally recognized as the other of the two classic right-
to-refuse cases from the civil commitment context) as the case announcing the 
right, Rennie is considered the source of the right.  Yet, Rennie is a case that at 
each and all points along its meandering route to final disposition is in fact 
reasonably deferential to medical decision-making authority. 
The plaintiff-petitioner, John Rennie, was a man with longstanding mental 
disorder who had been hospitalized on numerous occasions, in fact twelve 
times in the six years leading up to the litigation.129  It was during his last 
 
 126. Dating a case can even depend on which issue one chooses as most significant.  For 
example, the Charters litigation, Charters I, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987), and Charters II, 863 
F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc), could be said to have begun in 1974 with judicial inquiry into 
the competency matter or not until 1976 if one decides the forcible medication of the patient 
marks the relevant beginning of the treatment dispute. 
 127. Charters I, the panel decision, is not cited because it was overruled by the full court in 
Charters II.  See Charters II, 863 F.2d at 314.  The latter decision is not usable to plaintiff 
advocates because of the minimal process it prescribes.  See id.  Even defense advocates may be 
prone to avoid it for the reason that the clients they represent can accommodate, and would not 
necessarily object to, more process and because the case’s procedural minimalism makes it 
vulnerable to being rejected as a precedent. 
 128. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978), 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), modified, 653 F.2d 
836 (3rd Cir. 1981), vacated, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), 720 F.2d 266 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
 129. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d at 267 (summarizing the case’s history in the court of appeals’ 
second review of the dispute). 
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institutionalization, involuntary this time, to Ancora Psychiatric Hospital, a 
public facility in New Jersey, that Rennie asserted his right to refuse with the 
persistence and legal backing that turned it into the sort of dispute that 
generates landmark rulings for whole classes of individuals (in this case all 
adult patients involuntarily committed to any of New Jersey’s five state mental 
health facilities).130 
New Jersey doctors had been medicating unwilling patients pursuant to a 
state administrative regulation.131  That regulation provided a fairly elaborate, 
but manageable, set of both substantive and procedural standards.  It required 
the treating physician to base his decision to administer the drugs to the patient 
on one of three alternative findings: (1) that the patient will harm himself or 
others if not medicated; (2) the patient will not improve without taking the 
medication; or (3) he can improve without taking the drugs, but only at a 
significantly slower rate.132 
Procedurally, the regulation mandated that the physician meet with the 
patient to explain his or her assessment of the patient’s condition, the reasons 
for prescribing the medication, and the benefits and risks of taking the 
medication as well as those of alternative courses of action.133  If the patient 
protested, the doctor was required to encourage the patient to discuss the 
matter with relatives or friends while the physician him or herself was required 
to consult with the patient’s treatment team.134  If the patient persisted in his 
refusal, the doctor was required to submit the case to the facility’s medical 
director who was to approve the recommended course of action before any 
medication could be administered.135 
The district court took several passes at the case because of the shifting 
situation of the petitioner, Rennie, who for a period had no issue with his 
treatment regimen until he deteriorated and was again prescribed a drug, 
Thorazine, which he did not want.136  The court’s ultimate holding consisted of 
two essential findings: (1) that the petitioner and members of the similarly 
 
 130. Id.  There are only four state hospitals today in New Jersey.  Angela Valdez, N.J. Plans 
to Release Psychiatric Patients, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 21, 2001, at B1.  The fifth and 
largest facility, Marlboro Psychiatric Hospital, was shut down in 1998.  Iver Peterson, At 67, 
Marlboro Mental Hospital Closes, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1998, at B6.  The remaining four facilities 
have had populations exceeding their planned capacities (undoubtedly lower than in the heyday of 
state institutionalizations) ever since, according to Mary Zdanowicz, J.D., executive director of 
the Treatment Advocacy Center (TAC), Mary T. Zdanowicz, Editorial, Dealing with the 
Dangerously Ill; Maryland and Virginia Offer Little Defense, WASH. POST, May, 21 2006, at B8, 
who used to work at the Marlboro facility and attended its closing ceremony. 
 131. See Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d at 274 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp.  1294, 1297 (D.N.J. 1979). 
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situated class of involuntary patients in New Jersey’s mental hospitals had a 
constitutionally based privacy right to refuse treatment, a result that went 
beyond New Jersey law, which accorded such a right to voluntary patients only 
and (2) though acknowledging, even stressing, that this right was not 
unqualified, the court found the New Jersey administrative procedure for 
overriding a patient’s treatment refusal encoded in Bulletin 78-3 to be 
inadequately protective of  the right.137  The court wound up prescribing an 
alternate procedure for overriding patients’ refusals, but it remained relatively 
manageable.138 
What due process required, according to the district court, was that the 
treating doctor’s recommendation be reviewed and approved not just by fellow 
physicians and the medical director but also by an independent decision maker, 
that is, presumably someone from outside the facility.139  That decider need not 
be a judge or even an administrative hearing officer—in fact, the court 
suggested a psychiatrist was preferable140—though the patient at this limited 
hearing was entitled to representation, but by a public advocate of sorts and not 
necessarily by a lawyer.141 
Two considerations by the court of appeals followed,142 sandwiching a 
brief detour to the U.S. Supreme Court143 which vacated and remanded the 
case based on its then recent decision in Youngberg v. Romeo144 and the 
professional judgment rule therein espoused.  This remand prompted the court 
of appeals to drop, as inconsistent with Romeo, one requirement previously 
imposed below on the institutional physicians and reviewers—that the 
determination to medicate be made in legally explicit accordance with the least 
restrictive, least intrusive principle.145  The overall result was that the New 
 
 137. Id. at 1296, 1311. 
 138. Id. at 1311–12. 
 139. Id. at 1308. 
 140. Id. at 1312. 
 141. Rennie, 476 F. Supp. at 1311. 
 142. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 
1981). 
 143. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982). 
 144. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 145. Rennie, 653 F.2d at 846–47; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1147.  We say “legally explicit” in 
that doctors can ordinarily be presumed to make their medical intervention decisions based on the 
least intrusive principle and cannot or should not ordinarily be challenged on this.  The earlier 
Rennie decisions in effect did away with that presumption, holding that the medical deciders had 
to explicitly consider and justify their course of action as being least intrusive and that they could 
be challenged on this on the merits.  Rennie, 653 F.2d at 847; Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1147.  The 
post-Romeo holding, by contrast, says any challenge to the medical judgment cannot come until 
after the course of action has been implemented and it cannot be on the merits, is not a de novo 
reconsideration, but an inquiry limited into the matter of whether the judgment exercised was 
indeed professional.  Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269. 
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Jersey procedure in the Administrative Bulletin then met the protective 
mandates generated by even a constitutionally based right.146  The medical 
decision could be arrived at and implemented so long as the deciders followed 
the procedure outlined in the administrative regulation; and it would be 
sustained upon any court review (after initiation of treatment, i.e., post-
deprivation) so long as it was made “professionally”—by individuals trained 
and authorized to make them—and not arbitrarily.147  Among other things it 
freed the defendants, unlike many defendants facing directives issued by later 
courts adjudicating this type of dispute, from having to contend with such 
medically baseless claims as that restraints or seclusions or the use of 
tranquilizers on schizophrenic patients furnished reasonable, less intrusive 
options to treatment with antipsychotics.148 
From a medical perspective (or that of a legal advocate representing that 
perspective), the only downside of the final Rennie outcome was that the court 
of appeals in its last review interpreted the New Jersey administrative 
procedure to require, as a matter of substantive due process, a finding of 
dangerousness to self or others before involuntary medication could ensue.149  
The regulation, by contrast, merely listed that as one of three alternatives, two 
of which were straightforward medical standards.150  Treating doctors, of 
course, favor medical standards for medical decisions, not least in the case of 
patients involuntarily committed to their charges by the judiciary based on the 
patients’ inability to make that initial hospitalization decision and perforce 
already found dangerous.  If not plainly anomalous, having to prove or reprove 
such a fact would appear to be unnecessary and counterproductive to the 
objective of achieving maximally effective and efficient care of the patient 
population.151  But, in the context of what was to follow in terms of litigation 
and legislative outcomes subsequent to Rennie, this could be seen as only a 
minor drawback. 
 
 146. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 269. 
 147. Id. at 269–70. 
 148. See supra Part I for the proven proposition that restraints and seclusion or the 
administration of tranquilizers are not feasible alternatives for treating schizophrenics or other 
patients with severe mental disorders. 
 149. Rennie, 720 F.2d at 272. 
 150. Id. at 274 (Seitz, C.J., concurring). 
 151. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 454–55 (regarding the costs of the need to relitigate 
the treatment issue after the patient has been committed).  The literature cited there documents 
these costs and includes, i.a., such studies as Hoge, Gutheil & Kaplan, The Right to Refuse 
Treatment under Rogers v. Commissioner: Preliminary Empirical Findings and Comparisons, 15 
BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 163 (1987); Veliz & James, Medicine Court: Rogers in 
Practice, 144 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 62 (1987); Schouten & Gutheil, Aftermath of the Rogers 
Decision: Assessing the Costs, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1384 (1990).  Brakel & Davis, supra note 
1, at 454–55 nn.70, 71, 74. 
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In addition to thus yielding an outcome doctors could live with, Rennie 
also incorporated judicial reasoning and rhetoric that from a medical 
perspective was mostly benign, if not better.  The district court, for example, 
variously at one or the other of the two junctures in the case before it (1) made 
a generous acknowledgement of the efficacy of drug treatment (citing studies 
documenting success rates as high as ninty-five percent for first admission 
schizophrenic patients152 as well as the marked improvement of the original 
plaintiff-patient himself while on prolixin);153 (2) did not overemphasize the 
misuse or negative effects of the drugs, despite hearing expert testimony that 
tended in that direction;154 (3) appropriately rejected the First and Eighth 
Amendments as apposite theories for the plaintiffs’ claim or the relief 
requested;155 and (4) opined that, while some objections to medication are 
well-grounded (including at least one instance involving the named plaintiff) in 
“many” of the substantial number of treatment refusals in mental hospitals, the 
patient’s opposition stems from the “irrational components of his illness,”156 in 
marked contrast to claims accepted as fact by the courts in other cases 
regarding the intact reasoning capacity of the large majority of institutionalized 
mental patients.  There were some low points, too, in that the institutional 
administration and treatment staff also came in for heavy criticism of some of 
their specific decisions as well as their larger modus operandi, in the form of 
 
 152. Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1137 (D.N.J. 1978). 
 153. Id. at 1139. 
 154. Id. at 1136–38. 
 155. Id. at 1143–44.  To put it in unvarnished terms, use of the First and Eighth Amendments 
in right-to-refuse litigation is patently wrong-headed and demonstrates the users’ 
misapprehension (deliberate distortion?) of the nature of antipsychotic drugs and why they are 
administered.  Antipsychotics are given to psychotic patients in order to restore the brain’s 
chemical balance and thereby to restore normal, pre-morbid thinking and functioning to the extent 
possible.  Id. at 1137.  They do not infringe on the patient’s right of free speech or association in 
any sensible interpretation of that right.  Id. at 1144.  Contrary to what the anti-psychiatric 
advocates wish to allege, there is no constitutional due process protected right to be crazy.  And 
medicating an institutionalized patient, or for that matter a mentally ill outpatient, over his 
objections does not mean the “government” is engaging in political mind control or that it is 
pursuing some other bizarre, sinister scheme for dealing with or disposing of its “undesirable” 
citizens.  Nor does it constitute punishment in any commonsense or constitutionally accepted 
meaning of that term when doctors in public or private treatment settings medicate resisting 
patients.  Yet these are the kinds of scenarios on which legal advocates proceed when they invoke 
these amendments in support of their clients, many of whom are unknowing of or manipulated 
into buying this literally outlandish worldview. 
 156. Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294, 1305 (D.N.J. 1979). 
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testimony accepted as fact by the district court,157 but again, in context this 
was, or would prove to be, a relatively small price paid.158 
Rogers v. Okin is a different matter.159  Far less sympathetic to the medical 
perspective and less balanced on the medical facts, the various courts that 
considered the case on the merits (excluding the Supreme Court) prescribed a 
legal override regime that ranged from cumbersome to effectively 
obstructionist to the provision of unassented-to medical treatment. 
In their initial action, the patients in the litigant class in Rogers—seven 
individuals at two units of Boston State Hospital for the mentally ill and later 
expanded to all present and future patients on these units—asked the U.S. 
district court to issue a permanent injunction against their being involuntarily 
medicated as well as an award of money damages, both compensatory and 
punitive, for what they had “suffered” at the hands of the hospital staff.160  The 
court granted the injunction,161 henceforth allowing the hospital to forcibly 
medicate patients in emergencies only (as tightly redefined by the court from 
the concept used by the medical staff) and to require competency hearings in 
all other situations; treatment without personal consent would be permitted 
only for those found incompetent and then only through a laborious 
guardianship process.162  The court declined to award any damages, but that 
 
 157. Id. at 1303–04. 
 158. See the description of the relief prescribed in Rogers v. Comm’r., 458 N.E.2d 308, 310–
11 (Mass. 1983), or the facts and theories adopted by the court in Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 
915 (N.D. Ohio 1980), as guiding its judgment, as described in the text below. 
 159. Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 634 F.2d 
650 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated sub nom., Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291 (1982), Rogers v. Comm’r., 
458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). 
 160. See Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. at 1352. 
 161. Id. at 1371. 
 162. Id. at 1361–62.  The prescription of so much process in this first go-around of the Rogers 
case was, as one surmises to be true for all cases with similar outcomes, undoubtedly influenced 
by the court’s “pessimistic” view (the adjective is taken from the Charters II en banc opinion, 863 
F.2d 302, 307 n.3 (4th Cir. 1988)) of the risks and benefits of drug treatment.  Not only did the 
court grossly overstate the potential for bad side effects—for example, it quoted studies 
estimating the prevalence of tardive dyskinesia at 50%–56% (for institutionalized schizophrenics) 
at a time when the average length of stay for patients at the Boston Hospital units was fourteen 
days (meaning the risk of contracting TD was in fact nil for first admissions and a fraction of one 
percent in incremental risk for readmissions and other patients previously treated with 
antipsychotics), Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1360—it seemed to misperceive the nature and purpose 
of drug treatment altogether.  While antipsychotic drugs may have “mind-altering” properties in 
some positive, restorative sense, the court appeared stuck on the inapposite negative connotations 
of the term.  Id.; cf. Douglas Mossman, Denouement of an Execution Competency Case: Is Perry 
Pyrrhic?, 23 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY. L. 269, 274 (1995) (“Neuroleptics are to psychosis 
what eye glasses are to myopia: both interventions remove impediments to perception.”).  It saw 
the medications as endangering the First Amendment’s “right to produce a thought” and the 
“communication of ideas,” indeed the very “capacity to think.”  Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1366–67.  
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part of the decision, along with its supporting arguments, is not significant 
other than for the fact that it logically undercut the justifications for the 
injunctive relief prescribed.163 
The defendants’ appeal to the court of appeals resulted in some cutting 
back of the farther reaches of the district court’s decree.  To the extent the 
hospital had so interpreted the district court’s holding, the court of appeals 
corrected that “fullblown probate proceedings” to override medication refusals 
were not required.164  Nor would all medication decisions have to go through a 
guardian when the patient had been found incompetent.165  In addition, the 
appeals court vacated the “limited definition” of emergencies imposed by the 
court below and suggested a new formula be worked out on remand that would 
include consideration of a patient’s “significant deterioration”, a medically 
oriented criterion that avoids the police and emergency aspects of 
“dangerousness.”166  However, the court of appeals did sustain the substance of 
the competency hurdle and also perpetuated the requirement of engaging in a 
least restrictive alternative analysis, suggesting—quite erroneously for a 
population of the severely mentally ill—that “in most situations less restrictive 
means [than forced medication] will be available.”167 
The case then was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court on the theory that 
an intervening state court decision involving the right to refuse of an 
 
It spoke of “mind control” and speciously counterposed Justice Brandeis’s famous dissenting 
remarks in Olmstead v. United States about “man’s spiritual nature” and the Constitution’s 
implicit acknowledgement of that fact in the protections accorded to speech and thought which 
“secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness,” against the presumed threat to these 
fundamental values posed by the unwanted administration of drugs in a hospital designed to treat 
the most severely mentally ill.  Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1367 & n.30 (quoting Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
 163. Rogers, 478 F. Supp. at 1383.  The court ruled against damages because it could find no 
intent to inflict harm on the part of the defendants or even the harm itself that might entitle the 
plaintiffs to such recovery.  Id. at 1382.  Nor could it find any violations of state law on the order 
of assault and battery, false imprisonment, or plain negligent malpractice.  Id. at 1383, 1389.  
Instead, the court made appeals to common sense in favor of the defendants, the difficult context, 
resource and otherwise, in which the state physicians operated, and their presumed good faith.   
Id. at 1384–85.  This is curious given all the verbiage about the infringement of fundamental 
rights and liberties that drove the injunction, language that presumes some intentionally culpable 
or at least reckless state of mind.  See id. at 1364–71. 
 164. Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 659 (1st Cir. 1980).  The appeal also generated a new take 
on the right to refuse treatment for voluntary patients, the court saying essentially that it made no 
sense to equivocate their right to that of involuntary patients.  Id. at 661.  If a voluntary patient 
disagrees with the treatment regimen proposed, he or she can be asked to “leave,” the court 
intimated, and there is nothing unconstitutional about that request or command.  Id. 
 165. Id. at 660–61. 
 166. Id. at 660. 
 167. Id. at 656–57. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
538 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:501 
incompetent non-institutionalized patient (In re Guardianship of Roe)168 
suggested Massachusetts law recognized “more extensive” liberty interests 
than those protected by the Federal Constitution’s Due Process Clause.169  The 
Court took the case and agreed, stating in passing that it “assume[d] for the 
purposes of . . . discussion” that involuntary patients retained liberty interests 
protected by the Constitution,170 and remanded the case for ultimate resolution 
to the State’s judiciary.171  In Rogers v. Commissioner, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Court seized the opportunity to deliver an opinion that fully endorsed 
the civil libertarian premise (and, in our view, anti-medication bias) underlying 
the dispute and the need to value a process protective of legal rights over any 
asserted institutional, medical, or even personal interests.172 
In terms more certain than contained in any of the federal court decisions, 
the Massachusetts court reaffirmed the surviving competency of involuntarily 
committed patients to make treatment decisions.173  The commitment criteria 
had in the court’s view “nothing” to do with the patients’ “judgmental 
capacity,” which was a wholly independent issue,174 impliedly requiring the 
kind of “full-blown” de novo examination the federal appeals court had shied 
away from.175  If found competent at this trial, the refusing patient’s refusal 
would stand, period.176  And even if incompetent, every effort would be made 
to honor the patient’s presumed wishes via a substituted judgment inquiry.177  
Not even guardians could consent for the patient in the absence of such an 
inquiry.178  The patient has and should be given every right to make the 
decision, even the wrong decision, the court emphasized, “however unwise.”179  
Whether or not to drug a patient was, after all, not a medical determination in 
the first place but a social one over which the patient, and the court through its 
oversight responsibility, had as much control as anyone.180  Drug treatment 
was dangerous, “intrusive” business analogous to other “extraordinary” 
medical interventions such as electroconvulsive therapy and psychosurgery.181  
Moreover, the more radical judicial statements from other cases were invoked 
 
 168. In re Guardianship of Roe, 421 N.E.2d 40 (1981). 
 169. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 303 (1982). 
 170. Id. at 299 n.16. 
 171. Id. at 306. 
 172. Rogers v. Comm’r., 458 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1983). 
 173. Id. at 322–23. 
 174. Id. at 313. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 313–14. 
 177. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 315–16. 
 178. Id. at 316. 
 179. Id. at 314. 
 180. Id. at 317. 
 181. Id. at 316. 
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along with cites to the antipsychiatric socio-legal literature.  Doctors could not 
be trusted with the drugs, given their “conflict of interests” and habit of using 
them as “chemical restraints,” for “convenience” and “expediency,” that is, to 
save time, money, and hassle or to instill in patients the proper measure of 
“passivity,” “obedience,” and “submission,” when not outright medicating 
them for “punishment.”182  This could have been a brief written by the anti-
psychiatry lobby; instead, it became the mainstream model for the right-to-
refuse law as it would henceforth be conceived. 
If Rennie and Rogers are the so-called seminal cases on the right to refuse 
in the civil mental hospital context (with Rogers representing the “problem” 
precedent), then Davis v. Hubbard183 is the bastard child.  Davis was an all-
inclusive class action against doctors, administrators, and other officials at 
Ohio’s Lima State Hospital for the mentally ill, in which the need to obtain 
prior consent from the involuntary patients before they could be medicated was 
just one of many contested issues, though it turned out to be by far the most 
conspicuous and significant one.184  The case contains some of the more 
incendiary language used in the line of cases on this subject, and it has 
received more than its share of judicial and lawyerly attention because of that, 
though the decision’s final procedural prescriptions are fairly modest and 
moderate. 
“Prescriptions” is the wrong word even for what the Davis court came up 
with at the end.  Citing the parties’ failure to address the matter of what 
procedural protections the application of due process required in this context, 
the court declined to do so on its own.185  Rather, it emphasized the 
“flexibility” of the concept and said it could offer no more than “certain 
general observations.”186  These included that the state should give the patient 
“some kind of hearing”187 before compelling the administration of drugs.  Such 
a hearing should be presided over by an “impartial decision-maker”188 but by 
no means need this be a judge or even a lawyer, according to the court.189  In 
fact, based on its reading of Parham v. J.R.,190 the court did not think someone 
 
 182. Rogers, 458 N.E.2d at 320. 
 183. 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980). 
 184. Id. at 917, 920, 922, 925, 940 (stating the various issues addressed by the court).  The 
U.S. district court in its final published holding identified twenty-three “Issues” as requiring 
resolution, among which the matter of consent to medication was Issue 11, which the court in its 
opinion disposed of together with Issue 12 on the need for or right to prior consent to any 
treatment modality or modalities used at the hospital.  Id. at 916, 925. 
 185. Id. at 938 (“[T]his Court is simply in no position to decide the question.”). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 939. 
 189. Id. 
 190. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
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from outside the institution was necessarily required.  It also noted “full-scale” 
competency proceedings are not in the patient’s interests in that they could 
lead to a deprivation of rights broader than treatment decision making and 
would in any event be “unnecessarily expensive and burdensome.”191 
The legacy of Davis v. Hubbard, however—why it has come to be cited so 
often in later briefs and opinions—lies in the court’s rhetoric and its use of 
facts for which the word “questionable” is a generous description.  For 
example, the court noted that patients at Lima State Hospital were generally 
not given an opportunity to refuse medications even though “roughly 85% of 
the patients are capable of rationally deciding whether to consent to their 
use.”192  Instead of providing support for this estimate—out of line with even 
the most generous competency conceptualizations, not to mention empirical 
data—the footnote accompanying it merely goes on to make the further 
assertion that “[o]f the 15% incapable of making such decisions, few have been 
found ‘incapable’ by some neutral party or tribunal.”193  The court had strong 
things to say as well, for lack of a better characterization, about the costs and 
benefits of the medications.  On the benefits, it asserted in a footnote that 
“recent studies indicate that in cases in which psychotropic drugs are usually 
given, the patient can improve just as effectively without as with the drug.”194  
A note immediately prior to this claim concluded that “the drug[s] may even 
exacerbate the symptoms for which they are given.”195  On costs, the court 
devoted a full page to the alleged harmful side effects, citing many of the most 
resolutely anti-psychiatric and polemical “studies” from the socio-legal 
literature along with a small and very select smattering of medical journal 
pieces.  It gave as fact the distinctly high-end finding cited also in the first 
Rogers decision of a 50% to 56% incidence of tardive dyskinesia among 
hospitalized schizophrenics and added an estimate from the same study that as 
many as 41% of outpatients “are affected.”196 
The court’s rhetoric was, if anything, even more over the top.  The section 
of the opinion addressing “Issue 12,” the need for “prior consent,” began by 
noting psychotropic drugs were the most popular form of “treatment” at 
LSH.197  As if the word popular (not in quotes in the original) were not 
dismissive enough, the court did put the word “treatment” in quotes.198  This 
was followed by the court’s conclusion from what it said was the testimony at 
 
 191. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 939. 
 192. Id. at 927. 
 193. Id. at 927 n.8. 
 194. Id. at 928 n.14. 
 195. Id. at 928 n.13. 
 196. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 929. 
 197. Id. at 925. 
 198. Id. at 926. 
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trial that the drugs were used in a “countertherapeutic” fashion and only for 
“the convenience of the staff and for punishment.”199  It then wrongly depicted 
the effect of the drugs as primarily “mood-altering” and tranquilizing.200  And, 
it went on to such excesses as comparing the forcible use of drugs to the 
practice of “mind control” and other politically motivated tactics that are the 
“hallmark of those ‘totalitarian ideologies we profess to hate.’”201  Footnotes to 
a study on criminal justice in the People’s Republic of China, to Antony 
Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange, and a law review article by Peter Breggin, one 
of a small number of radically anti-psychiatric psychiatrists, on Psychosurgery 
for Political Purposes rounded out the court’s picture202 that would then 
presumably inform the “interest balancing” required to reach the appropriate 
due process solution. 
In the aggregate, with Rennie liberally cited but its more moderate 
approach essentially rejected and the outcomes and especially the rhetoric of 
Rogers and Davis paramount, the civil commitment precedents of the 1980s 
left the right to refuse field in the following posture: (1) a mandate for 
overblown procedure plus the attendant bad effects, i.e., obstruction of timely 
treatment even for those ultimately found treatable; (2) bad medical facts and 
bad rhetoric with their self-perpetuating force in law; (3) a requirement for 
competency inquiries that would exempt resisting “competent” patients from 
treatment; (4) a mandate to prove dangerousness, the substantive standard, 
before even the incompetent could be administered unassented-to treatment; 
and (5) the potential anomaly of  a class of “nondangerous” incompetent 
treatment refusers or even dangerous “competent” ones locked up under court 
order, on grounds of dangerousness, in treatment institutions. 
B. Troublesome Criminal Competency Cases 
Bee v. Greaves203 and Charters I204 are two problematic judicial decisions 
with a different legal twist.  Distinct from the civil “committees” in Rennie, 
Rogers, and Davis, the plaintiff in Bee v. Greaves was a detainee in Salt Lake 
City’s County Jail whose medication refusal rights were at issue in the context 
of his competency to stand trial.205  The same was the case in Charters, except 
that the petitioner there was confined specifically for treatment in Butner, in 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 927. 
 201. Davis, 506 F. Supp. at 933 (quoting Sobell v. Reed, 327 F. Supp. 1294, 1305 (S.D.N.Y. 
1971)). 
 202. Id. at 933 n.22. 
 203. 744 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 204. 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).  We confine ourselves to discussing in this section the 
first, panel, decision and opinion; Charters II, the en banc decision, we reserve for review in the 
section that follows, discussing what we think is right with the law. 
 205. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1389. 
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North Carolina, a federal correctional facility with a dominant “forensic” 
mission.206  A brief review of these two cases will reveal the potential impact 
of that legal complication on what the deciding court views as the 
appropriately tailored right to refuse for the patients.  We say “potential 
impact” because the effect is not discernible in the two decisions with which 
we begin, Bee and Charters, though we believe that it should be. 
Bee involved a detainee who actually begged for medication shortly after 
being booked because he was emotionally unhinged and hallucinating.207  He 
started refusing only months later after he had been found competent to stand 
trial while medicated (it is not clear whether his refusal was a legal tactic, the 
court cryptically attributing it to his complaints of “having problems with the 
drug”).208  He began “decompensating” within a matter of days, however, at 
which point he was forcibly medicated by injection administered by a jail 
medic accompanied by several guards who were sufficiently rough physically 
and verbally to intimidate him into taking the medication orally henceforth; he 
did not retake it voluntarily in any meaningful sense of that term.209  He 
subsequently filed for damages under section 1983 naming as defendants just 
about everybody who had any connection to the Salt Lake County Jail, 
including several county commissioners.210  The district court rendered 
summary judgment for the defendants on the ground that the county had 
interests in medicating the complainant that superseded any rights the 
complainant had to not be medicated.211  The court of appeals reversed and 
remanded to the trial court for further action.212  The appellate outcome in Bee 
was not especially remarkable or revolutionary in the light of the civil 
commitment precedents, the court limiting its holding to a determination that 
forcibly medicating a detainee was justified only in an emergency.213  The 
court of appeals thus instructed the district court to decide whether an 
emergency had in fact existed214 and whether the seemingly indefinite period 
during which the less than voluntary medication continued was justified or 
constituted the sort of “exaggerated [government] response” that the 
Constitution and the courts do not condone.215  As with Rogers and Davis, 
however, it is the rhetoric and reasoning that make the case the oft-cited 
 
 206. 829 F.2d  479, 482 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 207. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1389. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 1389–90. 
 210. Id. at 1389. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1389. 
 213. Id. at 1395. 
 214. Id. at 1396. 
 215. Id. at 1397.  Some of this is classic prison law analysis and no more.  See Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
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precedent it is.  In arriving at its decision the court of appeals indulged in the 
tactic of focusing almost exclusively on the bad side effects of medication 
while at the same time grossly overstating them (the 50%–56% estimate of the 
incidence of TD featured prominently here as did several of the “studies” 
where this claim and other similarly excessive claims were made).216  Concern 
was expressed about government mind control and the like.217  Various other 
by now familiar but unconvincing, not to say false, lines of persuasion were 
thrown into the court’s decision justification mix.  But on the issue of 
significance, the issue that differentiated Bee from Rennie and Rogers and 
other alleged precedents, the status of the complainant as a criminally accused 
individual whose competency was at stake, all the court had to offer was the 
conclusion that where the use of antipsychotic drugs is concerned “[t]he needs 
of the individual, not the requirements of the prosecutor, must be 
paramount.”218  Certainly that is a simple, but not necessarily satisfying, way to 
dispose of the case.  After all, the interests of the government here, whether 
ultimately judged as overridingly compelling or not, are different than in the 
civil commitment context.  Moreover, even the mentally ill accused has 
treatment “needs” that at the very least ought to be weighed against his 
strategic legal interests to the extent his refusal is motivated by such. 
Bee, however, is legal pabulum compared to the disposition and language 
of the first Charters case.219  The accused in Charters I was a “presidential 
threatener,” as the Secret Service tends to put it, who was found incompetent to 
stand trial for that offense and sent to Butner for restoration.220  In an effort to 
accomplish his restoration, medical staff, based on the sole opinion of the 
treating doctor, obtained an order from the federal district court to medicate the 
accused despite his objections.221  He appealed to the circuit court.222  The case 
was heard by a three-judge panel, which sustained his, i.e., his lawyers’, every 
argument and then some.223 
The court’s opinion began inauspiciously with the usual citations to 
Plotkin’s Therapeutic Orgy article224 and similarly oriented commentary, plus 
 
 216. Bee, 744 F.2d at 1389 & n.3. 
 217. Id. at 1394. 
 218. Id. at 1395. 
 219. 829 F.2d  479 (4th Cir. 1987). 
 220. Id. at 482. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 483 n.2 (citing Robert Plotkin, Limiting the Therapeutic Orgy: 
Mental Patients’ Right to Refuse Treatment, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 461 (1977)).  Other favorite 
“authorities” cited (though not in Charters I) include: George E. Crane, Clinical 
Psychopharmacology in its 20th Year, 181 SCIENCE 124 (1973); and Lawrence D. Gaughan & 
Lewis H. LaRue, The Right of a Mental Patient to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs in an Institution, 4 
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a recital of the familiar negative attributes of antipsychotic medication and its 
misuses and abuses.  The list of negatives reads like an endless litany: the 
drugs “dull the senses”;225 the “threat of permanent injury is substantial”;226 
“there is no principled distinction between the chemical invasion of drug 
therapy and the mechanical invasion of surgery”;227 indeed, the medications 
are “potentially mind-altering [and] the threat to individual rights goes beyond 
a threat of physical intrusion and threatens an intrusion into the mind”;228 the 
drugs have the “potential to infringe upon an individual’s freedom of thought”; 
and to “allow the government to alter or control thinking [would] thereby 
destroy the independence of thought and speech so crucial to a free society.”229  
This did not augur well for those hoping for any amount or kind of judicial 
deference to medical authority. 
It was only downhill from there on.  First, the court dismissed any notion 
that the accused’s designation as incompetent to stand trial (his “legal 
incompetency”) had anything to do with or say about his treatment decision-
making capacity (his “medical competency”).230  The court’s position could be 
compared to the refusal of the majority of courts to equate civil commitment 
with any loss of capacity and right to consent to or reject treatment once 
institutionalized.  Rogers v. Commissioner231 thus becomes the model here.  
The accused’s competency for the latter purpose, not having been assessed, 
still needs to be assessed if the government is to have the authority to ignore 
his wishes on this score.  And, pursuit of the Rogers model continues: if the 
accused is found competent his wishes must be respected and he may not be 
medicated, regardless of the medical, personal, or institutional downside to 
this.232  If he is incompetent, then there must be a second judicial hearing, now 
on whether or not he should be medicated.233  Even then the medical interests 
do not necessarily prevail—the patient’s or his doctors’—as the first 
requirement is to follow the substituted judgment rule and to try to divine what 
the accused might have wanted if competent and only in the absence of being 
able to unearth this, a determination of his best medical interests.234  Clearly 
this medicating business was not going to be made easy. 
 
LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43 (1978); Thomas K. Zander, Proloxin Decanoate: A Review of the 
Research, 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 37 (1977). 
 225. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 489. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. at 492. 
 229. Id. at 492. 
 230. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 495. 
 231. 458 N.E.2d 308 (1983). 
 232. Id. at 311. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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And why should it?  In the view of the Charters I court, the results of 
medicating the patient were iffy at best.  Restoration to competence was by no 
means guaranteed.235  And even if restored, it was to some “synthetic” 
competence236 that could easily lead to what the court termed 
“misimpressions”237 about the accused’s “true” mental state and his sanity at 
the time of the crime, which would presumably be at issue in the trial.238  
Moreover, whatever interest the government might have in an adjudication of 
the charges paled in the light of “such a draconian invasion of the individual’s 
freedom and the risk of permanent physical injury”239 posed by drugging him. 
Together with Rogers and Davis in the civil commitment context and Bee 
in the criminal detention sphere, the first Charters decision seemed to 
consolidate an anti-psychiatric legal mode and mood that virtually precluded 
treatment to which the patient did not explicitly consent. 
C. Some Good News: Revised Judgments on Medicating the Restorable 
Accused and the Convicted 
A radically different view of psychiatric medications than the decidedly 
jaundiced one that prevailed in legal circles and that drove the preoccupation 
with legal due process for refusers was not wholly lacking.  The subsequent 
overruling of the panel decision in the Charters case by the full court of 
appeals furnished an early opportunity for those among the judiciary so 
informed to articulate a much more benign, and by all measures an historically 
and medically more accurate, view of psychiatric medications and their uses.240  
This view moved the court to empower physicians to dispense the medications 
on their own accord in the context of a “legally” incompetent institutionalized 
patient who refused to be “helped,” as the government doctor put it and the 
court implicitly seconded.  Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court followed 
suit in Washington v. Harper with a similarly tenored ruling in a prison case.241 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ three-judge panel in Charters I and 
the Washington Supreme Court in Harper had prescribed the maximum 
possible process: judicial competency-to-make-medical-decisions hearings for 
every refuser whom the doctors wanted to medicate over his or her resistance 
and a second trial on whether in fact to medicate for incompetent refusers 
 
 235. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 494. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Id.  See also Linda C. Fentiman, Whose Right is it Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to 
Stand Trial in Light of the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109 
(1986), which the court cites in the text of its opinion.  Id. at 493–94. 
 239. Charters I, 829 F.2d at 494. 
 240. Charters II, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 241. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
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while the “competent” refuser would remain unmedicated until he or she had a 
change of mind or decompensated to such a state that the need for a new 
competency trial was evident to everyone.  The overruling courts saw no need 
for anything like that amount of legal protection. 
The full circuit court in Charters II admitted that, given the individual 
liberty interest at stake in treatment refusals, there might be “instinctive appeal 
to the notion that only a panoply of procedural protections this complex and 
multilayered is adequate to protect it.”242  But it ultimately rejected the “two-
stage plenary judicial” process prescribed below as needlessly 
“complicated.”243  Its reasons were several. 
First, the full court disagreed with the panel’s assessment of the costs and 
benefits of the medications at issue, alluding to the fact that a “much less 
drastic appraisal of the risk-potential” than the excessively “vivid” and 
“pessimistic” description given by the panel was possible and appropriate.244 
Second, the full court felt the panel had ignored the professional judgment 
principles of Parham v. J.R.245 and Youngberg v. Romeo246 under which “base-
line” medical decisions are made by medical personnel subject to judicial 
review for whether they are indeed professional, i.e., made by appropriately 
credentialed persons and non-arbitrary.247  Instead, the panel decision had 
made the judiciary the baseline decision makers, which created a regime the 
full court saw as “collapsing their normal review functions into this threshold 
function . . . [and relegating the role of institutional treating doctors to that of] 
expert witnesses defending their opinions in judicial proceedings.”248  To put it 
in the language of Fourteenth Amendment litigation, the holding of the panel 
essentially granted pre-deprivation judicial review in a context where post-
deprivation relief is the norm or, as the full court must implicitly have judged, 
a context where the post-deprivation mode is the only realistic mode given the 
costs in terms of court resources and the diversion of medical resources of the 
alternative, not to mention the costs of treatment delayed or denied for those 
who medically need it. 
Finally, the full court in Charters II rejected the notion that the patient’s 
competency to refuse to be treated, his so-called medical competence, was an 
open issue in the context of an institutionalized accused because he was legally 
 
 242. Charters II, 863 F.2d at 307. 
 243. Id. at 309. 
 244. Id. at 307 n.3.  The quoted sentences refer specifically to the side effect of tardive 
dyskinesia, but the language is clearly generalizable to the costs and benefits of antipsychotic 
drugs at large. 
 245. 442 U.S. 584 (1979). 
 246. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
 247. Charters II, 863 F.2d at 308. 
 248. Id. at 309. 
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incompetent to stand trial.249  The court found practically and theoretically 
implausible the idea that these two competencies could or should be materially 
different.  It presumed, the court said, a differentiation between the two mental 
states “of such subtlety and complexity as to tax perception by the most skilled 
medical or psychiatric professionals.”250  Treating the two competencies as 
separate issues further posed the “threat” of producing “wholly inconsistent or 
highly anomalous adjudications”251 of the same controversy, in turn casting 
doubt on the “integrity and trustworthiness of the courts’ already perilous 
involvement . . . in the adjudication of complex states of mental pathology.”252  
Like consideration of the possible side effects of medication prescribed, the 
patient’s competence to make an informed judgment was to be treated “as 
simply another factor in the ultimate medical decision” on whether to go 
forward and treat over the patient’s objection.253  In sum, the decision in 
Charters II could not be more different in tone and outcome than Charters I or 
its “progenitors.” 
In Washington v. Harper, the U.S. Supreme Court took up the distinct 
issue of whether mentally ill individuals incarcerated in prisons had a right to 
refuse the medication prison doctors wished to have them take.254  The 
majority had no trouble deciding that such a right existed or survived for 
inmates in the prison setting,255 yet it was decidedly conservative in the 
procedural protections it felt to be required to safeguard the right.  Squarely 
against the two-hearing plenary judicial model prescribed by Washington’s 
highest court, it approved the administrative review mechanism used at 
Washington’s Special Offender Center, the state’s correctional treatment 
facility.256  While not without substantial protections for the inmate, that 
review process had the virtue of being capable of finalization within a day or 
two of the original treatment recommendation, that is, essentially without delay 
and the bad medical and institutional effects of that. 
Going by the designation of “Policy 600.30,”257 the Washington process 
permitted involuntary medication of a prisoner upon approval of the treating 
psychiatrist’s decision to do so by a special committee consisting of another 
psychiatrist, a psychologist, and the facility’s associate superintendent258 in a 
hearing where the inmate could fully and openly contest the issue and with 
 
 249. Id. at 310. 
 250. Id. 
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 252. Charters II, 863 F.2d at 310. 
 253. Id. at 311–12. 
 254. 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990). 
 255. Id. at 221–23. 
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provisions for appropriate notice; the right to be present at the hearing; to 
cross-examine staff; to present his own witnesses; and to the assistance of at 
least an independent, knowledgeable lay advisor.259  In finding the process 
constitutionally adequate, the Court thus held that independent pre-deprivation 
medical and administrative review was all that due process in this context 
required.260  There was no need for this cumbersome first-instance, two-stage 
judicial vetting with its opening focus on the prisoner’s “medical” 
competency—in fact, the issue of treatment decision-making competency was 
summarily dismissed by the Court as “in no way responsive to the State’s 
legitimate interests” in this situation.261  As to substantive criteria, the Policy 
required a finding that the prisoner suffer from a mental disorder, i.e., have a 
medical need, and that he be either “gravely disabled” or pose a threat of 
serious harm to self, others, or property (the dangerousness component 
common to the vast majority of commitment statutes)—standards the Court 
also essentially approved.262 
The reasoning of the Court’s majority in Harper—the type of arguments, 
facts, and precedents invoked to support the result—is telling and furnishes as 
nice an example as any on the other side of the philosophical divide that the 
selection of these supports is driven by the outcome as much as the supports 
drive it.  Unlike the classic right to refuse cases and their strings of self-
referential citations on that issue, the Harper precedents are drawn mostly 
from classic prison law, in particular, cases that champion the principle of 
deference to expert decision making and the judicial review strictures this 
principle implies.263  These precedents, moreover, show a federal deference to 
state control over the state’s own housekeeping (or how it houses the kept, if 
you will) and fealty to the notion, made explicit here, that ordinarily the Due 
Process Clause confers no greater rights on prison inmates than those 
recognized under state law. 
 
 259. Harper, 494 U.S. at 216. 
 260. Id. at 235–36.  The independence, in fact, of the review mechanism was challenged in no 
uncertain terms by the dissenters per Justice Stevens who, writing for himself and Justices 
Brennan and Marshall, referred to the process approved by the majority as “a mock trial before an 
institutionally biased tribunal.”  Id. at 237 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).  
That is strong stuff, but perhaps not entirely out of line given shared institutional and penological 
interests among the tribunal members that could trump strict medical considerations.  Less 
defensible is the dissent’s heavy emphasis, in line with the Washington Supreme Court, on all the 
negative properties of psychotropic medications, including their equation with psychosurgery, 
and so on.  Id. at 239–41. 
 261. Id. at 226. 
 262. Id. 
 263. Id. at 223–25 (citing O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Turner v. 
Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987); Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 
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As to the specifics of the business of dispensing drugs in prison, the 
Court’s posture toward this “medical finding,” including the fact that it so 
classified it, could not differ more from the suspicious to hostile mode that 
dominated so much of the earlier legal cases and commentary.264  Are the 
antipsychotics mind altering?  Yes, the Court said, but in the positive sense that 
they “alter the chemical balance in a patient’s brain” with the intended result of 
producing “beneficial” changes.265  Are there risks?  Yes, but instead of citing 
a 50%-plus incidence of tardive dyskinesia, the Court maintained that “[a] fair 
reading of the evidence” suggests its occurrence is more in the 10–25% range, 
with 60% of that range being “mild” cases having “minimal . . . effect.”266  
Finally, if protections are needed for prisoner patients, the idea that in these 
medical matters those protections are best furnished through adversary judicial 
proceedings is “more illusory than real.”267 
When it comes to the uses of the drugs by prison doctors, the Court makes 
clear that “[u]nlike [the dissent]” and the legal tradition the dissent draws on, it 
“will not assume that physicians will prescribe these drugs for reasons 
unrelated to the medical needs of the patients.”268  The posture is one of belief 
in medical good faith.  Doctors do not abuse the dispensation of drugs because, 
as the Court puts it simply and directly, “the ethics of the medical profession 
are to the contrary.”269  Their institutional “purpose is not to warehouse the 
mentally-ill, but to diagnose and treat.”270  The operating mindset here is 
distinctly of the sanguine kind and diametrically opposite to the judicial 
attitude on display in, say, Davis v. Hubbard or Rogers v. Commissioner.  And 
this despite the reality that in the prison context the temptation to deviate from 
the patient population’s medical interests in favor of, or to mix them with, 
management, security, or punitive considerations would seem to be inherently 
stronger than it is in the civil hospital.271 
Important commonalities notwithstanding, there is at the same time 
significant contrast to be found between the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
holding in Charters II and the Supreme Court’s decision in Harper.  Harper 
prescribes (sustains) a fair amount of procedure, i.e., mandatory pre-
deprivation review, even if of the administrative or medical kind rather than 
judicial, and of course substantive constraints, such as proof of medical need 
 
 264. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222. 
 265. Id. at 229. 
 266. Id. at 230. 
 267. Id. at 232 (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979)). 
 268. Id. at 222 n.8. 
 269. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222 n.8. 
 270. Id. 
 271. See id. at 244–45 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing for stronger 
procedural protections in the prison context than provided by the majority). 
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plus dangerousness;272 Charters II prescribes none of either—the treating 
doctor has final authority and medical propriety, inferentially, is the only 
standard.  The explanation appears to lie in the parenthetical “sustains” we 
used above to characterize the Harper holding, not in the differences between 
the types of institutions housing the petitioners (prison versus “forensic” 
hospital) or the differences in legal status between them (convicted offender 
versus accused detainee), though there is an argument to be made—and we 
will make it later—that these differences matter as well and should tend in the 
same direction process-wise. 
By happenstance (we know of no deliberate planning) the Court in Harper 
was operating in the context of an elaborate state-created review mechanism 
which it saw fit to approve as constitutionally sufficient.  The Harper 
mechanism thereupon came to be seen as a safe and sound model for 
correctional departments around the country, many of which in short order 
adopted its features either intact or with some local variations.  The Charters 
court by contrast was given a barren record.  The doctors at Butner had no 
internal paper procedure to follow but apparently in practice, would go for 
approval of their decisions to the federal district court, where review was by a 
lenient professional judgment standard that avoided complications of patient 
competency, substituted (patient) judgment, or least restrictive alternative 
inquiries.  The court of appeals displayed no urge to create the internal review 
machinery out of whole cloth.  Nor for that matter did it mandate the judicial 
application process followed by the Butner doctors.  To the contrary, it rejected 
this approach, because, as it made clear, it did not think it appropriate to have 
judges play such a baseline decision-making role.273 
That happenstance ultimately limited the utility and shelf life of Charters 
as even many doctors will support oversight mechanisms that are medically 
controlled and efficient and that give the resisting patient some recourse, while 
Harper, which provided both, became the next great precedent. 
IV.  ZINERMON,274 RIGGINS,275 AND SELL:276 THE SUPREME COURT RETREATS? 
In our 1991 article we wrote that the Harper decision notwithstanding, “it 
can hardly be concluded that the medical side has won the battle of what 
 
 272. The “gravely disabled” criterion, which was part of the Washington Policy, seems to 
have been conflated by the Court, as is often done, with dangerousness to self as it is not alluded 
to in the key parts of the Court’s opinion regarding the substantive adequacy of the Policy.  Id. at 
215, 225–27 (majority opinion). 
 273. Charters II, 863 F.2d 302, 307–08 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 274. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). 
 275. Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
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process best serves the treatment interests of mental patients.”277  This 
assessment has proved accurate. While there have been both legislative and 
judicially fostered gains since Harper, a certain amount of backsliding to the 
anti-drug posture and rhetoric of earlier years, including imposition of 
accompanying legal restrictions on the authority of (state) physicians, has 
simultaneously occurred.  Surprisingly, given its relatively pro-government, 
pro-doctor record on matters involving medical authority (exemplified by the 
Harper judgment as well as any), the U.S. Supreme Court has aided and 
abetted this latter development via a short series of decisions on treatment 
refusal rights in varying legal contexts.  Examining these decisions leaves a 
sense that the Court was not purposefully steering this reversal of direction, but 
that it drifted there in response to dominant alternate issues raised in the 
litigation before it, which threw off the Court’s jurisprudential compass. 
The Zinermon case,278 decided virtually simultaneously with Harper in 
1990, had been cited in our article with an assessment that it threatened the 
very “capacity of the states to provide treatment for mentally ill persons.”279  
Based on an action brought by a disgruntled Florida patient who had been 
rescued from the streets and successfully treated as a voluntary patient but who 
argued that he was wronged because he did not have the legal capacity to 
admit himself, as he had,280 the Court’s decision essentially prescribed pre-
admission competency hearings for all future patients willing to sign 
themselves into a mental facility for treatment.281  As a competency to assent 
as opposed to refuse case, Zinermon had the ironic potential of putting doctors 
in the position of having to be treatment refusers for needing and willing 
patients or, alternatively, requiring them to act as the less than willing initiators 
of involuntary treatment proceedings whose cumbersomeness and costs were 
compounded by the stark reality that in many situations they would not “work” 
because the patient did not meet statutory involuntary treatment criteria. 
In the months following the Zinermon decision, state mental health 
systems around the country, aided by professional organizations such as the 
American Psychiatric Association, worked to mute the case’s impact by 
devising quick and easy screening procedures which were medically 
controlled, had low competency standards, and would respond to the Court’s 
mandate at minimum cost.  These efforts were successful and ultimately 
proved wrong the direr assessments regarding the case’s potential to destroy 
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mental health services as we then knew it.282  Thanks to a unique combination 
of concerted mobilization and timely reaction, the predicted admission disaster 
did not materialize.  But the experience showed that the Court, preoccupied 
with the competency and pre- and post-deprivation issues in which the 
Zinermon case came framed and with scant attention to the larger need-for-
treatment issues and systemic implications, could be diverted from the salutary 
course it had historically chosen to navigate. 
Riggins v. Nevada, decided two years after Harper and Zinermon, is a case 
that is more difficult to interpret than its 1990 predecessors in that it seems to 
give out signals for which the word “mixed” is underdescriptive at best.283  It 
has in fact been interpreted in widely varying ways,284 but on the whole it is a 
step back rather than forward from the medical perspective. 
The case involved a capital defendant charged with robbery and murder 
who, while detained in jail prior to trial, initially asked for medication to 
overcome his sleeping difficulties and to quiet the voices he said he was 
hearing in his head.285  He was given Mellaril (thioridazine) because, as he told 
the psychiatrist contracted to treat the jail’s detainees, he had been successfully 
treated with that drug before.286  Three months into his detention his attorney 
moved for a determination of his competence to stand trial.287  He was found 
competent while taking the medication and preparations for his trial went 
forward.288  Six months later, however, as the trial date approached, the 
defense moved for a court order to suspend administration of the medications 
until the end of the trial.289  The county court denied this motion and the 
defendant continued to be medicated on what was at least technically an 
“involuntary” basis throughout the trial, proceedings in which he presented an 
 
 282. See, e.g., Rael Jean Isaac & Samuel Jan Brakel, Subverting Good Intentions: A Brief 
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insanity defense and personally testified.290  He was found guilty and 
sentenced to death by the jury that convicted him.291 
On direct appeal of his conviction and sentence to the Nevada Supreme 
Court, the defendant claimed, i.a., that the forced administration of medication 
had “prejudicially affected his attitude, appearance, and demeanor at trial,” 
thereby inhibiting his ability to assist in his own defense and denying him a 
fair trial.292  The Nevada Supreme Court did not buy his arguments and 
affirmed his conviction and sentence, which led to a request to the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review the matter.293  The Court granted the petition and, in 
a decision whose majority opinion was written by Justice O’Connor, reversed 
the Nevada Supreme Court’s judgment, and thus the conviction and sentence, 
because “the Nevada courts failed to make findings sufficient to support [the 
defendant’s forcible medication].”294  The decision contains several key 
subsidiary points, or speculations, elaborating on the reversal, but where they 
lead or were meant to lead is difficult to tell. 
Though Riggins involved a jailed detainee and not a convicted prisoner as 
in Harper, the Court applied the Harper analysis,295 inappropriately, according 
to the dissent,296 and began by reiterating that a Due Process Clause protected 
liberty interest was at stake here, citing well-settled precedent that unconvicted 
jail detainees “retain at least those constitutional rights . . . enjoyed by 
convicted prisoners.”297  Due process being flexible, however, this did not 
answer what should be or should have been done to lawfully medicate 
someone in Riggins’s position.  The primary problem with the way Nevada 
had operated was, as the Court saw it, that all along the way the judgments 
made were essentially unsupported—no adequate justifications were 
established, or even offered, for why the defendant’s wishes could or should be 
overridden.298  Having made that point in the opinion’s second sentence 
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(“failed to make findings sufficient to support . . . ;”299 allowed continued 
medication “without making any determination of the need . . . or any findings 
about reasonable alternatives”300), the Court went on to set out two distinct 
standards that would have satisfied due process had the state actors chosen to 
try to meet them. 
The first standard is emphatic: “Nevada certainly would have satisfied due 
process if the prosecution had demonstrated, and the District Court had found, 
that treatment with antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, 
considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the sake of Riggins’ own 
safety or the safety of others.”301  Not only does the Harper analysis apply; this 
is the Harper standard.  The question is, is it an appropriate standard? Our 
answer would be “possibly appropriate, but incomplete.”  Jails and prisons are 
institutions that share many, if not all, security concerns implicated in housing 
criminal offender populations.  It is why the courts have permitted curtailment 
of detainees’ rights in jails essentially duplicative of those allowed for 
convicted felons in prisons.302  But when we are dealing with a pre-trial 
detainee whose competency to be tried is at issue, additional interests present 
themselves—interests that would presumably be invoked especially where the 
dangerousness standard is not met. 
Evidently aware of this, Justice O’Connor presented a second option, 
though in slightly less certain terms (“the State might [also] have been able to 
justify . . .”),303 requiring that the prosecution establish medical propriety plus 
a criterion directly related to the reason Riggins-style defendants are where 
they are and to what purpose they are kept: “that it could not obtain an 
adjudication of Riggins’ guilt or innocence” any other way.304  As she had in 
articulating the first standard, Justice O’Connor employed formal least 
restrictive alternative language as a qualifier (“could not obtain an 
adjudication . . . by using less intrusive means”).305  However, the significance 
of that is unclear, given that the Court ultimately resisted the doctrinal 
implications of that language, such as the application of a strict scrutiny review 
standard, a fact Justice Thomas took unfavorable note of in his dissent.306  
What is significant is that this was clearly a different standard than Harper’s, 
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one that had no bearing on convicted prisoners or, for that matter, prison 
doctors but was specifically tailored to a pre-trial population. 
How difficult would it have been for Nevada to meet either of these 
standards?  Or, how much trouble would Riggins’s either/or formula cause 
physicians in any other county jail or special forensic facility housing 
offenders before trial, whether run by corrections or mental health?  An initial 
facial assessment would suggest “not very much.” 
Establishing medical propriety should be easy-to-automatic given the 
courts’ deference to this quintessential medical judgment, uncontaminated as it 
is in isolation, separated from judgments that have arguable social components 
such as whether the treatment should be forced upon the patient given medical 
need.  That is when other factors and values might come into play, when 
context becomes relevant.  But second-guessing professional, medical 
judgments is not the courts’ business, and, as before, in those cases where such 
judgment is reviewed it is limited to evaluating assertions that it was 
unprofessional.307 
The second criterion in both standards veers away from pure medical 
propriety, though by no means totally.  In Riggins’s Harper-style formulation 
the second criterion is dangerousness, which is assessed by a mix of medical 
and security considerations.308  It should not be difficult to establish in prisons, 
as the courts also defer substantially to correctional expertise particularly on 
security issues.  They also defer to jail administration expertise for the same 
reasons.  So, the Riggins context should not change anything in this respect.  
One could speculate about the number or percentages of mentally ill pre-trial 
detainees who would meet the second criterion.  Arguably, it would be 
comparable to the numbers or percentages in prisons given the comparability 
in populations.  On the other hand, those in special forensic units might be 
there more for treatment needs than because of security risk, so fewer 
individuals in such units would be dangerous.  The answer is not important.  
The point is that some detainees who need treatment, whatever their numbers, 
will fail the Harper standard but should, at least from the state’s perspective, 
be treated. 
This is where Riggins’s new standard comes into play, that is, the alternate 
standard of medicating the detainee because that is the only way to achieve a 
recovery of or to maintain trial competence.309  How hard will it be for the 
state to prove this?  We submit that it, too, should be easy—easier perhaps 
even than Harper-style dangerousness.  The reason is that medicating for 
competency is, both theoretically and pragmatically speaking, essentially 
indistinguishable from doing it based on medical need.  Pursuing the objective 
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of achieving or maintaining trial competence is and should be no different than 
that of regaining or maintaining mental health.  Those who have argued 
otherwise, whether in the pre-trial context or at the post-conviction sentencing 
or execution-of-sentence phase especially in capital cases, where there is talk 
of treating to relieve suffering but stopping short of restoring to competence,310 
are pursuing a different agenda; they have a different social and legal bone to 
pick.  The fact is that we send incompetent defendants to mental health 
treatment facilities rather than to schools where the rudiments of the trial 
process are taught.  We send them to the jail psychiatrist for the same reason—
to be treated, not to be instructed in the law.  They are sent because they are 
sick.  The institutions and professionals who staff these institutions are trained 
and in the business of treating sick people, not of affecting legal restoration.311 
 
 310. Much of this is driven by opposition to the death penalty per se and by the ethical 
quandaries many physicians feel are posed by the axiom not to do harm to patients—an axiom 
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See generally Michael A. Norko, Organized Psychiatry and the Death Penalty: An Introduction 
to the Special Section, 32 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 178 (2004) (discussing the divergent 
views of various authors regarding the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law’s (AAPL) 
stance on capital punishment and the appropriateness of physician involvement in capital 
punishment proceedings in states that have the death penalty). 
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To put it another way, the idea that there is a right to be crazy in free 
society is precarious enough, subject to curbs by the state based on its parens 
patriae and police powers.  That such a tenuous right survives for incompetent 
persons in detention institutions with compelling security concerns and the 
treatment obligations of total institutions,312 and with the added specific 
responsibility of readying or keeping their charges ready for trial, is an even 
longer stretch.  Or, if one is inclined to make the stretch and assert that there is 
a nominal right to refuse in this context, it should be with the 
acknowledgement that the right cannot come protected by a heavy, in effect 
treatment-stifling, dose of procedural or substantive due process. 
In sum, Riggins should not complicate matters much for physicians in 
special forensic detention facilities or in jails where some reasonable 
semblance of mental health treatment is provided.  Other than to give 
incompetent defendants a new, just-before-trial, opportunity to challenge their 
treatment regimen; the interests and stakes are (and outcomes, in cases of 
formal contest, should be) the same as before.  This prognosis, however, 
appears to be off the mark.  Whether because courts and lawyer advocates have 
not appreciated the above analysis or do not agree with it, or for some other 
reason, the fact is that the post-Riggins jurisprudence has become contaminated 
by issues such as the relative importance of the need to try the defendant rather 
than the need to treat, as we shall see.  First, however, we turn to some other 
ways in which Riggins has proved regressive. 
 
treatment suffices for the 80% to 90% who are restored.  Studies also show that an accused’s 
forcible medication does not adversely affect ability or opportunity to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable plea bargain nor inhibit success, from the defense’s perspective, in cases where the 
insanity defense is asserted.  See Brian Ladds et al., The Disposition of Criminal Charges After 
Involuntary Medication to Restore Competency to Stand Trial, 38 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1442, 1452–
53 (1993).  There is evidence that specific legal education-oriented restoration efforts, when 
combined with treatment of the medical symptoms, speed up the restoration process; though this 
may also be due to the halo effect, i.e., the extra staff attention given to the patients.  See Debra 
A. Pinals, Where Two Roads Meet: Restoration of Competence to Stand Trial from a Clinical 
Perspective, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 81, 83–90 (2005) (citing Daniel L. 
Davis, Treatment Planning for the Patient Who is Incompetent to Stand Trial, 36 HOSP. & CMTY. 
PSYCHIATRY 268 (1985); Robert D. Miller, Hospitalization of Criminal Defendants for 
Evaluation of Competence to Stand Trial or Restoration to Competence; Clinical and Legal 
Issues, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 369 (2003); Stephen G. Noffsinger, Restoration to Competency 
Practice Guidelines, 45 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 356 (2001); Linda 
Pendleton, Treatment of Persons Found Incompetent to Stand Trial, 137 AM. J. OF PSYCHIATRY 
1098 (1980)).  That finding may argue for legal restoration efforts as one facet of treatment, 
though concerns have been expressed about over-involving clinicians in the patients’ legal 
matters from both an ethical and pragmatic standpoint.  It may, ironically, yield a competency 
that is in both appearance and fact superficial and synthetic—the very charges that have been 
leveled, with much less if any justification, against medication-restored patients. 
 312. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976) (stating that the state may not be deliberately 
indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs). 
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At least one of the problems with Riggins lies in the subtext, which has 
provided ammunition to those who wish to adhere to the old and inaccurate 
view that medicating a person with antipsychotics produces in him or her a 
“synthetic” sanity or competency.  The resulting state, it is said, is not “real.”  
In fact it may be worse, in that it comes at the price of obscuring the person as 
he or she “normally” is, behaves, reacts, interacts, and so on.  The charge is 
that it dehumanizes the person and in the case of criminal offenders robs them 
of such defense-friendly assets as the capacity to show empathy or, where an 
insanity defense is on the line, the opportunity to exhibit craziness.  Perhaps in 
part because the defendant in Riggins was overmedicated (in response to his 
continuing symptom complaints), the case is full of language that nurtures this 
sort of old school speculation. 
In reversing the verdict against Riggins—not a small step in a capital 
murder case fully reviewed by the state’s judicial machinery—the U.S. 
Supreme Court assumed there was a substantial probability that his trial was 
adversely prejudiced by his being on medication.313  Having set the bar high, 
the Court then had to clear it, which it did by reciting a litany of possible 
effects of the drug on Riggins’s demeanor and appearance.  In the space of one 
page, three paragraphs, Justice O’Connor lists a whole range of negative 
possibilities some of which were speculated about at the trial, others not: 
“could make him ‘uptight’”; “might suffer from drowsiness or confusion”; 
“clearly possible that such side effects had an impact upon not just [his] 
outward appearance, but also the content of his testimony . . . , his ability to 
follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communication with counsel”; 
“[expert testimony about the potential effects of the medication] did nothing to 
cure the possibility that the substance of his own testimony, his interaction 
with counsel, or his comprehension at trial were compromised”; and so on.314  
All of which, the Court added, likely “impaired [Riggins’s] constitutionally 
protected trial rights.”315  The impact of this language was nothing less than to 
give renewed credence to the notion that the drugs are, if not hazardous per se, 
typically productive of serious side effects that often overwhelm the primary 
effect, which as a chemical artifice is more likely negative for legal 
competency than restorative in any case.  The Court seems to have lost sight of 
the fact that against these speculative risks stands the proven fact that, left 
untreated, the defendant is incompetent. 
 
 313. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137.  Later in the opinion, the Court speaks of the “unacceptable 
risk,” id. at 138, and the “strong possibility,” id. at 137, of prejudice.  Justice Thomas in dissent 
makes the point, among several other technical but critical ones, that to justify a reversal of one’s 
conviction, one must prove actual prejudice, not merely allege its possibility.  Id. at 147 (Thomas, 
J., dissenting). 
 314. Id. at 137–38 (majority opinion). 
 315. Id. at 137. 
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A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy was even more damaging.  
Emphasizing the dangerous side effects of the drugs, Justice Kennedy wrote to 
express his conclusion that  
absent an extraordinary showing by the State, the Due Process Clause prohibits 
prosecuting officials from administering involuntary doses of antipsychotic 
medicines for purposes of rendering the accused competent for trial and to 
express doubt that the showing can be made in most cases, given our present 
understanding of the properties of these drugs.316 
It is language that not only resurrects the negative view of antipsychotics in all 
its force, but suggests, in addition, a need to weigh the state’s interest in 
prosecuting a case—and apparently only an “extraordinary” interest will do—
against the presumably competing private interests of the patient, a difficult 
and diversionary inquiry into a false dichotomy that has spelled all kinds of 
trouble in later cases.317  The whole thing smacks of old fashioned psychiatry 
bashing, a fact reinforced by Justice Kennedy’s reference to “prosecuting 
officials”318 as the ones who need to be prohibited from administering the 
medications, as if the doctors who work in government facilities are mere 
stand-ins for the prosecutors who for all intents and purposes are calling the 
“shots.”319 
That Riggins thus caused some backsliding in the form of subsequent court 
decisions insufficiently deferential to medical judgment in a variety of legal 
contexts is not surprising.  As for the specific authority to restore the 
incompetent-to-stand-trial defendant, the denouement of that issue came only 
recently in the case of Sell v. United States, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court 
in 2003.320  It is a decision that shows the Court’s thinking continues to be 
freighted with Riggins’s heavy anti-medication baggage. 
The accused in Sell was a once practicing dentist with a “long and 
unfortunate history of mental illness”321 which, whatever its relevance to the 
criminal behavior at issue (insurance, mail, and Medicaid fraud),322 clearly 
affected the accused’s capacity to deal with the aftermath of being caught and 
charged.  He went on a retaliatory bender, which included trying to intimidate 
one witness in the case against him as well as attempts to murder two other 
witnesses—a former employee who had relevant knowledge and the FBI agent 
 
 316. Id. at 139 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 317. See infra. 
 318. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139. 
 319. Recall the similarly inappropriate implication in Bee v. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1395 
(10th Cir. 1984). 
 320. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 321. Id. at 169. 
 322. Id. at 170. 
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who had arrested him.323  During various pre-trial proceedings Dr. Sell was 
“totally out of control,” as he engaged in “screaming and shouting,” throwing 
out “personal insults and racial epithets,” and in at least one instance spitting in 
the arraigning judge’s face.324  Based on the evident doubts this behavior raised 
about his competency to proceed, a formal inquiry was held and Dr. Sell was 
found incompetent.325  He was sent to the United States Medical Center for 
Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, where the staff recommended that 
he be put on antipsychotic medication.326  But he refused, which landed the 
case in the courts. 
In fact, the question of whether Dr. Sell could be medicated against his will 
went through five “hierarchically ordered lower court and Medical Center 
determinations,”327 the initial treatment staff recommendation followed by two 
medical and administrative intra-institutional reviews and three judicial 
hearings from the federal magistrate to the district court and circuit court of 
appeals, before the United States Supreme Court took the sixth (and still not 
final—given that the case was remanded) pass at the issue.  Each of the 
decisions below was that the medication could be administered over Dr. Sell’s 
objections, but each posted somewhat differing rationales from the others 
based on different factual assumptions, mostly about the accused’s 
dangerousness and dependent less on which of his particular charges were 
emphasized than on whether dangerousness went to his behavior within the 
institutional environment or outside.328  At one point, even new factual 
evidence came into play, evidence of the accused’s not-so-innocent 
“boundary” violations with a female nurse at the Medical Center.329  The 
machinations in the case were so strange that the Supreme Court had the case 
before it on the stipulation (based on the last reviewing court’s conclusion) that 
Dr. Sell was not dangerous to others, a conclusion the Court itself saw the need 
to brand as “contrary” to the record.330  However, the Court also added to this 
mischaracterization, or at least to the confusion, when Justice Breyer opened 
the majority opinion with the statement that the question was about the 
accused’s restoration to competency to stand trial for “serious, but nonviolent 
crimes.”331  Attempted murder, two attempts in fact, may be nonviolent in the 
sense that ultimately the violence did not materialize, but not in any other 
sense, including common.  There is no question the Court was forced to 
 
 323. Id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Sell, 539 U.S. at 171. 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. 
 328. Id. at 171–75. 
 329. Id. at 172–73. 
 330. Sell, 539 U.S. at 184. 
 331. Id. at 169. 
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assume Dr. Sell’s non-dangerousness in the face of a contrary record; it is less 
clear whether or not the depiction of the offenses as nonviolent is 
hypothetically based as well—forced by the limits of the lower courts’ focus 
on the fraud charges—as opposed to being the Court’s own assessment. 
In any event, the rule that came out of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sell 
was a conscious and explicit combination of the Harper and Riggins standards.  
It held that involuntary medication of a “mentally ill defendant facing serious 
criminal charges” is permitted “but only if the treatment is medically 
appropriate, is substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine 
the fairness of the trial, and, taking account of less intrusive alternatives, is 
necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-related 
interests.”332  The Riggins legacy is pronounced here, particularly in the 
reference to bad side effects and the need to take into account less restrictive or 
intrusive alternatives, whatever these may be in the real world, as distinct from 
the world of doctrinal make-believe.  It is not a message that comports well 
with the properties of the modern drugs, or the alternatives for that matter. 
As for the importance of the governmental interests in obtaining an 
adjudication, the “trial-related interests,” one would think, in fact there is no 
question but that, they are weighed earlier in the process and are what put the 
defendant in his current situation, in the institution, in the first place.  The fact 
that he is there means that (1) the court and the parties have deemed the case 
important enough to lead to a formal inquiry into competency and (2) the 
government (the court and prosecution), once the incompetency decision was 
rendered, saw the case as significant enough to commit the accused for 
restoration (few if any minor felons or misdemeanants are hospitalized in the 
hope that they will be restored so that they can then be prosecuted).  Why the 
matter must be litigated again is difficult to comprehend.  The prerequisite in 
the formula, the preamble to it, that the defendant face “serious charges” only 
adds to the redundancy; it means that the already duplicative assessment of 
trial-related interests called for in the formula’s body is ultimately a triplicate 
rendering of the same. 
Finally, the opinion eviscerates its own mandate by suggesting its 
standards are likely to be rarely met333 and that institutional physicians should 
as much as possible use other more traditional standards for doing what they 
want to do334—which are characterized as “more ‘objective and 
manageable’”335 than determining whether the defendant ought to and will be 
rendered competent.  The Court here is referring to alternative legal rationales 
 
 332. Id. at 179. 
 333. Id. at 180. 
 334. Id. at 181. 
 335. Sell, 539 U.S. at 182 (quoting Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 140 (1992) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring)). 
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such as premising the recommendation to medicate on the defendant’s 
dangerousness to others and the prognosis that he will thus be rendered 
nondangerous (Harper) or on dangerousness to self, one of the traditional civil 
commitment justifications.  The Court even suggests the possibility of using a 
best-(medical)-interests-of-the-patient standard as applied in guardianships to 
justify administering unwanted medication,336 but how that is different from 
how physicians decide and what they do when treating to restore is not clear.  
It is not different of course, except from that twisted perspective articulated by 
Justice Kennedy in Riggins that sees institutional physicians acting as mere 
stand-ins for the prosecutor who is the real needle-wielder, unknowing and 
uncaring of the medical needs and interests of the patient. 
It is hard to think of instructions less edifying to doctors in treatment 
institutions than that they should substitute for their clinical judgment a 
decision-making process based on a professionally foreign, not to say 
unprofessional, quasi-legal calculus.  This is not progress in any sense of the 
word—legal or medical—and in the end one can trace the roots of Sell’s 
misdirectedness to the old misgivings dug up in Riggins about whether drugs 
can “really” make people better, saner, and more competent. 
One of the mysteries of Sell is why there is no reference in the majority 
opinion to the administrative regulation in place, and in fact used by the 
Center, for deciding when medications can be administered to a federal 
prisoner or detainee.  The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in 1992 put forth a 
regulation addressing “Administrative Safeguards for Psychiatric Treatment 
and Medication,”337 precisely to deal with defendants in the position of Dr. Sell 
and other inmates in federal treatment facilities.  The regulation sets out both 
substantive criteria and procedural requirements for the lawful, forcible 
medication of federal prisoners or detainees who refuse to comply voluntarily 
with the treatment prescribed for them. 
The BOP rule’s procedural mandates are closely modeled on the Harper 
administrative and medical review mechanism that originated at the state level 
(Washington) but was in effect “constitutionalized” when the U.S. Supreme 
Court approved it as at least minimally sufficient, in the case in which it was 
challenged.338  The BOP rule posits that in cases where an inmate cannot or 
will not voluntarily consent to the treatment prescribed for him, he is entitled 
on twenty-four hour notice to a hearing before a psychiatrist “not currently 
involved in the diagnosis or treatment of the inmate.”339  If the reviewing 
psychiatrist’s decision supports the treatment staff, the inmate can appeal 
within twenty-four hours to the “institution mental health division 
 
 336. Id. 
 337. 57 Fed. Reg. 53820 (Nov. 12, 1992) (codified at 28 C.F.R. §§ 549.40–549.43 (2006)). 
 338. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 236 (1990). 
 339. 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. 
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administrator” who in turn has twenty-four hours to render his decision.340  
Unless emergency circumstances dictate the contrary, no medication shall be 
administered prior to that final administrative decision.  As the Harper Court 
intimated, such administrative and medical decision making and review are 
adequately protective of the inmates’ interests while at the same time not 
unduly burdensome to institutional treating staff nor ultimately self-defeating 
for inmates who, despite their resistance, could in fact use psychiatric help. 
Also arresting is that the majority in Sell addressed its legal prescriptions 
to “a court.”341  The problem with that is in the routine run of things there is 
no, and need be no, court to make a binding treatment decision.  In fact, the 
BOP rule, as written, specifically addresses the substantive criteria to be used 
by the reviewing psychiatrist as the relevant decision maker342 and perforce 
implies that the inmate’s medication can lawfully begin on administrative 
authority alone.  Justice Scalia’s dissent picks up on this point noting the 
majority’s tangentiality, so to speak, to the rule’s procedural schema.  But it is 
only to make the technical point that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction 
because there is no appealable final order or grounds for an interlocutory 
appeal and that the petitioner, Dr. Sell, has chosen a “mistaken litigation 
strategy.”343  Beyond that, Sell’s procedural misdirectedness remains 
essentially unnoticed. 
Of at least equal if not greater interest are the substantive standards 
prescribed by the BOP rule: who may be forcibly medicated in federal 
detention facilities under what circumstances?  Here the regulators drew upon 
Harper as well, but also heeded Charters and Riggins because of the 
competency angle, while adding a novel factor that seems to derive from a mix 
of institutional security and civil treatment concerns.  The rule states that 
forcible medication is authorized when it “is necessary in order to [attempt to] 
make the inmate competent for trial or . . . because the inmate is dangerous to 
self or others, is gravely disabled, or is unable to function in the open 
population.”344 
Note that the regulation’s first stated rationale, the competency restoration 
rationale, for medicating the inmate is succeeded by the alternatives of doing it 
for the inmate’s dangerousness or inability to function in the facility.  It 
suggests that the regulators continued to consider Charters a viable precedent 
in terms of substantive due process: assuming medical propriety (as Charters 
does), restoring a defendant is an independently sufficient reason for 
medicating him and requires no further proof of things such as dangerousness 
 
 340. Id. 
 341. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 183 (2003). 
 342. 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. 
 343. Sell, 539 U.S. at 193 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 344. 28 C.F.R. § 549.43. 
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or grave disability (functional or otherwise), much less gauging the 
government’s interest in prosecuting the case or requiring the deliberate 
“shooting down” of every conceivable less restrictive alternative to 
administering medication, including unreasonable ones.  The alternative 
ground of risk to self or others, in or apart from the general inmate population, 
is there in case the matter presents itself primarily as such, but it need not be 
invoked to obtain the requisite medical authority to treat.  Had the attention of 
the Supreme Court’s majority been focused on the BOP regulators’ judgment, 
presumably entitled to some substantial deference, who knows how Sell would 
have been decided.  And, who knows how much more of a medically rational 
regime would have been constructed for dealing with mentally ill incompetent 
patients committed for treatment or restoration. 
Not only was Sell decided in a regulatory vacuum despite the existence of 
pertinent regulation, apart from invocations of Harper and Riggins there was 
no reference to caselaw precedent either—even though several post-
Harper/Riggins decisions of note did exist.  The Court’s consideration of these 
cases would likely have been illuminating as well and perhaps, as with the 
neglected regulation, might have materially affected the outcome. 
United States v. Brandon is a 1998 decision by the Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit that has relevance, even if from our perspective it sets a bad 
precedent.345  The case concerned a non-dangerous federal detainee whom 
institutional personnel sought to medicate over his objections under the BOP 
procedures.346  Overruling the judgment of the trial court that the 
administrative review process prescribed in the BOP regulation was adequately 
protective of the inmate’s interests,347 the circuit court held that what was 
required in the absence of either proof of dangerousness or a medical 
emergency was a judicial hearing on the evidence.348  At this hearing the 
government would, in the Brandon court’s holding, have the burden of proving 
by a clear and convincing standard that the proposed treatment “is the least 
restrictive and least harmful means of satisfying the government’s goal . . . of 
rendering [the accused] competent to stand trial.”349 
The Brandon opinion detailing the rationale for the decision is a throwback 
to old school judicial thinking about antipsychotic medications.  It identifies 
the inmate’s private interests as, i.a., the First Amendment right to be free from 
government interference with one’s ability to communicate ideas, citing Bee v. 
Greaves, and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial and even to effective 
 
 345. United States v. Brandon, 158 F.3d 947 (6th Cir. 1998). 
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assistance of counsel,350 as if these interests are safeguarded by allowing a 
defendant to remain or be rendered incompetent.  Much is made of Justice 
Kennedy’s jaundiced Riggins view regarding the questionable remedial 
properties of the medications and their potential to prejudice the accused’s trial 
rights351—perceptions that drove the Brandon court to its prescription of a 
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review as well as its requirement that the 
government prove its case by a clear and convincing standard.  After all, the 
decision to medicate in cases where imminent danger is absent was in the 
court’s view a legal rather than medical one352 (how it is so transformed is a 
mystery, the patient being no less sick or incompetent when “nondangerous” 
and the facility where he is housed no less of a hospital), while an extra margin 
of protection was felt to be in order where the risk of error was substantial, 
given the prospects of harm to both trial rights (the Riggins legacy) and to 
medical well-being (the old bad side effects bugaboo). 
Finally, by having the decision mandating all this extra process (over and 
above the BOP regulation’s prescriptions) hinge on the patient’s non-
dangerousness, the Brandon court impliedly held that dangerousness was a 
necessary element of proof before the government could medicate in 
accordance with the BOP regulations, the facial sufficiency of the restoration 
goal by itself notwithstanding.  As late as 1998 then, at least in the Sixth 
Circuit, we were back to a regime of judicial dominance over medical and 
administrative discretion every bit as total as that which was first arrogated by 
judges in the civil commitment cases of twenty-some years ago.  As for the 
government’s, i.e., the public’s, interest in prosecuting crime or in the patient’s 
being treated, that would simply have to take a back seat to the ostensibly 
“private” interest of the patient to remain or render himself incompetent.  The 
empirical fact that restoration can be safely and readily achieved in a 
substantial majority of incompetency cases,353 or that restoration serves 
substantial private interests, as well the patient’s not inconsequential medical 
well-being, must apparently be ignored. 
The Brandon case came in the midst of a confusion of precedents 
perseverating about strict scrutiny versus reasonable interest balancing, whose 
outcomes ironically were not determined by the choice made between the two.  
Its most noteworthy exemplar, decided before the BOP regulation was 
promulgated, and cited in Brandon, is an impassioned but equally 
anachronistic dissent to a District of Columbia Court of Appeals majority 
decision not to rehear a case in which the Government’s doctors had been 
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given the go-ahead to medicate based on a Charters/Harper procedure.354  
None of this gave confidence that institutional doctors would soon be allowed 
to make medical decisions based on medical criteria. 
A year after Brandon, however, in the Fourth Circuit—where Charters 
was decided—United States v. Morgan355 yielded a very different line of 
reasoning in a case where the incompetent patient was dangerous, though his 
attorney intimated that the designation was a sham perpetrated by doctors who 
wanted to medicate and avoid laborious process.356  Operating from the 
perspective that Charters was still viable, the Morgan court held that the BOP 
regulation’s protections were more than adequate in this context.357  Indeed, 
the court seemed to doubt that Harper had changed anything since Charters 
either procedurally or substantively when it came to treating an incompetent 
patient, whose legal status, i.e., reason for being institutionalized, was 
materially different from that of a prisoner.358  As for the impact of Riggins on 
the adequacy of the BOP process and in particular the regulation’s sufficiency 
for addressing the potential impact of the medication on the accused’s 
demeanor, the Morgan court brushed off this concern.  The matter, it 
intimated, might be something for the trial judge to look into immediately 
preceding trial,359 but it should not influence the basic treatment regimen 
doctors wanted to use to make the patient medically better and, perforce, 
enhance his legal competence. 
In the Fourth Circuit, then, medical reason and legal sanity continued to 
prevail.  Had the legal precedents been invoked in Sell, Justice Breyer might 
have been moved to borrow a page or two from Morgan.  If so, we would have 
had a very different opinion and a very different standard for dealing with trial-
incompetent treatment refusers—one much more in tune with the remedial 
properties of the medications and much better aligned with the forensic mental 
health system’s goal and responsibility of treating and restoring the patients 
committed to its charge. 
A random but intimate example of what is wrong with today’s standard 
comes from the forensic practice of the first-listed author.  It involves a 
deliberately failed bank robber (he wanted to get caught and be “safely” jailed 
so he would escape the CIA operatives who he thought were after him on the 
street).  After a false start or two occasioned by the defense attorney’s 
misunderstanding of the mental health facts and their implications (shared by 
the trial judge until the evidence became overwhelming), he was found 
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incompetent to stand trial and sent to the Butner institution from where so 
many of the federal caselaw precedents come.  As of the moment, he refuses to 
be medicated, but for irrational reasons (he thinks he is not sick and that his 
delusions are reality).  And the Butner staff will not force him or try to obtain 
the administrative approval or court order that might allow them to, no doubt 
because they feel they cannot under the Sell standard since his crime is 
comparatively non-serious, he is non-aggressive in the institution, and he has 
already done substantial time there.  Without medication, however, the 
patient’s legal restoration is a long shot and his personal well-being, not to 
mention his peace of mind, precarious given persisting delusions about 
government persecution mixed in with sexual paranoia involving cellmates and 
family members.  Of the so-called better and more manageable forcible 
treatment alternatives contemplated by Sell, civil commitment with the 
government dropping the charges may in theory be the most apt.  But the 
process will take a long time and likely involve substantial legal maneuvering 
to get there, assuming we get there at all with a client or patient who shows 
few overt signs of dangerousness, i.e., risk of imminent violence to others or 
self.  In short, the idea that the civil route for criminal trial-incompetent 
patients is preferable to what could be done directly, simply, and quickly under 
a Charters-style standard or for that matter a Morgan-style interpretation of the 
BOP regulation fades rapidly in light of the clinical and legal “realities.” 
The most recent reported legal cases, in particular two from the Tenth 
Circuit, bear out the same.  Sell is all but unworkable.  In United States v. 
Morrison the court of appeals vacated a trial court order to medicate on 
grounds that it had failed to do Justice Breyer’s preferred Harper 
dangerousness analysis before reaching its conclusion.360  United States v. 
Bradley followed.361  While upholding the district court’s order to medicate in 
that case,362 the court got bogged down in standard of proof issues and the need 
to divide Sell’s tripartite standard between factual and legal issues.  It wound 
up classifying the Government’s interest in trying the case as legal, the 
likelihood of restoration and medical necessity of the treatment as factual 
matters.363  But how this will help the reviewing psychiatrist who under the 
BOP rule is to approve or disapprove the treating doctor’s recommendation is 
anyone’s guess. 
There is also the case of Susan Lindauer, the former congressional aide and 
journalist, accused of working with Iraqi intelligence prior to the start of the 
 
 360. 415 F.3d 1180, 1187  (10th Cir. 2005). 
 361. 417 F.3d 1107 (10th Cir. 2005). 
 362. Id. at 1117. 
 363. Id. at 1113–14. 
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Iraq war.364  By most accounts she is a seriously mentally ill person.  However, 
a federal trial judge in Manhattan released her on bail when he found she could 
not be medicated under the Sell standard on the ground that the Government’s 
interest in prosecuting her was not compelling and because he believed that 
even when medicated she might not be competent.365 
Finally, there is the unedifying saga from Utah of Wanda Barzee and Brian 
David, the kidnapping defendants in the case of Elizabeth Smart.  Both are 
institutionalized as mentally ill and incompetent to stand trial, though the 
behavior of David suggests he may be faking.366  Attempts to medicate them 
are undergoing the sort of intense and diverting legal scrutiny that can be 
expected in the wake of Sell, with Barzee’s case already argued to the Utah 
Supreme Court but nowhere near resolution.367 
V.  LEGISLATIVE PROCESS AND PROGRESS 
Our discussion of Sell v. United States ends the caselaw description and 
analysis and, perforce, the focus on the constitutional dimensions of the right 
to refuse treatment for patients and any corresponding authority on the part of 
doctors to override patient resistance to treatment which is medically ill-
advised.  Indeed, in our analysis of Sell, we suggested that deference to 
existing non-judicially made rules—in this case an administrative (BOP) 
regulation—might have produced a “better” outcome than the one Justice 
Breyer devised based on constitutional caselaw precedent.  Progress in the 
legislative arena, unlike in regulatory law, is impossible for the courts to ignore 
and important for that reason as well as for what it says about the legislators’, 
i.e., the public’s, grasp of the medical needs and realities. 
We will report primarily on legislative developments in civil commitment, 
which cover, especially if one incorporates the somewhat incongruously 
named but salutary concept of “outpatient commitment,” what is both 
theoretically and practically most important in the civil arena.  Reports by 
groups favoring psychiatric intervention when needed such as the Treatment 
Advocacy Center (TAC)368 suggest that in regard to inpatient commitment 
 
 364. Anemona Hartocollis, Ex-Congressional Aide Accused in Iraq Spy Case is Released, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9 2006, at B1. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Pat Reavy, Barzee Ruling Argued, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 7, 2006, at B4; Pat 
Reavy, Highly Agitated Mitchell Still Incompetent for Trial, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Dec. 19, 
2006, at A1. 
 367. Reavy, Barzee Ruling Argued, supra note 366. 
 368. See generally New Help, New Hope, in Florida, CATALYST, Summer 2004, at 1.  TAC 
also maintains a website, www.psychlaws.org, on which it provides, i.a., updates on the latest 
legislative reforms.  TAC advocates refer to the process as “assisted outpatient treatment” (AOT) 
which apart from deemphasizing the nonconsensual aspects of “outpatient commitment” also has 
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observable strides have been made nationally—i.e., jurisdiction by 
jurisdiction—to impart a more medically oriented, parens patriae perspective 
and, if not replace, to at least supplement the danger-to-others, police power 
focus of the earlier statutes.  This has been accomplished via a revival of the 
need for a treatment standard to suffice for commitment and an accompanying 
refocus of the legal lens on indicators such as psychiatric treatment history, 
recent decompensation, deterioration or destabilization, or even mere risk of 
such—all of which avoid, conceptually, the implicit emergency and police 
power strictures that dominate the dangerousness formulation and should help 
us move away in practice from the consequent futile pattern of repetitive one-
at-a-time, typically post-crisis, interventions. 
As for outpatient commitment statutes, the concept underlying them is not 
new, but they have over the past few years swept the country in terms of 
increased visibility and use.369  The objective of these laws, at least partly met 
according to early studies,370 is to ensure treatment for those who otherwise 
resist, avoid, stop, slip-through-the-cracks-of, and recycle through the mental 
health and criminal justice systems to their own as well as their fellow citizens’ 
detriment.  More, and especially earlier, treatment for more people who need it 
is the aspiration here, as is the continuation of treatment already begun given 
the proven benefits of compliance and the well-documented negatives 
associated with the interruption or cessation of the treatment regimen.  The 
concept’s ancillary virtue, ignoring some unhappy commentary by 
uncompromising civil libertarians that it has “widened the net” and subjected 
 
the advantage of avoiding its oxymoronic quality, the term commitment being associated with 
confinement in an institution, i.e., being an inpatient. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Kendra’s Law Families and Participants Laud Program, CATALYST, Spring/Summer 
2005, at 15.  The TAC group points to a number of other studies supporting the notion that the 
outpatient commitment laws have achieved their intended effects: Gustavo A. Fernandez & 
Sylvia Nygard, Impact of Involuntary Outpatient Commitment on the Revolving-Door Syndrome 
in North Carolina, 41 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 1001 (1990); Mark R. Munetz et al., The 
Effectiveness of Outpatient Civil Commitment, 47 PSYCHIATRIC SERVS. 1251 (1996); B.M. 
Rohland, The Role of Outpatient Commitment in the Management of Persons with Schizophrenia, 
IOWA CONSORTIUM FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH (1998); Guido 
Zanni & Leslie de Veau, Inpatient Stays Before and After Outpatient Commitment, 37 HOSP. & 
CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 941 (1986).  Later studies in North Carolina have been especially persuasive 
in documenting positive effects of mandated outpatient treatment in various respects.  See 
generally Virginia A. Hiday et al., Impact of Outpatient Commitment on Victimization of People 
with Severe Mental Illness, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1403 (2002); Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., 
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment and Reduction in Violent Behaviour in Persons with Severe 
Mental Illness, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 224 (2000); Jeffrey  W. Swanson et al., Can 
Involuntary Outpatient Commitment Reduce Arrests among Persons with Severe Mental Illness?, 
28 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 156 (2001); Marvin S. Swartz et al., Can Involuntary Outpatient 
Commitment Reduce Hospital Recidivism?, 156 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1986 (1999). 
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more people to the coercive power of the state,371 is that it is and has been 
correctly perceived by many as a lesser infringement on patients’ liberty than 
having the treatment need met by inpatient hospitalization or the “police need” 
for segregation met by incarceration.  In other words, it is a concept on which 
people of differing political or philosophical persuasions and orientations, i.e., 
those on opposite sides of the traditional advocacy divide, should be able to 
agree.372 
 
 371. Once seemingly a minority perspective, this reflexive civil libertarian complaint is now 
the dominant perspective, if the law journal literature is any guide—that literature is of course 
selective.  See, e.g., Bruce J. Winick & Ken Kress, Preventive Outpatient Commitment for 
Persons with Serious Mental Illness: Forword: A Symposium on Outpatient Commitment 
Dedicated to Bruce Ennis, Alexander Brooks, and Stanley Herr, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & LAW 
3 (2003).  One need only read the Foreword, invoking the views of past mental health law 
luminaries, to know where the surviving generation of those who presume to be patients’ 
advocates is going.  Further evidence that the civil libertarians have organized themselves is that 
both old and new “research” findings are (mis)used to make the case against outpatient 
commitment.  E.g., Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, Outpatient Commitment Debate: New 
Research Continues to Challenge the Need for Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEW ENG. J. ON 
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109 (2005) (Honig is Staff Attorney to the Mental Health Legal 
Advisors Committee of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Boston; Stefan is an 
attorney with the Center for Public Representation in Newton, Massachusetts.).  How something 
new can “continue” to make a case for or against anything is one small mystery.  The substance 
of what is presented is no more edifying.  Much of it has the imprint of the therapeutic 
jurisprudence school of thought which, its benign if not disingenuous name notwithstanding but 
in line with its civil libertarian roots and continued backing from these quarters, is against therapy 
in its straightforward sense, i.e., as sought to be provided via the laws of civil commitment, both 
in- and outpatient.  Among other things, the argument is made, with conspicuous irrelevancy, that 
recent studies, id. at 113, presumably documenting an absence of a relationship between mental 
illness and violent behavior robs the outpatient treatment concept of its primary rationale (or 
“pretext” as the over-the-top lingo of this school would have it).  Id.  An Australian study is cited 
for the proposition that outpatient commitment alone does not reduce hospitalizations in the first 
year after the introduction of community treatment orders (some measure!).  Id. at 115.  The 
distinctly uncontroversial idea that outpatient commitment improves compliance with medication 
is dismissed on the ground that “few previous studies have directly addressed [it].”  Id. at 117.  
The few that have, purportedly, are inconclusive because they do not appear to show discernible 
improvement in the short term but only in the longer run, and even that is a mirage because, in a 
sequitur that is as dubious logically as it is empirically, the drugs complied with “have serious 
side effects and [are of] questionable efficacy.”  Id. at 116.  Studies on the so-called “subjective 
quality of life experiences” of the severely mentally ill are invoked to show that the subjects 
perceived outpatient commitment as “coercive” (is that not the point?) and that they would be 
inclined to participate voluntarily in all sorts of alternative “consumer-operated and -oriented” 
remedial programs whose lack of availability is matched only by absence of any proof of efficacy 
(a true mirage!), id. at 119, and so on.  Personally, against this sort of lawyerly special pleading, 
we are quite willing to take the word of the Treatment Advocacy Center’s reporters and the 
studies they rely on, see supra note 370, that the outpatient treatment laws have had many of their 
desired effects. 
 372. In theory at least, a recent article by Richard J. Bonnie and John Monahan, From 
Coercion to Contract: Reframing the Debate on Mandated Community Treatment for People with 
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Finally, we will look at a key Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) 
provision and its relevance to the provision of outpatient treatment services, as 
interpreted in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Olmstead v. L.C. ex 
rel. Zimring.373  The case is at best a sidelight, but nevertheless of interest and 
perhaps importance in that it may signal a new appreciation of the medical 
realities on the part of several Justices not known to be so oriented previously. 
A. Increased Treatment Focus in Commitment Statutes 
Literature disseminated by the TAC group reports374 that since 1990 the 
civil commitment statutes of at least thirteen states have undergone revision in 
a way that advances the possibility of getting timely psychiatric treatment to an 
individual who needs it but resists for medically unsound and incompetent 
reasons (by incompetent we mean not necessarily the states’ legal definitions, 
but more the commonsense meaning of incompetence as irrationality).375  
While this certainly presents cause for optimism, we are at the same time 
concerned that the picture drawn is a bit too optimistic.  The reason is that the 
count of states having made changes in the right direction comprises changes 
of different orders, some more significant than others. 
1. Persistence of Dangerousness as the Sole Commitment Criterion and 
Four Deviations 
The dominant characteristic of the “old” laws is the dominance of 
dangerousness as the standard for hospitalizing someone involuntarily.  In fact, 
that was seen as the laws’ “beauty.”376  There was danger to self as well as to 
others, with the emphasis on the latter, provable by threats or actions 
(preferably actions) of varying degrees of overtness.377  If danger to self was 
invoked it would have to be shown by evidence similarly drastic or explicit in 
terms of imminence and seriousness.  Some states translated the danger-to-self 
requirement into a “gravely disabled” or similarly worded standard or else 
 
Mental Disorders, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 485 (2005), confirms, by the title alone, that there is 
much less agreement on the value of the concept than its proponents once optimistically believed.  
See also supra note 371. 
 373. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 374. See supra note 368. 
 375. See, e.g., supra notes 73–74 (supporting the notion that the resistance to treatment on the 
part of a high percentage of the mentally ill is founded on bad reasons, including the failure to 
recognize their illness which is a feature of the illness). 
 376. The American Bar Foundation in the 1970s and ’80s published two editions of a major 
study tracing these developments in civil commitment law, including commentary on the 
rationales, i.e., their “beauty.”  SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY & BARBARA A. WEINER, THE 
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1985); THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 
(Samuel J. Brakel et al. eds., rev. ed. 1971) (1961). 
 377. See generally supra note 376. 
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posed it as an alternative ground for commitment.378  But neither in intent nor 
in practice did these “alternate” standards deviate much from the 
preoccupation of having commitment be essentially a police operation—to 
intervene and commit only to squelch serious, imminent harm or to prevent 
additional harm where it had already been done. 
This continues to be the pattern notwithstanding the reports of meaningful 
progress.  When it comes to inpatient commitment (to be redundant for 
clarity’s sake) only four states have moved away from “dangerousness” 
according to our search: Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Iowa, and Oregon.379  The 
legislatures in these states have enacted a more medically oriented need-for-
treatment-style standard as a sufficient alternate ground for commitment.  
Legal change in all other states has been in the form of enacting medical 
standards for involuntary outpatient treatment only, or to permit medically 
focused evidence as proof of dangerousness or of grave disability for purposes 
of inpatient commitment, but not as independent grounds.380  This is not to 
understate the significance of these latter changes in the absolute, but to point 
out that the kind of statutory change we would see as the biggest measure of 
progress is at this point far from universally endorsed. 
Wisconsin’s civil commitment law today has what is locally called a “fifth 
standard,” enacted in 1995 after a long and contentious legislative battle.381  
The fifth standard designation stems from the fact that Wisconsin already had 
four other standards for determining “committability” under the law, each one 
reflective of the traditional emergency-suggestive conceptualizations that ruled 
the civil libertarian era during which they were enacted: 
The individual is [mentally ill and] dangerous because he or she [evidences]: 
(a) . . . substantial probability of physical harm to himself or herself as 
manifested by . . . recent threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily 
harm[;] (b) . . . substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals as 
manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior [etc.][;] 
 
 378. Id. 
 379. The Oregon law contains a feature, discussed below, that could cause one to hedge a bit 
on whether the state has fully decoupled commitment from proof of dangerousness, but on 
balance the conclusion that it has seems not merely tenable but appropriate.  Even Wisconsin’s 
statute retains some ambiguity on this point in that there is an antecedent reference to 
dangerousness “[a committable person] is dangerous because he or she does any of the 
following: . . . .”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)(2) (West Supp. 2006).  But to read standard (e), 
the critical fifth standard, as that language’s final modifier defies both the logic of this law and 
the history of its passage.  See also infra note 388 on the current legislative situation in 
Oklahoma, where there has been a surprising and little noticed reversal. 
 380. See supra note 376. 
 381. Personal contact with advocates in Wisconsin and others outside the state, including Rael 
Jean Isaac, an influential New York-based supporter of this assisted treatment standard, confirms 
the fight over this standard was major.  Isaac, of course, is the first author of MADNESS IN THE 
STREETS, supra note 72. 
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(c) . . . impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts 
or omissions, that there is a substantial probability of physical impairment or 
injury to himself or herself[;] (d) . . . behavior manifested by recent  acts or 
omissions that . . . he or she is unable to satisfy basic needs for nourishment, 
medical care, shelter or safety . . . so that a substantial probability exists that 
death, serious physical injury, serious physical debilitation or serious physical 
disease will imminently ensue[.]382 
The fifth standard, standard (e), by contrast is not tied to the threshold 
dangerousness criterion.  It provides that commitment may ensue if the 
individual proposed for it lacks capacity to understand his or her illness and to 
make rational treatment decisions but “needs care or treatment to prevent 
further disability or deterioration.”383  The quoted phrase is the key.  Unlike 
with the previous four standards, it stands independently of the dangerousness 
predicate.  It is followed by a long qualifier describing further medical and 
social risks if the individual remains untreated and even employs verbiage 
about “loss of cognitive and volitional control”384 that seems to hearken 
somewhat unfortunately to criminal insanity, but none of this undermines the 
essential decoupling of committability from evidence of what we might call 
policeable harms.  This is a medically focused parens patriae standard, as 
opposed to emergency or police power standard. 
Oklahoma is one of the three states besides Wisconsin that appears to have 
decoupled a medical commitment standard from dangerousness, though it has 
done so more simply and directly.  It has, today, three independently sufficient 
criteria for civil commitment.385  The first is the traditional identifier of a 
committable person as one “who because of a mental illness . . . represents a 
risk of harm to self or others.”386  The second speaks of “drug- or alcohol-
dependent person[s] . . . who as a result of dependency represent . . . a risk of 
harm to self or others.”387  But Oklahoma’s “third standard” for effectuating 
involuntary treatment is as simple as it is classical in its medical essence: 
a person who . . . require[s] inpatient treatment for [either] a previously 
diagnosed history of schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, or major depression with 
suicidal intent, or [who] due to the appearance of symptoms of schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, or major depression with suicidal intent . . . and for whom 
 
 382. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(a)–(d). 
 383. Id. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(e). 
 384. Id.  This language is taken from the “gravely disabled” statute of Washington, which was 
reformed to encompass more medically oriented criteria back in 1979.  See infra note 394. 
 385. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 1-103(13)(a) (West 2001). 
 386. Id. § 1-103(13)(a)(1). 
 387. Id. § 1-103(13)(a)(2). 
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such treatment is reasonably believed to prevent progressively more 
debilitating mental impairment.388 
There is no language here of imminent physical harm or dangerousness, but 
instead of mental regression as such and only in cases where the diagnosis or 
history suggests the presence of one of the three major, DSM Axis I, mental 
disorders.  It embodies the view, correctly so in our opinion, that for 
determining the need for psychiatric intervention it is both apposite and 
sufficient to use psychiatric standards and terms and not those of law 
enforcement.  The law is not asking a secondary question here such as it does 
in the context of, say, the insanity defense, where the psychiatric input is meant 
to address cognitive or volitional capacity so as to help resolve the ultimate 
legal issue of accountability or culpability, or any of a number of issues where 
the law seeks psychiatric consultation as it were via testimony on so-called 
penultimate issues.389  This is direct and ultimate: it is about treatment and 
treatability.  The question can both be posed and answered directly in medical 
terms.390 
Iowa, today, still operates with the two traditional standards of danger to 
self or others and inability to provide for basic needs, but it also has a new 
commitment criterion focusing on the likelihood that the person proposed for 
hospitalization will “inflict serious emotional injury on members of [his or her] 
family or others who lack reasonable opportunity to avoid contact with the 
[mentally ill] person.”391  The reference to family members and others close to 
the person as well as the concern not only for their physical but also emotional 
well-being can be considered breakthroughs in this area of law. 
 
 388. This third standard was in effect and could be found under tit. 43A, § 1-103(14)(c) of the 
Oklahoma law prior to its amendment via Oklahoma House Bill 2865 of 2005.  That bill redrafted 
the mental illness, dangerousness, and drug- or alcohol-dependent portions of the law, under 
subsections (13)(a) and (b) and retained the history and symptoms of schizophrenia and other 
major mental disorders language plus its reference to mental regression under (13)(c).  However, 
between the drafting of the bill and its enactment in April 2006, subsection (13)(c) disappeared 
altogether.  Treatment Advocacy Center staff lawyers say this occurred without any conspicuous 
notice or debate and they suggest that, as in the case where legislators sometimes “slip in” a 
controversial provision that goes unnoticed in a long and complicated bill, this one was “slipped 
out.”  E-mail from Jonathan Stanley, Staff Lawyer, Treatment Advocacy Center, to Samuel Jan 
Brakel (Nov. 8, 2007) (on file with author). 
 389. The law has gone back and forth on whether it is appropriate for mental health experts to 
offer testimony on ultimate legal issues.  The post-Hinckley reforms following the acquittal by 
reason of insanity of President Reagan’s would-be assassin, were enacted in 1984 for the federal 
courts and lead the way toward the currently dominant position of disallowing it. 
 390. It has been pointed out innumerable times by both judges and legal commentators that 
commitment is a social and legal decision rather than a medical one, but this does not alter the 
fact that medical criteria and medical facts are what that social and legal decision should be 
heavily based on. 
 391. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16)(b) (West 2006). 
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Finally, Oregon provides for the commitment of the “chronically mentally 
ill” as a separate class.  The class is defined as comprising those who “[w]ithin 
the previous three years [have at least] twice been placed in a hospital [and are] 
exhibiting symptoms or behavior substantially similar to those that preceded 
and led to one or more of the hospitalizations.”392  The law further specifies 
that it must also be found that, unless treated, the members of this group “will 
continue, to a reasonable medical probability, to physically or mentally 
deteriorate so that [they] will become [dangerous to self or others or unable to 
provide for basic needs].”393  The prospective reference, as it were, to the 
traditional commitment criteria could give one pause on whether Oregon has 
fully decoupled commitment of the chronically mentally ill from these criteria, 
but it seems acceptable to determine that the difference between that and the 
traditional law’s insistence on current to retrospective-but-recent 
dangerousness does indeed “make the difference.” 
2. Secondary, Psychiatry-Focused Reforms 
On the lesser reforms—those not undoing the dangerousness standard, but 
allowing proof of it via more medically oriented testimony—the State of 
Washington took the lead in 1979.  In that year the state’s legislature redefined 
“gravely disabled” (both in spirit and practice a danger-to-self standard, 
“danger of serious physical harm” in fact) as alternatively provable by “severe 
deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss 
of cognitive or volitional control over his or her and actions and . . . not 
receiving such care as is essential for his or her health and safety.”394  The 
alleged practical results of this change were promptly panned in a near-
hysterical article by researchers Durham and LaFond who exclaimed that it 
would among other things permit hospitalization on the basis of “[v]irtually 
any ‘decompensation’ or significant worsening of an individual’s 
psychological condition,”395 but this did not stop other states from gradually 
taking a similar approach.  Today one can count about a dozen jurisdictions 
where like changes have been made by the legislature.  A few examples 
follow.  Some of the “victories” identified by proponents of this sort of legal 
change are small indeed, though even small victories are prized; others are 
more significant. 
 
 392. OR. REV. STAT. § 426.005(1)(d)(C)(i)–(iii) (2005). 
 393. Id. § 426.005(1)(d)(C)(iv) (emphasis added). 
 394. Act of June 4, 1979, 1979 Wash. Sess. Laws 1872 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 71.05.020(16)(b) (West Supp. 2007)). 
 395. Mary L. Durham & John Q. La Fond, The Impact of Expanding a State’s Therapeutic 
Commitment Authority, in DAVID B. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A 
THERAPEUTIC AGENT 121, 121–22 (1990). 
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We begin with one of the smaller, which occurred in Idaho where the 
legislature in 2002 decided that “gravely disabled,” formerly defined as 
“inability to provide for his essential needs,” could henceforth be found if the 
subject for commitment could not meet his or her “basic needs.”396  Though 
dutifully noted on TAC’s “legislative successes” list,397 one could be inclined 
to doubt that the change from essential to basic would have much operational 
consequence.  However, a more significant change was missed in the TAC 
summary, which was that the new basic needs formulation came with the 
complementary words “for nourishment, or essential medical care, or shelter or 
safety.”398  As classic deficiencies in so many mentally ill people’s lives, the 
addition of these terms to the assisted treatment law is likely to have significant 
impact on the ability to get mental health care to those in Idaho who need it.  
Proof of lack of basic medical care indeed should equate to it.399 
What one hopes is also a significant reform, one that not only could but 
should have practical consequences, was enacted in Wyoming where in 1999 
the legislature added “[mental] destabilization from lack of or refusal to take 
prescribed psychotropic medications” to the traditional kinds of evidence that 
could prove danger to self.400  This is important.  Not only does “mental 
destabilization” signal an appropriately lower and more psychiatrically focused 
standard for treatment intervention than the traditional inability to provide for 
essential nourishment requirement, let alone likely “death or serious physical 
injury,” the provision also gains from alluding to one of the major causes of 
such destabilization—lack of medication or refusal to take it even though 
prescribed.  In other words, it joins the matter of proof to basic medical 
realities. 
Between the low-end and high-end of the spectrum of reforms, there have 
been, tautologically, many statutory language changes tending more toward the 
middle.  A general, and in our view salutary, focus on treatment history 
characterizes a fair number of such changes.  A couple of examples are: 
Illinois, where the commitment statute was amended in 2003 to say that “[i]n 
determining whether a person meets the [danger to self or others criteria], the 
court may consider evidence of the person’s repeated past pattern of specific 
behavior and actions related to the person’s illness”401 and South Dakota, 
 
 396. Act of Mar. 20, 2002, 2002 Idaho Sess. Laws 357 (codified at IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-
317(13) (2007)) (emphasis added). 
 397. See supra note 370. 
 398. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-317(13). 
 399. Mary T. Zdanowicz of TAC, supra note 130, brought the incompleteness of the earlier 
analysis to the Authors’ attention. 
 400. Act of Mar. 4, 1999, 1999 Wyo. Sess. Laws 395 (codified at WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-
101(a)(ii)(C) (2007)). 
 401. Act of Aug. 21, 2003, 2003 Ill. Laws 3644 (codified at 405 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-119 
(2004)). 
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where today the danger to self or others standard is provable by recent 
statutory language (enacted in 2000) that makes three discrete references to the 
individual’s “treatment history.”402 
Finally, a growing number of states are passing statutory provisions that 
premise involuntary hospitalization on a finding by the committing court that 
the individual proposed lacks capacity to make treatment decisions.403  In our 
1990 article, we counted six states (though one of these may have been 
misclassified) whose statutes required such a finding and we lauded these 
statutes as making explicit what we felt was logically implicit in the finding 
that the individual was committable.404  More important than any perceived 
logical consistency is the fact that such laws collapse the inquiry into need for 
hospitalization with the self-evident need to be treated once hospitalized and 
thereby avoid the anomaly of legally sustainable treatment refusals by 
whatever number of patients chooses to assert this “right” and thereby winds 
up languishing on the wards-untreated-until-a-formal-legal-disposition-of-
their-case-is-made-and-possibly-never-be-treated-in-the-event-they-are-found-
competent-to-refuse-or-that-there-is-credible-evidence-they-would-refuse-if-
competent-or-that-treatment-is-not-in-their-best-medical-interest.  We string all 
these unlikely eventualities together stream-of-consciousness-style to 
emphasize the near-absurdity and ultimately the futility of the  individual-
institutional scenario created by laws that continue to separate hospitalization 
and treatment determinations.405 
One problem with arriving at a fair count of how many states have enacted 
such reforms is that the statutory language in some, including Connecticut, 
Delaware, Florida, and New York,406 refers to the individual’s incapacity to 
make the decision regarding hospitalization.  That of course is self-evident.  
When a court decides to commit a resisting or non-assenting person it not 
merely implies but, perforce, determines that he or she is incapable of making 
that decision.  To require the court to specifically find such incapacity is 
redundant.  It is only when the statute speaks of the broader issue of capacity to 
decide on treatment that anything new is added, with or without attendant 
 
 402. Act of Feb. 14, 2000, 2000 S.D. Sess. Laws 179 (codified at S. D. CODIFIED LAWS § 
27A-1-1(4), (5)(a), & (b) (2004)). 
 403. See, e.g., supra notes 368, 370 (reports on this trend reported by the Treatment 
Advocacy Center). 
 404. See Brakel & Davis, supra note 1, at 469–72. 
 405. The process is futile in that ultimately, after all the delay and its bad consequences, the 
override of the patient’s refusal is sustained by the courts in over 95% of the cases.  See, e.g., 
Ronald Schouten & Thomas G. Gutheil, Aftermath of the Rogers Decision: Assessing the Costs, 
147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1348 (1990) (98.6% of 1,514 Massachusetts cases studied). 
 406. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17a-495(a) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 
5001(6)(i) (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.467(1)(a)(1)(b) (West 2006); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. 
LAW § 9.01 (McKinney 2006). 
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implications for the patient’s right to assent to or refuse treatment once 
committed.  The states we identified previously as having such broader 
language were Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, South Carolina, and 
Utah,407 but Delaware’s law clearly speaks to the ability to make “responsible 
decisions with respect to . . . hospitalization.”  Iowa’s law refers to deciding on 
“hospitalization or treatment,” with the remainder speaking of treatment only.  
Two new states, Texas408 and Wisconsin, can be added to the latter list with the 
Wisconsin statute (in the course of articulating its fifth standard) referring to 
“either [the individual’s] incapability of expressing an understanding of the 
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the 
alternatives, or substantial incapability of applying an understanding of the 
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or her mental illness.”409 
B. Outpatient “Commitment” Laws 
The judicial power to order treatment outside the institutional context has 
today been formalized in the laws of all but eight states in the U.S. with the 
passages of what are generally, if oxymoronically, known as outpatient 
commitment statutes.410  Actually, the courts have long if not always had such 
power via a variety of less formal or less explicit routes, but due to lack of 
knowledge of the existence, or weak confidence in the solidity of this authority 
on the part of the judiciary, it was rarely used.  These routes included: (1) an 
outpatient treatment option under the “least restrictive” application of general 
civil commitment statutes; (2) mandated outpatient treatment as a condition of 
discharge following inpatient commitment; and (3) in cases involving criminal 
charges (and thus under the jurisdiction of the criminal court rather than a 
probate court or the like), the possibility of a diversionary disposition whereby 
the offender (typically charged with a minor offense) could (a) “choose” to go 
for outpatient mental health treatment as part of a pre-trial agreement that 
would end the criminal case or (b) where the case is processed criminally, as a 
condition of probation, following a guilty plea, or even a guilty verdict, if the 
judge is so inclined.411 
 
 407. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5001(6); IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.1(16) (West 2006); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-2946(f)(1) (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 330.1401(1)(c) (LexisNexis 
2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-17-580(A)(1) (Supp. 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-15-631(10)(c) 
(2006). 
 408. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(a)(2)(C)(iii) (Vernon 2003). 
 409. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)2(e) (West Supp. 2006) (emphasis added). 
 410. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 372, at 485. 
 411. See Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 372, at 489; Joel M. Silberberg, Terri L. Vital & S. 
Jan Brakel, Breaking Down Barriers to Mandated Outpatient Treatment for Mentally Ill 
Offenders, 31 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 433, 435 (2001).  The former makes the point that all of 
these choices are coerced from the patient’s standpoint but also that the level of coercion varies 
and that any evaluation of the relative merits or wisdom of making these choices available would 
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Even after enactment of the first series of explicit outpatient commitment 
laws during the early 1970s412 the concept was slow to take hold in practice.  
This has changed, however, with the recent passage of this type of legislation 
in several key states—New York (1999), California (2002), Florida (2004), 
and Michigan (2004)—a development that both signals and responds to the 
reality that the concept “has arrived.”  Mandated outpatient treatment was 
identified in a 2005 scholarly article as “one of the most contested [read 
“significant” or “contentious”] human rights issues in mental health law in the 
United States at the beginning of the 21st century.”413  Kendra’s Law, New 
York’s outpatient treatment law, is today as much part of the popular or at least 
popular legal lexicon as is Megan’s Law, New Jersey’s sex offender 
registration statute, and for reasons beyond that the victims after whom the 
statutes were named suffered brutal death.  That last allusion of course also 
says something about the motivation behind this legislation or at least its most 
recent push.414 
Though almost half the states operate with a unitary standard for both in 
and outpatient involuntary treatment, conceptually the defining characteristic 
of the outpatient commitment laws is that they permit mandated treatment 
based on criteria that are “looser” than those that authorize involuntary 
inpatient treatment—typically more medically oriented criteria under which 
dangerousness or grave disability is at best a predicted outcome if the 
individual is not treated.415  In that sense, the treatment mandate differs from 
one that could eventuate under the least restrictive application of the traditional 
inpatient commitment statutes, which premise that the subject meets the 
criteria for hospitalization but the judge in his wisdom or generosity decides 
 
profit from being viewed from a contract law perspective as distinct from an autonomy 
infringement or coercion stand point.  If taken literally, this advice may suffer from the drawback 
that many patients may not be competent to contract.  Id. at 486–89. 
 412. See Zanni & de Veau, supra note 370, at 941 (noting that outpatient commitment has 
been an option in the District of Columbia since the early 1970s). 
 413. See Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 372, at 485. 
 414. While it would be inappropriate, even unfair, to discount the rehabilitative motives 
driving the mandated outpatient treatment movement, it is also a fact that—as with similar legal 
developments, e.g., recent sex offender commitment legislation—the catalyst is often a criminal 
event that inspires public horror, suggesting that the objectives of punishment and incapacitation 
are also operative.  Advocates from groups such as TAC and others who favor expanding the 
availability of “assisted” treatment, contrary to earlier activists for mental patients, make no bones 
about the association between mental illness and violent behavior or about using this association 
to motivate legislators to support their agenda. 
 415. It could be argued that states with a unitary standard for inpatient and outpatient 
commitment do not technically have discrete outpatient commitment laws as the least restrictive 
principle as applied in commitment requires a finding that outpatient treatment be considered first 
and that inpatient commitment is permissible only on proof that outpatient treatment is not the 
answer. 
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that the risk of not hospitalizing can be taken.416  It is that difference that is of 
course also the focus of the mandated outpatient treatment laws’ critics, the 
civil libertarians, who by virtue of their fealty to liberty in its most obvious and 
conspicuous sense only, deplore any widening of the so-called coerced-
treatment net.417 
There have recently been more subtle challenges than the libertarian 
broadside to the concept of outpatient commitment, or leveraged outpatient 
treatment as the modern lingo has it.  These include the general detraction that 
the concept, whether good or bad, is less significant than both its proponents 
and opponents suggest by the vehemence of their opposition.  Apart from 
whatever diminution in significance is conveyed by the change in terminology 
(leveraging treatment certainly sounds less onerous than mandating 
commitment or coercing care), the point is bolstered by research findings 
indicating that other forms of “leverage”—such as those the state may invoke 
in providing housing or abstaining from criminal punishment—may play as 
large, if not larger, a role in encouraging, enforcing, or both, treatment 
compliance than that brought to bear by direct judicial order.418  And, as 
mentioned, there is the reformulation of the outpatient commitment issue as 
one essentially of contract rather than forcible imposition.419  Neither of these 
perceptions, these “new takes,” however should in fact diminish the salience of 
the outpatient commitment idea.  Maximizing treatment initiation and 
adherence for the mentally ill is critical no matter how or in how many ways it 
can be achieved.  And while the language of contract may be appropriate to 
some situations and certainly implies a softer message in all, it does not apply 
where the patient lacks legal competence or, by virtue of his legal status, 
choice.420 
Even though it is among the more recent statutes of this type, New York’s 
Kendra’s law may serve as an example because of its prominence in the public 
scheme of things: 
 
 416. It could also be argued that applying the least restrictive alternative principle is 
mandatory, in which case the judge is merely following the law instead of exercising benevolent 
discretion. 
 417. Mary Zdanowicz, Executive Director of TAC, points out that the opponents of outpatient 
commitment argue that the “home invasion” that could occur in the course of the effort to 
medicate an uncooperative outpatient is every bit as demeaning of liberty as involuntary 
hospitalization.  We disagree.  Such unwanted home entries, if they occur, would be exceptional 
whereas hospitalization and its total loss of residential freedom is the rule in inpatient 
commitment. 
 418. Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 372 (listing different forms of leverage that can be used 
to convince a patient to consent to treatment). 
 419. Id. 
 420. For purposes of their paper, Bonnie & Monahan, supra note 372, at 489, simply assume 
the competency of the patients involved in the bargaining process.  This may be theoretically 
permissible but it does not do away with the practical problem. 
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A [patient] may be ordered to [obtain] assisted outpatient treatment if the court 
finds that such person: (1) is eighteen years of age or older; and (2) is suffering 
from a mental illness; and (3) is unlikely to survive safely in the community 
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; and (4) has a history of 
lack of compliance with treatment for mental illness that has: (i) . . . at least 
twice within the last thirty-six months been a significant factor in necessitating 
hospitalization . . . , or receipt of services in a forensic or other mental health 
unit of a correctional facility or . . . (ii) . . . resulted in one or more acts of 
serious violent behavior toward self or others or threats of, or attempts at, 
serious physical harm to self or others within the last forty-eight months . . . (5) 
is, as a result of his or her mental illness, unlikely to voluntarily participate 
in . . . treatment; and (6) in view of [the patient’s treatment history and current 
behavior, the patient is] in need of assisted outpatient treatment in order to 
prevent a relapse or deterioration which would likely result in serious harm to 
[self or others]; and (7) is likely [that the patient will] benefit from assisted 
outpatient treatment.421 
Note first that the New York statute uses the up-to-date “assisted treatment” in 
somewhat incongruous conjunction with “ordered.”  That is merely a linguistic 
quibble, however.  A more important point is that there are several provisions 
that hearken back to the dangerousness matter.  This feature is not unique as 
the language appears in and was borrowed from state statutes passed prior to 
New York’s enactment and can be found as well in laws passed 
subsequently.422  It gives a libertarian cast to the law.  Whether that is desirable 
or whether it comports with the ultimate goal of delivering treatment in timely 
fashion to individuals who need it is a matter of opinion.  Empirical data at this 
point are wanting but even if developed would be subject to varying 
interpretations.  Our sense is that it is too restrictive and excessively conscious 
of the legal concerns that still dominate inpatient commitment.  Without 
subsection (4)(ii) and the last clause in subsection (6) that speak of serious 
harm, the remaining provisions would seem more than adequately protective of 
the patient’s overall interests.  Certainly for assisted outpatient treatment—a 
lesser infringement on “liberty” than hospitalization—the dominance of 
medical criteria is easily justified. 
A few states in fact appear to have recognized that.  Georgia’s statute for 
example is much shorter and simpler.  The patient must be (1) in need of 
involuntary treatment and (2) unable to voluntarily seek it or comply with it 
based on his or her mental status and history.423  The third component is that he 
or she requires outpatient treatment “in order to avoid predictably and 
 
 421. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c). 
 422. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a) (West Supp. 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 334-60.2 (LexisNexis 2004). 
 423. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1) (Supp. 2007). 
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imminently becoming an inpatient.”424  That last standard, if interpreted 
narrowly, could be seen as equivalent to requiring imminent dangerousness, 
but it may also leave room for an order based on medical harms.  Texas 
appears to have moved away from any dangerousness references or 
implications altogether.  The patient in order to be required to undergo 
temporary outpatient treatment must have a mental illness that is “severe and 
persistent” who if not treated will continue to “suffer severe and abnormal 
mental, emotional, or physical distress[,] . . . experience deterioration of the 
ability to function independently . . . [and] safely in the community and . . . 
[has demonstrated] . . . an inability to participate in outpatient treatment . . . 
effectively and voluntarily.”425  Extended outpatient treatment may be ordered 
if one additional criterion is met: “the proposed patient has received court-
ordered inpatient mental health services . . . for at least 60 consecutive days 
during the preceding 12 months.”426  That last proviso still speaks to medical 
history, even if in practice it may in most or all cases equate with the reality of 
dangerousness. 
C. The ADA, Olmstead, and the “Conversion” Of Justice Kennedy 
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) in 
order to help combat discrimination against disabled persons, which it found to 
be pervasive in many public and private spheres of socioeconomic life 
throughout the United States.427  Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring is a case in 
which the U.S. Supreme Court took the opportunity to construe, in the face of 
conflicting assertions about its proper reach, the antidiscrimination mandate in 
Title II, the public services portion of the Act.428  The suit was brought on 
behalf of two female patients at Georgia Regional Hospital in Atlanta who, 
based on the judgment of the state’s own treating doctors, were well enough to 
be discharged and enrolled in community-based treatment programs, but who 
were not so enrolled because there were no openings.429  The two patients were 
mentally retarded but one was diagnosed as also suffering from schizophrenia, 
while the other was found to have a coexisting personality disorder; both, 
 
 424. GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-1(12.1)(A). 
 425. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 574.034(b) (Vernon 2003). 
 426. Id. at § 574.035(a)(4). 
 427. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 337 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12132 
(2000)).  The latter section refers to Title II of the Act, at issue in the Olmstead case, infra note 
428. 
 428. 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999). 
 429. Id. at 593–94.  Actually, the patient-petitioners had already obtained community 
placement by the time the Supreme Court took the case, but the Court ruled the matter was not 
moot because of the patients’ history of multiple institutional placements which presumably 
suggested similar controversies could arise in the future.  Id. at 594 n.6. 
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however, were treated on the hospital’s psychiatric unit.430  In an opinion 
written by Justice Ginsburg, the Court upheld the patients’ claim that they had 
been discriminated against by the state of Georgia in violation of Title II of the 
Act.431 
While we feel the concept of discrimination was misused by the majority 
of the Court in this case, our view being more in line with the dissenters and 
Justice Kennedy in concurrence that the patients suffered no discrimination on 
account of their disability and were not treated worse than any identified 
comparable class of individuals,432 the possible ill effects of the holding were 
much muted by the provisos written into the majority opinion by Justice 
Ginsburg.  In fact, those provisos turned the case into at least a partial victory 
for the psychiatric treatment-interest side.  Despite its conclusion that the 
plaintiffs in the case had suffered discrimination under the law by their 
continued confinement in an inpatient facility when the uncontroverted 
evidence was that they could be cared for in the community, the Olmstead 
Court made clear its decision was not a call for precipitous, massive 
deinstitutionalization.433  Rather, the ADA’s “reasonable accommodations” (or 
“reasonable modifications”/“no fundamental alterations”) standard for gauging 
the state’s obligation meant that any move toward greater than current reliance 
on community-based treatment could proceed at a “reasonable pace.”434  Even 
budgetary considerations—often dismissed as a defense to failure to fully and 
immediately respond to legal imperatives435—were held by the Court to be 
relevant to how and how fast to implement the remedy.  The Court further 
went on to note that any transfers to community facilities be of “qualified” 
individuals only and that there was no mandate to move those who did not 
desire it, much less move people to undesirable settings such as shelters for the 
homeless, as the state at one point proposed.436  Finally, the Court gave full 
recognition to the fact that a complete phasing out of inpatient institutions was 
neither realistic nor desirable, as there would always be mentally ill patients 
who need institution-based care “to stabilize acute psychiatric symptoms” and 
others, mentally ill or retarded, who are simply “not prepared at particular 
times—perhaps in the short run, perhaps in the long run—for the risks and 
exposure of the less protective environment of community settings.”437 
 
 430. Id. at 593. 
 431. Id. at 607. 
 432. Id. at 611–12 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 615–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 433. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604–05 (majority opinion). 
 434. Id. at 606. 
 435. Id. at 603–04.  It is possible the Court allowed the budgetary “defense” because it was 
interpreting statutory imperatives rather than constitutional ones, but that is doubtful given Justice 
Ginsburg’s opinion made no such distinction. 
 436. Id. at 605. 
 437. Id. 
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Perhaps most gratifying of all, however, was the verbiage used by Justice 
Kennedy in his concurrence in Olmstead.  Justice Kennedy began by quoting 
Dr. Fuller Torrey of the Treatment Advocacy Center for the proposition that 
For a substantial minority [of patients] . . . deinstitutionalization has been a 
psychiatric Titanic. Their lives are virtually devoid of ‘dignity’ or ‘integrity of 
body, mind and spirit.’ ‘Self-determination’ often means merely that the 
person has a choice of soup kitchens. The ‘least restrictive setting’ frequently 
turns out to be a card-board box, a jail cell, or a terror-filled existence plagued 
by both real and imaginary enemies.438 
Having thus exposed the cynical aspects of the civil liberties “talk” as applied 
to the lot of the mentally ill, Justice Kennedy added in his own words his 
understanding of mental illness and its amelioration through medication: 
It must be remembered that for the person with severe mental illness who has 
no treatment the most dreaded of confinements can be the imprisonment 
inflicted by his own mind, which shuts reality out and subjects him to the 
torment of voices and images beyond our powers to describe . . . .  It is a 
common phenomenon that a patient functions well with medication, yet, 
because of the mental illness itself, lacks discipline or capacity to follow the 
regime the medication requires.439 
This is a far cry from the language penned by Justice Kennedy in Riggins 
seven years earlier.440  While that case presented a legal and strategic context 
unlike civil commitment or discharge, in- or outpatient, one is tempted to 
believe that perhaps the radical change in tone stems from new insight into the 
medical reality.  As such, just as the damaging Riggins language was 
capitalized on by the anti-medication forces, Justice Kennedy’s new words can 
be used in years to come to mobilize those who through the medium of either 
legislation or litigation seek to return mental health treatment decision making 
to a form and forum that more adequately accounts for the interests of patients, 
doctors, and the state—the last to the extent it designates and manages the 
locus of treatment; where treatment will take place; and delegates control over 
whom, how, and when to treat. 
CONCLUSION 
Because we feel it is more appropriate to offer guiding principles in our 
conclusion than detailed legal reforms, we can and will be brief, very brief in 
fact. 
We believe that for civil commitment, including those found not guilty by 
reason of insanity, NGRI, a population not specifically touched on in this 
 
 438. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 609 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 439. Id. at 609–10. 
 440. See supra notes 316–19 and accompanying text. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2008] OVERRIDING MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT REFUSALS 585 
Article, and commitment for restoration to trial competence both the 
substantive standards and procedures can and should be medical.  As we said 
at the outset, every patient or proposed patient has a right to refuse treatment if 
he or she does not want it.  That is to say, patients, as other citizens, should be 
able to articulate their objection to prescribed treatment and that objection, if 
made, should be heard.  Moreover, the physician who is responsible for 
treating the patient should try to convince the patient that the course prescribed 
is best for him or her, or propose another course or courses of treatment that 
the patient finds more palatable but that, despite perhaps being suboptimal, still 
work(s).  In short, we support the kind of therapist-patient dialogue about 
therapy that we will presume takes place in any hospital, community treatment 
center, or doctor’s office to the extent the patient’s mental condition permits.441 
However, if the patient cannot be convinced to accept the prescribed 
treatment, rejecting it and any plausible alternative courses including trial and 
error, the physician should be allowed to initiate treatment over the patient’s 
objection with minimal legal interference.  That is, the only substantive 
criterion that need or should inform the physician’s decision to proceed to treat 
is medical propriety.  Inquiries into the patient’s dangerousness, the 
government’s compelling interest in prosecuting, or any similarly diversionary 
issues should not be required.  Procedurally, in-house medical review of the 
initial treatment decision should suffice to allow the primary physician to go 
ahead.  The purpose after all of each of these commitments, simply stated even 
if not always simple to achieve, is to restore mental health and functioning as 
much and as quickly as possible, whether defined or understood in the civil 
discharge terms of “no longer mentally ill” (and dangerous or gravely 
disabled), recovery of “sanity” (same as civil commitment but with 
dangerousness only), or in the language of restoration to “legal” competency.  
The medical objectives being the same for each of these classes of patients, 
whatever the institutional or non-institutional setting, so is and should be the 
medical treatment and the grounds on which it can be delivered. 
 
 441. The law is allowed to, should, in fact, assume basic medical and institutional realities 
including such that there ordinarily is communication about treatment prospects and plans 
between therapist and patient.  As distinct from caselaw drawn from litigation where worst-case 
evidence is introduced, the statutory or regulatory law ordinarily need not and should not be 
written based on worst-case scenarios.  See our discussion of Rennie v. Klein, supra Part III, 
where we reproduce the administrative regulation—presumptively a codification of practices—
guiding doctors in New Jersey on how to approach patients who resist prescribed treatment.  
Substantively, the regulation, in fact, incorporates the least intrusive and least restrictive 
principle, and its procedural mandates suggest abundant deference to the patient’s preferences via 
the physician’s stated obligation to discuss alternatives with the patient, to try make the patient 
understand, and to encourage voluntary acceptance, with the help of relatives and friends if so 
indicated, before seeking approval from the hospital medical director to proceed over the patient’s 
objections. 
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The only group of patients for which the standards may or perhaps should 
be different is for correctional detainees and prisoners.  Even for them, if ill, 
the treatment is the same as and its purpose identical to that for the foregoing 
groups.  However, because detainees and prisoners are not incarcerated for 
treatment of their mental illness and being so treated is not an expected part of 
their detention or punishment,442 the law appropriately may require proof of 
facts beyond medical need and propriety.  That is, for this class of patients, 
dangerousness is a legitimate second substantive standard to be met before 
unwanted treatment may ensue.  In fact, the standard not only may but should 
incorporate impact on institutional security as the appropriate measure of 
dangerousness, as per Harper.443  Harper provides the procedural standard as 
well.  That is to say, in-house medical review, by an interdisciplinary 
committee, of the treating doctor’s recommendation suffices. 
There neither should nor need be any judicial involvement in processing 
the stated treatment refusals for any of these classes of patients.  Judges cannot 
and should not be the baseline decision makers in any of these institutional or 
non-institutional, post-legal judgment phases of the treatment process.  Forced 
treatment can begin once the medical reviewer has approved the treating 
physician’s recommendation.  Post-deprivation judicial review, after treatment 
has been initiated and limited by the professional judgment rule, is all the law 
should call for at this juncture.444 
 
 442. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 489–90 (1980). 
 443. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215–16 (1990). 
 444. Post-deprivation judicial review should suffice because (1) judges have no expertise in 
medical matters and therefore should not be baseline (first-instance) decision makers and (2) the 
costs in time and treatment foregone, deflection of resources, and institutional bad effects of the 
judiciary’s failing to show proper deference to medical professionals are large. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 1: FOUR COMMON SIDE EFFECTS OF NEW AND OLD ANTIPSYCHOTICS 
 Somnolance EPS Dystonia Akathesia 
 Drug Placebo Drug Placebo Drug Placebo Drug Placebo 
Aripiprazole445 11.0 8.0 6.0 6.0 0.5 0.5 10.0 7.0 
Quetiapine446 15.0 12.0 1.0 7.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 3.0 
Olanzapine447 28.0 15.0 5.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 7.0 2.0 




23.0 9.0 15.0 4.0 5.0 1.1 20.0 6.0 
 
* Expressed as percent of patients experiencing a side-effect. 
 
 445. John M. Kane et al., Efficacy and Safety of Aripiprazole and Haloperidol Versus 
Placebo in Patients With Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective Disorder, 63 J. CLIN. PSYCHIATRY 
763, 763–71 (2002); Steven G. Potkin, Aripiprazole, An Antipsychotic With a Novel Mechanism 
of Action, and Risperidone vs. Placebo in Patients with Schizophrenia and Schizoaffective 
Disorder, 60 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 681, 681–90 (2003). 
 446. Lisa A. Arvanitis, Multiple Fixed Doses of “Seroquel” (Quetiapine) in Patients With 
Acute Exacerbation of Schizophrenia: A Comparison With Haloperidol and Placebo, 42 BIOL. 
PSYCHIATRY 233, 233–46 (1997); Joyce G. Small et al., Quetiapine in Patients With 
Schizophrenia: A High- and Low-Dose Double-Blind Comparison With Placebo, 54 ARCH. GEN. 
PSYCHIATRY 549, 549–57 (1997). 
 447. Charles M. Beasley et al., Olanzapine versus Placebo and Haloperidol: Acute Phase 
Results of the North American Double-Blind Olanzapine Trial, 14 
NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 111, 111–23 (1996). 
 448. Psychopharmacological Drugs Adv. Comm., FDA, Briefing Document for Zeldox 
Capsules (Ziprasidone HCl), at 50–57 (July 19, 2000). 
 449. See the haloperidol and placebo control groups in the studies supra notes 445–48. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
588 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 52:501 
TABLE 2: A COMPARISON OF DRUG EFFICACY IN EFFECT SIZE UNITS OF 
SECOND GENERATION ANTIPSYCHOTICS WITH FIRST GENERATION 
ANTIPSYCHOTICS (LIKE HALOPERIDOL) 
 Davis450 Cochrane450 Geddes450 Leucht451 CATIE-1452 
Comparitor FGA FGA FGA FGA FGA 
Clozapine 0.49 0.38 0.66   
Olanzapine 0.21 0.27 0.22 0.08 0.21 
Risperidone 0.25 0.09 0.16 0.17 -0.04 
Quetiapine -0.01 -0.10 0.03 -0.10 -0.17 
Ziprasidone -0.03    -0.13 
 
* Drug efficacy in effect size units.  A 0.00 would indicate no difference, a + 
number indicates that the second generation drug is more efficacious. 
 
 
 450. Davis et al., supra note 96.  The results from the Cochrane Collaborative Group were 
also summarized in this reference. Since the initial meta-analyses were done, there have been 
approximately seventy-five new controlled clinical trials. In general, the results confirm the 
earlier findings. We have recently performed a meta-analysis on all the trials, the results of which 
will appear in part in a paper in Molecular Psychiatry and in part in other journals. 
 451. Stefan Leucht et al., Amisulpride, An Unusual “Atypical” Antipsychotic: A Meta-
Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 159 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 180, 180–88 (2002). 
 452. Lieberman et al., supra note 91, at 1209–23.  Based on the p-values given in this paper, 
we converted duration of time with good efficacy to the same units as used in the meta-analysis to 
make comparison easier.  We have also compared the CATIE results to similar long-term efficacy 
trials.  See Charles M. Beasley et al., All-Cause Treatment Discontinuation in Schizophrenia 
During Treatment With Olanzapine Relative to Other Antipsychotics: An Integrated Analysis, 27 
J. CLIN. PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 252, 252–58 (2007).  In our opinion, the antipsychotics can be 
ranked from most to lease efficacious as follows: clozapine, olanzapine, risperidone, and 
quetiapine/ziprasidone.  Since these drugs have slight variations in efficacy; substantial variations 
in the type, frequency, and severity of side effects; and since individual patients may respond to a 
given drug quite differently, choice of drug is as much a complex art as a science.  The net result 
of the availability of more drugs and the increased knowledge and skill in using the drugs 
translates into a generalization that at present the drugs can be used with considerably greater 
efficacy and a lesser degree of side effects than they were fifty or even ten years ago. 
